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MEMOIRS

OF

COUNT LALLY.

PREFACE.

IF there is any human inſtitution ſo intrinſically excellent as to require no compariſons to recommend it, it muſt, certainly, be the method of adminiſtring juſtice, both diſtributive and vindictive, in England, where no man's life or liberty, good name or fortune, let his lot be ever ſo low, can be taken from him, but ſolemnly in the face of the whole world, according to laws made before the fact laid to his charge was committed, and by the unanimous verdict of his equals, and equals, who may be ſaid to be of his own chuſing, conſidering the latitude of exception allowed him; men, whoſe very imperfections, as productive of ſympathy, are a ſecurity for his being tenderly treated, whilſt the preſence and authority of ſtated and profeſſed Judges ſufficiently ſecure that free courſe to legiſlative indignation, which the public ſafety indiſpenſably requires.

But, though no compariſons may be requiſite to evince this intrinſic excellence of the Engliſh judicature, the hiſtory of what paſſes in foreign tribunals may be highly uſeful to make us attend to it, ſo as to reconcile us to thoſe government burthens, which, however heavy in themſelves, muſt appear light, when weighed againſt the bleſſings ſecured to us in conſequence of them.

Independent, therefore, of the pleaſure the public may have in peruſing the following Memoirs, as written by, and giving ſome account of, a man, whoſe long and diſtinguiſhed ſervices had gained him the approbation of his Prince, and the eſteem and confidence of a great body of his fellow ſubjects, and, at laſt, recommended him to a command, which brought on him the eyes of all Europe and Aſia, we hope they will prove ſtill more beneficial by throwing ſome light on the treatment he met with at his trial, condemnation, and execution, from the higheſt and reputedly moſt impartial tribunal of a ſtate conſidered, even by many amongſt ourſelves, as the beſt governed of all Europe.

This unfortunate gentleman was the ſon of a Captain in Lord Dillon's regiment, one of thoſe which went over into France upon the capitulation of Limerick, by a French Lady

Lady of diſtinction. As ſoon as born, he was, according to the cuſtom of the French army, entered a ſoldier in his father's company; and, continuing under his tutorage till near fifteen, made a great proficiency in all thoſe accompliſhments, for which the young Nobility of France, when born with a happy genius, and conducted by proper maſters, are generally remarkable. As the ſon of an Officer of diſtinguiſhed merit, he could not fail of gaining an early acquaintance with arms, at the ſame time that his being, by his mother, allied into ſome of the beſt families of France gave him a much better opportunity, than moſt of his Iriſh fellow ſoldiers had, of being early initiated in high and polite life. Theſe advantages, added to that of a handſome perſon, diſtinguiſhed young Lally ſo much, that, by the age of nineteen, he ſaw himſelf at the head of a company in the Iriſh Brigade; an honour, which few of the unhappy adventurers in that brave corps have been able to obtain after as many years conſtant ſervice in the field; but which, however, he ſeemed to be well intitled to by an unqueſtionable courage; an excellent underſtanding; and that martial air, which, even without any extraordinary degree of ſenſe or knowledge, has been often found to have ſuch influence in a Commander.

However well qualified young Lally appeared to be for military command, he was thought equally fitted for civil employment. Accordingly, at an age that moſt young gentlemen, unleſs thoſe of the higheſt birth, would think themſelves honoured by a place in ſome of the inferior departments of the ſtate, he ſaw himſelf ſuddenly promoted to the head of one of the higheſt. At five and twenty, he was ſent by the French Court to negotiate ſome buſineſs at that of Ruſſia, where his dexterity and fidelity gained him the confidence of the French King his maſter, and his wit and addreſs a recommendation from the Czarina herſelf; in conſequence of which he, on his return to France, began to be conſidered as one of the moſt riſing characters at the Court of Verſailles; a judgement, which was ſoon after verified by his being promoted to the command of a regiment, in which ſtation he behaved ſo well in every ſervice, in which the Iriſh Brigade was employed, particularly at the memorable battle of Fontenoy, where it ſuffered ſo much, and at the ſiege of Bergen-op-zoom, as to be juſtly eſteemed one of the beſt ſoldiers in all France.

In the year 1745, when the young Pretender invaded, or rather ſtole into, theſe kingdoms, Monſieur Lally came over into England, under a pretence of laying claim to ſome lands, which

which he affirmed his father had been poſſeſſed of in Ireland, and he himſelf had a legal title to; but, in reality, to act the part of a ſpy for the young Pretender; aſſiſt him with his counſels; and ſtir up the malecontents in the ſouthern parts of Great Britain, by promiſes of money and other aſſiſtance; and in theſe bold attempts he is ſaid to have had ſome ſucceſs, till his dangerous practices were diſcovered and laid open to the Duke of Cumberland, who was not to be amuſed by ſuch idle pretences; and, accordingly, gave orders for his being ſeized. But Lally, who had, it ſeems, notice of the ſtorm, availed himſelf ſo well of ſome ſlight knowledge his late Royal Highneſs the Prince of Wales had of him, that, inſtead of being impriſoned as a ſpy, he was only, through the interpoſition of that generous and humane Prince, ordered to leave the kingdom in four and twenty hours, contrary, it is ſaid, to the Duke of Cumberland's opinion.

Such was Lally's infatuation at this time, that it was with great reluctance he left the kingdom. But he was not long in France, before the young Pretender's affairs began to wear ſo bad an aſpect, that he had reaſon to thank Providence for having ſo early extricated him from them, and thereby prevented his running ſuch lengths, as it would

have been impoſſible for the Britiſh government to overlook.

From this time till his being appointed Lieutenant General, and Commander in Chief, of the French ſettlements in the Eaſt Indies, we know but little of Count Lally, except that he from day to day confirmed the good opinion ſo early conceived of him, and roſe proportionably in the ſervice; without ſacrificing, however, fortune to rank, ſo that he came, at length, to be conſidered as one of the wealthieſt as well as one of the braveſt men in the French army; and, of courſe, we may preſume, the fitteſt perſon to command in a country, where the deſire of making a ſpeedy fortune has often proved more detrimental, than even ignorance itſelf, to European affairs.

For Count Lally's hiſtory from his embarking for the Eaſt Indies to his death, we muſt refer our readers to the following Pieces, written expreſly by himſelf for that purpoſe; to which we have added, chiefly from his trial, ſuch others as were thought propereſt to illuſtrate his civil and military character. We cannot, however, put an end to this Preface, without obſerving how odd it was, that, after behaving towards the Engliſh with uncommon ſeverity, or rather cruelty, he ſhould be accuſed of carrying on a treaſonable correſpondence with

them;

them; and loſe, it is to be preſumed, his life, in conſequence of it. For, though this charge was not proved againſt him, it was made a pretence for refuſing him Council, ſo as greatly to diſable him from refuting the other charges with which it was, for that purpoſe, artfully interwoven. Some of our readers, therefore, may be apt to conſider the tragical end of Count Lally as a judgement; and we ſhall not take upon ourſelves to diſpute their opinion; for it muſt be owned, that many events have been univerſally acknowledged as ſuch, which did not wear more evident marks of a ſuperior interpoſition.

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MEMOIRS

OF

COUNT LALLY.

JOURNAL OF HIS EXPEDITION TO THE EAST INDIES.

IN the month of Auguſt 1756, Count Lally was appointed to command an expedition to the Eaſt Indies, for which the court had deſtined ſix millions of livres in money, ſix battalions, and three men of war, to be joined by what ſhips the Company could fit out for the ſame purpoſe.

The Chevalier de Soupire, Major General, who was to command under him, ſailed from Port l'Orient the 30th of December following, with two millions of livres in money, and two battalions.

On the 20th of February of the year 1757, the Count d'Aché ſet ſail from Breſt with Count Lally himſelf, two millions of livres in money, and two battalions; but, on an accident happening one of his veſſels in clearing the mouth of the harbour, was obliged to put in again, and detained by contrary winds till the 2d of May. The two remaining millions, and two remaining battalions, were to be immediately ſent after him from Port l'Orient.

During this interval, the ſituation of Canada determines the court to take from Count Lally two millions, two battallions, and two men of war; that is, above one third of the forces it had been originally agreed to give him.

Upon this, the Counts Lally and d'Aché write jointly to court, that they would no longer be anſwerable for the ſucceſs of the expedition; and Count d'Aché goes ſo far as to throw up his commiſſion. But they receive poſitive orders to put to ſea again at all events, with a promiſe to Count Lally, that in ſix months the money and forces now withheld ſhould be ſent after him; which, however, they never were.

The Count d'Aché, beſides about ten weeks, which his returning into harbour coſt

coſt him, ſpends twelve months in the paſſage. Thus, the firſt event robs Count Lally of one third of his forces; and the ſecond gives Admiral Stevens, who did not ſail from England till three months after the Count d'Aché ſailed from France, an opportunity of reaching the coaſt of Coromandel two months before him; whence it may be gathered, that, had the Count d'Aché made the beſt of his way for the Indies *, as Admiral Stevens did, he would have got there three months, at leaſt, before him; and even five months and a half, had he continued his voyage, as adviſed by all his officers, on his firſt leaving the harbour of Breſt. Now, two

* To make the beſt of one's way for a place, is not, to ſtop to pick up a little merchant ſhip, not worth 40,000 livres, and loſe two months to keep her by lying by every night; it is not, to put into port for ſix weeks in order to diſpoſe of her cargo, and then load her again; it is not, to loſe ſix weeks in order to avoid the Cape during the Equinox; it is not, to ſteer the longeſt courſe from the Iſle of France to Pondichery, in order to avoid the ſecond Equinox; it is not, to alter one's courſe by night, to get out of ſight of the firſt ſail deſcried in the day time; it is not, to take in all one's ſails, at the appearance of every guſt of wind, in paſſing the line, ſince it is only by the help of thoſe guſts the line can be paſſed. All this, however, has been done. In a word, to make the beſt of one's way for a place, is to endeavour to reach it by the ſhorteſt courſe, and with the greateſt ſpeed; and this is what has not been done.

months, nay one month, gained by the Count d'Aché on Admiral Stevens, would have enabled the former to prevent the junction of the latter with Admiral Pococke, and even rendered him maſter of the Indian ſeas. It would have rendered Count Lally maſter of Fort St. David, Madras, and the whole coaſt of Coromandel; in a word, it would have been ſufficient to enable the French to drive the Engliſh out of Bengal, where they had not eight hundred regular troops. There is not a man, who knows any thing of the Indies, bold enough to doubt it.

The Chevalier de Soupire debarked at Pondichery eight months before Count Lally, and, of courſe, had a ſhorter paſſage by four months. At his landing, the Engliſh could not bring one hundred men into the field, and the Chevalier de Soupire had two thouſand. Madras was ſtill open, as in the time of Monſieur de Bourdonnais; Fort St. David was in ruins, and garriſoned by ſixty invalids; it was the work of three weeks, at moſt, to carry theſe two places. But the Chevalier de Soupire, an utter ſtranger to the method of making war in that country, ſuffered himſelf to be governed by Monſieur de Leyrit, governor of Pondichery for the Company, who kept him all that time inactive, and thereby waſted the money, which the Cheva-

Chevalier had brought with him from Europe.

Six months before the Chevalier's arrival in the Indies, the Engliſh had driven the Company out of all their poſſeſſions in Bengal, the moſt valuable they had in all the Indies; and that through the ſupineneſs of this ſame Monſieur de Leyrit, and in ſpite of the reiterated and moſt preſſing ſollicitations of the council of Chandernagor for a reinforcement of three hundred men, which would have been ſufficient to ſave theſe poſſeſſions.

On the 28th of April 1758, the Count d'Aché ſent on ſhore at Pondichery Count Lally, ſome of the Count's principal officers, and ſome cheſts of money. The day following, as he was preparing to come to an anchor in the road of that place, he was ſurpriſed by the Engliſh ſquadron four leagues to the windward of it. He was worſted in the engagement, and in his retreat loſt a ſhip of ſeventy-four guns, to the leeward of Pondichery.

Count Lally, within three hours after his landing, inveſted Cudaloor, a place five leagues from Pondichery, with 800 men, and was maſter of it the third day. It muſt be allowed, that this ſervice might

have been performed before by the Chevalier de Soupire, with 8000 men. The garriſon then conſiſted of but ten invalids. This place, in the hands of the French, would have awed Fort St. David, and have prevented the reparation of its fortifications, as well as the conſtruction of two exterior works built of ſtone, which greatly retarded Count Lally's operations againſt it

Immediately after this, Count Lally laid ſiege to Fort St. David, and on the 2d of June entered the place, after ſeventeen days open trenches. He then directly turned his arms againſt Devi-cottah, a fort capable of making a vigorous defence; notwithſtanding which, the enemy abandoned it at his approach, leaving ſeventy pieces of cannon behind them. On the 10th of June, Count Lally returned to Pondichery.

The Count d'Aché, who, during the ſiege of Fort St. David, was continually ſending word to Count Lally, that he was afraid of the Engliſh ſquadron's coming every moment to attack him under the cannon of Pondichery, at laſt thought proper to change his poſition, and get ſixty leagues to the windward of that place, nearer to the line; and that the very day Fort St. David ſurrendered,

Upon

Upon this, Count Lally, who was for attacking Madras, aſſembles the council of Pondichery; and the council diſpatch a veſſel after the Count d'Aché with a ſummons to return. The Count d'Aché returns; but declares it impoſſible for him to face the enemy, and favour the march of Count Lally.

Monſieur de Leyrit then ſignifies to Count Lally, that he would not take upon him to ſubſiſt the troops above fifteen days longer; and that he could not think of any reſource but that of marching them into Tanjore, fifty leagues from Pondichery to the ſouth, in order to claim a debt due by the Rajah of that country; upon which it is to be obſerved, that it was ſcarce ſix weeks, ſince the Count d'Aché had brought Monſieur de Leyrit two millions, and that Count Lally's conqueſts had produced him one million, of which ſix hundred thouſand livres accrued from the taking of Fort St. David.

As Count Lally could not pretend to attack Madras, protected by a ſquadron, without the aſſiſtance of another ſquadron to oppoſe to it, and Pondichery could no longer ſubſiſt his troops, he found himſelf under a neceſſity, at the inſtances of Monſieur de Leyrit and Father Lavaur, to go and

look for ſubſiſtence in Tanjore, till the approach of the ſtormy ſeaſon ſhould oblige the two ſquadrons to take ſhelter in ſome diſtant port.

The Rajah of Tanjore having denied the debt claimed by Monſieur de Leyrit, Count Lally, by the advice of a council of war, marched up to his capital; and, in hopes of intimidating him, planted five pieces of cannon againſt it.

Six days after the erection of this battery, the army receives an account, that the Count d'Aché had been again attacked by the Engliſh ſquadron, and again worſted by it, before Karical; that he had thereupon retired to Pondichery, thirty leagues from Karical, the only place by which Count Lally could communicate with Pondichery, and which the enemy kept blocked up.

The Chevalier de Soupire and Monſieur de Leyrit write at the ſame time to Count Lally, that the Engliſh were in march with a body of eight hundred men againſt Pondichery; and that the Chevalier de Soupire, who had but ſix hundred, was preparing to abandon the environs to them. Upon this, Count Lally having called a council of war on the 8th of Auguſt, it was therein decided, that the

the French ſhould evacuate Tanjore on the 10th, in order to protect their own ſettlements; and, in conſequence of this reſolution, the heavy baggage, and the ſick and wounded, were ſent off under a detatchment on the 9th.

The main body of the army was to have begun its march the evening of the day following. But in the morning the Indians made a ſally, which was repulſed by fifty men of the regiment of Lorrain poſted before the gate at which the Indians iſſued. We had a ſoldier wounded in this affair, whereas the enemy loſt between one hundred and one hundred and fifty men. In the mean time fifty Black horſe, commanded by a general of cavalry, penetrated to the tent of Count Lally, which ſtood by itſelf in the middle of the plain, and about a quarter of a league from the army, on pretence of coming over to him. Count Lally, hearing of their approach, ſtarts out of bed, and comes to receive them in his ſhirt and drawers; but the Black general, inſtead of making his ſubmiſſion to the Count, made a ſtroke at him with his ſabre; and, the Count having been fortunate enough to ward it off with a ſtick, was going to give a ſecond, when ſome lucky hand cleaved his head in two. Of the fifty horſe, that followed him, eight and twenty fell at the feet of Count Lally, and the reſt threw

threw themſelves into a pond that lay before his tent. We had but one huſſar wounded, and one Black belonging to the ſtables killed, in this affair, which was over in about half an hour. In the evening, the army ſet out, purſuant to the orders given the day before, and evacuated Tanjore, after raiſing 440,000 livres in it in money, beſides ſubſiſting two months at the expence of the inhabitants.

Count Lally, at whoſe approach to Pondichery the Engliſh thought proper to retreat towards Madras, on his arrival there makes new inſtances to the Count d'Aché not to abandon the coaſt; and, to induce him to ſtay, offers half the army to recruit his ſquadron. But the Count d'Aché, deaf to all his prayers and arguments, ſails for the Madagaſcar Iſlands on the 1ſt of September, the very next day after the Count's arrival, without giving him time to get ready his diſpatches for court. The council of Pondichery proteſt againſt his departure. Thus it appears, that, in this voyage the Count d'Aché did not remain above four months in the Indian ſeas. The Engliſh ſquadron, left miſtreſs of them, after cruiſing two and twenty days before Pondichery, ſailed for Bombay on the coaſt of Malabar.

During this interval of five and twenty days which Count Lally ſpent at Pondichery, he

he found means to carry on a private correſpondence with the commanding officer of twelve hundred Blacks, who garriſoned Arcot; and, the very day the Engliſh ſquadron quitted the coaſt, moved towards that place, which, after making himſelf maſter of four forts that lay in his way, two of them by ſtorm, he took poſſeſſion of in the name of Salabetzingue, reſerving the revenues of it to the Company.

Count Lally had ſent for Meſſieurs de Buſſy and Moracin with the troops under them, one in the Decan, the other at Maſuli-patnam; and communicated to them his deſign upon Madras. But theſe gentlemen agreed amongſt themſelves to bring along with them but the third of their forces; and even on their arrival, applied to him for a reinforcement of one thouſand men, with orders to to return to thoſe they had left behind them; with a view, no doubt, of making war, on their own account, upon the purſes of the Black Princes in their neighbourhood.

Count Lally, who knew no enemies the Company had in India but the Engliſh, refuſed to comply with ſuch unſeaſonable demands; and, from that day forward, theſe gentlemen, far from aſſiſting him, let ſlip no opportunity of traverſing his operations; and had but too good ſucceſs.

Count

Count Lally, on the firſt news of the Engliſh having made a deſcent in the province adjoining that of Maſuli-patnam, orders Monſieur Moracin to return to it. Monſieur Moracin refuſes; ſends him word that he is diſſatisfied with the Company, and is determined to quit their ſervice. Count Lally complains of his diſobedience to Monſieur de Leyrit and the council, directing them, at the ſame time, to order Monſieur Moracin back to his command, and proteſting that he would hold him anſwerable for the conſequences, in caſe he did not return. But Monſieur Moracin perſiſted in his refuſal. Six weeks after this, Monſieur de Conflans was defeated; and five months after his defeat Maſuli-patnam was ſurpriſed.

Count Lally, after a ſtay of five days at Arcot, and conſtantly refuſing the incredible offers made him by Monſieur de Buſſy; in a word, 460,000 livres payable in three hours, to be ſent back with a body of troops into the Decan; returns to Pondichery. Monſieur de Buſſy, on his ſide, finding that he could not derive from the ſacrificing of this ſum any preſent increaſe to his fortune in the Indies (for with this body of troops he could have raiſed four, five, nay, perhaps, ten millions of livres) thought proper to employ it in ſecuring to himſelf protectors in Europe. He lends

lends one hundred thouſand crowns of it to the Count d'Eſtaing, on his eſtate, at three per cent. He then lends, and even gives away, more of it to ſome officers returning to Europe. Some of the principal of theſe officers refuſed his offers; in particular, the Chevalier de Crillon, to whom he offered two thouſand Louis d'ors, telling him, that he did not know what to do with them. All this while the army was without pay, though this ſame Monſieur de Buſſy had, on his arrival, given Count Lally to underſtand, that he was come with 240,000 livres for the ſervice of the Company; provided he, Count Lally, would be his ſecurity for the money, as he did not chuſe to have any dealings at all with that Body.

Count Lally, on his return to Pondichery, calls a mixed council; and moves, that the forces ſhould avail themſelves of the abſence of the Engliſh ſquadron to attack Madras. Monſieur de Leyrit is the only perſon to oppoſe this motion, alledging, that he had not wherewith to pay, or even ſubſiſt, the army. For this very reaſon, the reſt of the members approve it; and four or five of them, with the Count d'Eſtaing at their head, offers to contribute 80,000 livres in plate, towards the attempt. Monſieur de Buſſy, who,

ſix

ſix days before, did not know what to do with 100,000 crowns, offers not a ſingle farthing, whilſt Count Lally furniſhes 144,000 livres, which, five months before, on his landing at Pondichery, he had lodged in the Treaſury.

The council of Pondichery deprive Monſieur de Leyrit of the receiverſhip of the Company's land rents; and the farmers ſubſtituted to him engage to advance, in the courſe of three months, 500,000 rupees to pay the army. But they did not make good their engagements.

Thus, Count Lally had no other reſource, but the weak one abovementioned, for putting in motion an army then conſiſting of 2700 foot, 300 horſe, and about 5000 Blacks; the monthly expence of which amounted to a million of livres. It ſhould, beſides, be remembered, that credit is a thing unknown in the Indies; and that nothing is more common than for the Blacks to paſs, without any ceremony, from an army where they are not paid, to another where they expect better treatment.

Count Lally arrives in the plain of Madras on the 12th of December 1758; and, after ſome ſkirmiſhes with the enemy, pitches his

his camp, and ſits down before it, on the 13th.

The 14th before day break, he orders the Black Town to be attacked by the Chevalier de Crillon, at the head of his regiment, who carries it with little loſs. Count Lally, who, in the mean time, was in march to ſupport him, takes poſt in this Black Town at ſeven in the morning.

About nine, between eight and nine hundred picked men of the garriſon make a ſally, and attack the poſt occupied by the regiment of Lorrain, but are repulſed and routed; and, if Monſieur de Buſſy had not hindered the Chevalier de Crillon from taking poſſeſſion, with the regiment of Lally, of a little bridge, by which alone the enemy could get back to the place, it muſt have ſurrendered in eight days. The plunder of the Black City, which contained eighty thouſand inhabitants, was by the enemy themſelves made to amount to between five and ſix millions; and did not a little contribute to retard the operations of the ſiege.

By the time the French arrived before Madras, the military cheſt was reduced to 4000 livres, and the farmers of the Company's land rents had failed in their engagements.

ments. An Armenian offers to lend the cheſt 24,000 livres, and Count Lally becomes perſonally bound for it.

Monſieur de Buſſy had in his retinue miniſters from all the Black Lords in the country about Madras. Count Lally will not take upon him to gueſs the uſe he made of them. Monſieur de Buſſy having acquainted Count Lally, that one of theſe Black Lords offered for a ſafeguard 18,000 livres, 12,000 for Count Lally, and 6,000 for himſelf, Count Lally thought proper to agree to it, requeſting Monſieur de Buſſy to pay the whole to the Treaſurer. But Monſieur de Buſſy contented himſelf with paying the 12,000 livres intended for Count Lally, and thought proper to keep the remainder.

Count Lally has ſince diſcovered, that this Black Lord had ſent 24,000 livres to Monſieur de Buſſy. Monſieur de Buſſy muſt have conſidered perquiſites of this kind as very lawful, ſince he made no ſcruple of giving it under his hand.

Some days after, Monſieur de Buſſy ſent Count Lally eleven Pancartes in the Perſian language to ſign, with a letter to acquaint him, that the object of them was to procure proviſions for the army. Count Lally, who,

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at Monſieur de Buſſy's requeſt, had already put his hand to a great number of theſe Pancartes, ſeeing that he never received any anſwer to them, and that there did not arrive a grain of rice the more at the army, had the curioſity to get two of them tranſlated; when he found them to be no other than exemptions from the tribute, which the Black Lords they were to be ſent to owed the Maſter of Arcot. Count Lally, one may ſuppoſe, did not ſign them; but then he refuſed returning them to Monſieur de Buſſy.

It was, therefore, with a fund not exceeding 40,000 livres that Count Lally formed a park of artillery, erected a forge, and the day but one after, the 16th, a battery of cannon and mortars; with which, however, all he could propoſe was to ruin the place, and then return to Arcot.

Commodore de Leguille was by this time arrived at the Iſland of Mauritius, with four men of war and three millions of livres deſtined for Pondichery; but, juſt as he was about to leave that iſland, the Count d'Aché unfortunately arrived there, and hindered him from proceeding.

The Count d'Aché could not but know, that the Engliſh ſquadron, which had kept the ſea for four years, muſt ſtand greatly in need of reſt and repairs. He had himſelf, at his leaving the coaſt of Coromandel, written to Count Lally, that he had diſabled this ſquadron from doing any thing during the whole ſeaſon; and, indeed, had he thought otherwiſe, it would have been highly criminal in him to abandon Pondichery. He muſt, therefore, be ſenſible, that Monſieur de Leguille, with his four ſhips, might command the whole coaſt of Coromandel, during ſix months at leaſt, till the change of the monſoon. In fact, Monſieur de Leguille might have hindered Madras from being daily victualled; might have hindered ſix ſhips of the Engliſh Company from landing ſix hundred men at Madras; might have attacked Madras jointly with Count Lally. In a word, Madras might have been taken; and three months ſtill gained upon the Engliſh ſquadron, to recover what had been loſt in Bengal.

Where is the neceſſity of looking out for any other cauſes of the loſs of Pondichery, and the whole Indies? Why oppoſe to facts a confuſed heap of lies, thrown out at random by witneſſes combined againſt Count Lally,

Lally, concerning his manner, good or bad, of attacking Madras? Nay, what would he have done with Madras, had he taken it, as he had no ſquadron to keep it, or even ſecure him time to demoliſh it? Could he have hindered the Engliſh ſquadron from appearing two months after on the coaſt, and five months before the Count d'Aché? Could he have hindered this ſquadron from beating that of Count d'Aché, on its firſt appearance; and forcing it, in leſs than four and twenty hours, to fly the Indian ſeas, and return to the Madagaſcar Iſlands? To ſay he could, would be raiſing the ſtandard of impoſition, and ſaying in plain terms; "We love falſhood; truth is odious to us."

The Count d'Aché, beſides detaining Monſieur de Leguille, took upon him to ſend to Pondichery but a million of his money, and that by a little frigate, which came to anchor before that place the 21ſt of December 1758. Conſequently, Monſieur de Leguille might have reached Madras before the ſiege of it was begun. Ought not Count Lally be diſpenſed from alledging any more particulars in his defence?

On the arrival of this million of livres, Count Lally reſolves to beſiege Madras in

form; pays the European and Black troops half a month's pay, that remained due to them for the month of November; and opens the trenches the 6th of January 1759.

Count Lally attacked Madras with 2700 Europeans. As to the Blacks, they go for nothing at ſieges in the Indies. Beſides, the Engliſh had 5000 Blacks, headed by 200 Europeans, who were maſters of the open country, and ſufficient to keep in play the Blacks under Count Lally.

Madras was garriſoned by 5000 men, of which 1600 were regular troops; 400 ſervants of the Company, or inhabitants and invalids fit for ſervice; and 3000 ſepoys, allowed, behind a wall, equal to Europeans. Madras in Europe would paſs for a ſecond-rate fortification. It had, beſides, a free communication with the ſea, and was kept conſtantly ſupplied with proviſions by the Dutch.

The Engliſh army, which ſtill kept the field, made four attempts to raiſe the ſiege, but was as often repulſed with loſs; and after the laſt repulſe never appeared again.

In ſpite of the unſkilfulneſs of Monſieur Dure, who commanded the artillery without knowing any thing of the matter, Count Lally found means to make a breach; and then, in ſpite of the intrigues of this ſame Monſieur Dure, ſupported by ſome of the principal officers, to diſguſt and diſhearten the ſoldiers, made all the neceſſary diſpoſitions for ſtorming the place, when ſix Engliſh veſſels, with refreſhments and ſix hundred men of Draper's regiment, came to an anchor in the road of it, and determined Count Lally to march back to Arcot with an army, that had received no pay for ſix weeks; had but four days proviſion left; had but ten tuns of powder itſelf; and had left the garriſon of Pondichery but fifteen to defend themſelves with.

The arrears for the month of November, the preſent pay for December, with the extraordinary expences attending the ſiege, had, as one may eaſily gueſs, exhauſted more than the million lately arrived from the Madagaſcar Iſlands. The officers had nothing left for their ſubſiſtence but the common allowance of rice and meat; and this, too, they were obliged to ſhare with the ſoldiers. The European cavalry threatened openly, in caſe they were not paid, to go over to the enemy, ſo that

Count Lally, in his return to Arcot, found himſelf obliged to make a collection, at a minute's warning, of 1500 rupees, or 3600 livres, to appeaſe them.

Count Lally, on his arrival at Arcot, gives Monſieur de Leyrit, and the council of Pondichery, an account of the great extremities, to which his army was reduced. They, in anſwer, after deliberating upon his letter, acquaint him, that they are truly ſenſible of the wretchedneſs of his ſituation; that he muſt not, however, depend upon any kind of aſſiſtance from them; but muſt find ſubſiſtence ſword in hand, in the country he had conquered, the lands of the Company being entirely exhauſted.

Count Lally puts his army into quarters of cantonment; and, certainly, after a march of one hundred and fifty leagues, three ſieges, and eight battles, during an uninterrupted campaign of ten months, it muſt be allowed to have wanted ſome repoſe. This done, he makes over the command of it to the Chevalier de Soupire, and ſets out for Pondichery.

Six weeks after the raiſing of the ſiege of Madras, the Engliſh, who had been already reinforced by ſix hundred men, are recruited by ſix hundred more from Europe.

Upon

Upon this they take the field, and march againſt the Chevalier de Soupire, who abandons the poſt of Conjeveram to them, with all the conqueſts made by Count Lally on the left banks of the Paliar. By this means the dependencies of Arcot, from which alone the army could expect ſubſiſtence, are reduced to two paraganas or manors on the right banks.

The Engliſh ſquadron was likewiſe arrived, though not a word could be heard of that of the Count d'Aché. After this unfortunate expedition, the Chevalier de Soupire returned to Pondichery, and has not ſerved ſince.

At this very juncture, Count Lally is ſeized by a diſorder, which made it neceſſary to keep removing him continually from one part of the country to another, though with little hopes, for five months together, of his getting the better of it. But, in ſpite of all his pains and all his weakneſs, he forms a ſcheme for taking the fort of Thiagar to the ſouth of Pondichery, which was looked upon as impregnable; and is fortunate enough to ſucceed in the enterpriſe.

All this time, though he could not pay the ſoldiers, he contrived to find them ſubſiſtence. The officers, obliged to live upon credit, had almoſt all of them flocked to Pondichery;

and, indeed, it would have been unreaſonable to inſiſt on their remaining with their reſpective corps.

Part of the ſoldiers having mutinied, and deſerted their colours to go over to the enemy, the officers purſue them; and, coming up with them within three leagues of the enemies quarters, have the good fortune to prevail on them to return to their own. The farmers pretended that they were in advance with regard to Monſieur de Leyrit, and refuſed paying a farthing towards an allowance of half pay to the ſoldiers, with which they were prevailed upon to be ſatisfied.

In this extremity, Count Lally, unable to make the gentlemen of the council enter into the neceſſities of the troops, takes it into his head to profit by the frauds committed by their dobachies, or valets de chambre; and, with this view, impoſes a fine of 312,000 livres on three of them, who uſed to diſpoſe amongſt themſelves of all the rents of the Company in the receipt of Monſieur de Leyrit; and the pooreſt of whom was worth above a million of livres in ready money. We may judge of the maſters by the men. One of them belonged to Monſieur de Leyrit. This fine, which Count Lally threatened to double in caſe of delay, is paid into the treaſury within five

five days, and ſerves to keep the troops within bounds till the arrival of the ſquadron.

Count d'Aché, at length, after an abſence of thirteen months, arrives in ſight of Pondichery the 17th of September 1759, after a third battle on his appearing on the coaſt, and in which he was worſted as uſual.

On his coming to anchor in the road, that very ſame day, the 17th of September, he writes to Count Lally, that he was willing to let him have ſome money that was on board his ſquadron, and likewiſe ſome men; but that was all; and that, the day following, he ſhould ſet ſail again for the Madagaſcar Iſlands, concerned that he could not ſo much as have an interview with him.

Now this ſum, which the Count d'Aché condeſcended to let Count Lally have, conſiſted of four hundred and ſome odd thouſand livres in piaſtres, and about as much more in diamonds, the produce of an Engliſh prize, and which, happily, the Engliſh bought three months after at invoice price; this ſum was in part payment of the two millions ſtopt by him the year before at the Madagaſcar Iſlands; one of which would have then enabled Count Lally to take Madras.

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The enemy was then in full march to attack the army, under the walls of Vandiwaſh, commanded by a Captain of Count Lally's regiment. Meſſieurs Landeviſiau, de Buſſy, Dure, and Fumel, thought proper to wait the event in a whole ſkin at Pondichery. Some ſubaltern officers repaired to the army, with the Intendant at their head, who was made priſoner in the action.

This unexpected meſſage from the Count d'Aché throws the whole colony into the utmoſt conſternation. Count Lally, who was not as yet able to crawl, diſpatches on board him all his principal officers, and even the Chaplain of his own regiment, in whoſe holineſs the Count d'Aché placed a ſingular confidence, to engage him to ſuſpend the execution of ſo fatal a reſolution. But nothing can move him. Monſieur de Leyrit calls a council, and father Lavour draws up in it a very pathetic and forcible letter, which they immediately ſign and ſend to him. In fine, on his refuſing to comply with their demand, Monſieur de Leyrit again aſſembles the council, and with them the whole nation, who ſign an unanimous proteſt againſt the ſudden departure of the Count d'Aché, *rendering him alone anſwerable for the loſs of Pondichery, and threatening to reclaim the King's juſtice againſt him.*

The

The Count d'Aché had already ſet ſail; but, the winds and currents having driven him to the northward, the proteſt overtook him at ſea. Upon this, he returned to Pondichery, ſpent ſeven days there, and then again ſet ſail for the Madagaſcar Iſlands, promiſing to be back again early the next year. But from that day to the ſurrender of Pondichery, ſixteen months after, they never heard a tittle of him.

But, another very ſtrange, and almoſt incredible, circumſtance in the departure of the Count d'Aché is, that, being informed by Count Lally, whilſt he was preparing to put to ſea, that the army had juſt obtained a compleat victory, and requeſted to ſuſpend his departure for the Madagaſcar Iſlands, that he might at leaſt be able to carry the particulars of it there, and from thence forward them to Europe, he ſcarce condeſcended to return Count Lally his compliments, but went on with his preparations, and put to ſea, without expreſſing the leaſt curioſity concerning an event, which, were it not for this ſudden deſertion of the ſquadron, would have made all the Princes of the country declare in our favour. It looks, in a word, as if, during Count Lally's ſtay in the Indies, he, the Count d'Aché, and Monſieur

Monſieur de Leyrit, ſerved three different maſters. Unhappily, Count Lally could do nothing without the two others; he could do nothing without money to pay his troops, and ſhips to favour their operations.

Upon this the council of Pondichery diſpatch one of the Company's under merchants into Europe to inform the Governors, that, without ſpeedy ſuccours, Pondichery muſt fall into the hands of the Engliſh. And here it is to be remembered, that, a month before Count Lally's arrival in the Indies, this ſame council had written to theſe Governors, that, let them ſend what veſſels or troops they would, it would be all to no purpoſe, unleſs they ſent with them ten millions of livres, at leaſt, in ſpecie. The ſquadron they ſent came, notwithſtanding, without this ſum, and afterwards abandoned the Indies. Yet now people are ſurpriſed, that Count Lally, without money or ſhips, ſhould not be able, alone, to defend that place, but for the ſpace of three years. This expectation is ſurely unjuſt to the laſt degree.

The Count d'Aché had brought Count Lally diſpatches from the Court and the Company, enjoining him to examine the adminiſtration

adminiſtration of the council of Pondichery; and, above all things, to put a ſtop to the bad uſe the Governors made of their authority. Theſe injunctions to Count Lally were accompanied by the ſevereſt reprimands and threats, on the part of the Company, againſt the council itſelf.

From the day theſe reprimands and threats reached the council, which hitherto had lived in the greateſt harmony with Count Lally, and had been conſtantly making repreſentations and exhibiting complaints to him againſt the adminiſtration of Monſieur de Leyrit, they abandoned Count Lally to join Monſieur de Leyrit, and made a common cauſe with the latter againſt the former.

The Court had juſt recalled all the principal officers of the army. Monſieur de Buſſy was named to the ſupreme command, in caſe of the death or ſickneſs of Count Lally. This is a circumſtance we muſt not loſe ſight of.

Count Lally, who at this juncture was recovering his ſtrength, daily expected the arrival of Baſſaletzingue, brother of Salabetzingue, ſovereign of all the country, with a body of 12,000 men. This Prince

was

was already come one hundred leagues to join the Count, and was within five and thirty leagues of his army, when he required of the Count to ſend an officer of diſtinction with a detachment of Europeans to meet him, and facilitate their junction. Count Lally choſe Monſieur de Buſſy for this purpoſe.

Monſieur de Buſſy, inſtead of remaining, according to orders, but four and twenty hours, at the army, where he was to call for his detachment, does not leave it till the fifth day. He again ſtops eight days at another place but ten leagues from the army. At length, he joins Baſſaletzingue; but, by a fatality which Count Lally cannot as yet account for, returns without that Prince, the junction of whom, or even a diverſion made by him, would have obliged the enemy to fall back upon Madras. Inſtead of him. Monſieur de Buſſy brings Count Lally a Black Chief, who had been formerly his Secretary, at the head of 1800 Blacks, who had ſerved under him in the Decan, and now demanded with menaces a ſum of about two millions of livres, which Monſieur de Buſſy inſiſted was juſtly due to them; at the ſame time, requeſting Count Lally, though he knew he could not command two thouſand ſols, to let them

have

have one million on account, and engage the Company for the other.

The day but one after Monſieur de Buſſy's departure from the army to go and meet Baſſaletzingue, all the ſoldiers of that army take to their arms, deſert their colours, ſeize on the field artillery, chuſe themſelves commanders from amongſt their ſerjeants, and go and encamp a league from their old quarters on the road to the enemy.

Monſieur de Leyrit owed the ſoldiers ten months half pay; and ſome perſons had found means to inſtill into them, that Count Lally had, five days before, received their pay from the Count d'Aché; that he was freighting a veſſel to carry with him into Europe the money and the diamonds which the Count d'Aché had put into his hands; and that he would be replaced by a Monſieur de Godeheu, who would pay the ſcore due to them with a wet finger. It is well known, with what rapidity reports of this kind generally take with ſoldiers. At the ſame time, there was diſperſed amongſt them an account of the produce of the taxes and fines, which Count Lally had levied on the European and Black inhabitants of Pondichery. In a word, the ſoldiers were made as well acquainted with the amount of the revenues of the colony as

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the council of Pondichery themſelves could wiſh to be; and ſignified it to Count Lally, threatening him at the ſame time with the moſt terrible conſequences, if he did not do them immediate juſtice.

But it was Monſieur de Leyrit, who had received the money brought by the Count d'Aché, which they were now converting at the mint into the currency of the country. The ſame Monſieur de Leyrit had ſtill in his hands the box of diamonds brought by the ſame commander. He knew, that Count Lally, then at death's door, had no thoughts of freighting a veſſel to carry him to Europe. All Count Lally can add is, that Monſieur de Leyrit and the council having promiſed him, on the receipt of this ſtrange piece of news, to write to the army to undeceive the ſoldiers neglected it notwithſtanding; that they did not contribute a ſingle penny to the collection made by Count Lally in the town of Pondichery, to appeaſe the ſoldiers till their pay could be got ready at the mint, whereas he contributed all the money he had left, amounting to 50,000 livres; that theſe ſoldiers, after receiving two thirds of what was due to them, and allowing twenty days for the payment of the remainder, did not conſent, after five days

days of negotiation, to return to their colours, but on condition of receiving an amneſty from the council, which this council was not aſhamed nor afraid to grant them. We ſhall not here enter into Monſieur de Buſſy's conduct, who, inſtead of marching directly to join Baſſaletzingue, thought proper to wait and ſee the iſſue of this mutiny before he ſet out. The whole Indies know what happened ten years before, when Monſieur d'Auteuil commanded there, and all his officers deſerted him in ſight of the enemy. The fact, in itſelf, deſerves the moſt ſerious attention.

If all theſe intrigues; if all the enormities which followed them, and which ſhall be developed in a ſummary way; if an attempt upon the life of Count Lally, and that of the Intendant of the army, appear mere accidents, and the ſimple effects of chance; it is to no purpoſe for Count Lally to ſay a word more in his defence. But his judges will liſten to him, becauſe they are his judges.

Count Lally, in expectation of Baſſaletzingue's arrival, had aſſembled his army under Arcot; and had detatched from it the battalion of the Indies, which already began to foment a ſecond revolt on account of the de-

lay made in paying the third ſtill due to the ſoldiers, for want of a purchaſer for the diamonds. But, as there did not remain a ſingle horſeman in the army, and Monſieur de Buſſy's abſence, which ſhould have been but eight or ten days at moſt, turned out two and forty; the Engliſh, taking advantage of the impoſſibility Count Lally was under of taking the field without a body of horſe, made themſelves maſters of Vandiwaſh, without its being in his power to give the garriſon any aſſiſtance.

As ſoon as Count Lally heard that Baſſaletzingue was not coming, he made what haſte he could, in concert with Monſieur de Leyrit, to conclude a treaty with a Moratto Chief for a body of 2000 horſe; and with this body, joined by another of 1800 Blacks belonging to Monſieur de Buſſy, and which went by the name of Buſſy's army, he reſolved to keep the field, and encamped oppoſite to the Engliſh, from which nothing ſeparated him but the ſandy bed of the Paliar, then without water.

Count Lally and Monſieur de Buſſy were in Arcot, and lodged in the ſame houſe. Father Lavaur had placed a Jeſuit, called Saint-Eſtevan, with Monſieur de Buſſy, in quality of his ſecretary; and Monſieur de

Buſſy

Buſſy made this Father ſleep in the ſame room with him.

This wretch forms a ſcheme for making the army mutiny a ſecond time againſt Count Lally. At the end of eight days, he quits Monſieur de Buſſy's apartment to take up his quarters in the center of the regiment of Lorrain, which lay encamped a quarter of a league from Arcot, on pretence of preaching a miſſion there; and he, in fact, preaches one. But all his text was the ſucceſs and riches that would follow the army, did Monſieur de Buſſy command it in chief, as he was a man of God, and all in God; theſe were his common expreſſions. He reproached Count Lally with not attacking the Engliſh, which Monſieur de Buſſy, he added, would have routed long ago, had he commanded them in chief. He piouſly inſinuated to the ſoldiers, that Count Lally muſt have an underſtanding with the Engliſh, ſince he had not as yet attacked them.

Monſieur de Buſſy was, at the ſame time, conſtantly writing from his apartment to Count Lally, who occupied that immediately over it, that he would not have him by any means riſk a battle.

Father Saint-Eſtevan, finding that his miſſion was not attended with the ſudden converſions he expected, takes into his head to write to the officer who commanded in Arcot, and tells him, that he was loth to inform Count Lally of the diſcourſes he had heard in the army to his prejudice; that the beſt name the ſoldiers gave him was that of *Traitor*; that he was even under apprehenſions for his life, but that it was not proper he himſelf (Father Saint-Eſtevan) ſhould be the perſon to acquaint him with it; he concluded by adviſing Count Lally to throw up the command of an army ſo much indiſpoſed againſt him.

The Commandant of Arcot ſends this letter to Count Lally, whom the officers of the regiment of Lorrain had already made acquainted with the underhand operations of this Monk. Count Lally, however, contents himſelf with ordering him back immediately to his convent at Pondichery, where he took it for granted he muſt be already arrived, when, the third day after, part of the army, being, on a march, obliged to take a ſhort cut croſs the country, find him alone in conference with Monſieur de Buſſy in a pagoda that ſtood by itſelf in the middle of the fields. This ſecond fault

Count

Count Lally is likewiſe pleaſed to overlook Yet this Monk, when arrived at Pondichery. endeavours to propagate from the pulpit the morals he found himſelf unable to introduce in the army, all the while writing to Count Lally, that he could not conceive by what means he had incurred his diſpleaſure, unleſs by ſometimes ſaying, but merely by way of converſation, that it were to be wiſhed, he had remained at Pondichery, and from thence iſſued his orders to the army. This confeſſion is rather indiſcreet, and might be made a proof, were not Count Lally provided with others in writing.

Count Lally, though in preſence of the Engliſh, contrives to gain a march upon them, and make himſelf maſter of the magazines that lay behind them; and, having by this means diſabled them from keeping the field for ſome days, he falls back ſuddenly upon Vandiwaſh; carries the Black Town ſword in hand; and charges Monſieur Dure with the attack of the fort, under cover of the army commanded by himſelf.

Two months before this, the Engliſh had contented themſelves with firing from behind a muzzle high parapet, without any embrazures upon this fort with three pieces of cannon; and yet made themſelves maſters of it in ſix

and thirty hours. Monſieur Dure can make nothing of it in ſeven days; and thereby gives the Engliſh, twice ſtronger in Europeans than Count Lally, time to repair their loſſes, and march to the aſſiſtance of the garriſon.

Count Lally, obliged to fall back upon Pondichery, or riſk a battle, reſolves upon the latter. He ſets out to meet the Engliſh, and attacks them in their march; but is repulſed and beat, the 22d of January 1760. The loſs of men, however, was pretty equal on both ſides. Monſieur de Buſſy was the only priſoner made by the Engliſh. His Black army refuſed to fight; and the ſucceſs of the battle would have been doubtful, if Count Lally's European cavalry had not refuſed to follow him to the charge of the enemy's left wing, which began to give way. Count Lally contented himſelf with ſuſpending one of the commanders, and referring the puniſhment of the other to the council of Pondichery, which broke him.

It is more than probable, that, had the Engliſh immediately fallen on Pondichery, they would have carried that place in eight days. There was not a ſingle grain of rice in it. All the letters, intreaties, orders, and menaces, which for two years paſt Count Lally had been uſing with Monſieur de Leyrit, had

not

not ſucceſs enough to engage him to eſtabliſh a ſingle magazine there. Nevertheleſs, this was his principal duty, he being the only perſon the farmers accounted with for the crops, and incomes of the ſettlement, the Intendant himſelf being ſubordinate to him in theſe matters.

Count Lally, reduced to the defending, as long as he could, the approaches to Pondichery, encamped with his army at the diſtance of four leagues from it, in the way by which the Engliſh muſt march to attack it, in order to cover the tranſportation of grain to it from the ſouth. It was now harveſt. In the mean time the Engliſh were attacking a little fort ſeven leagues from Pondichery, where an officer of Count Lally's regiment, who commanded there, ſtopt them nine days.

The European cavalry, to whom a month's pay was due, encouraged by the remembrance of what had happened three months before at Vandiwaſh, have recourſe to the ſame expedient to obtain ſatisfaction. They ſound to horſe; file off by the road leading to the enemy, all to one company commanded by a gentleman called des Gras, whom the Chevalier de la Fare had brought with him from Europe, and who was not a

man to connive at practices of this kind ſo common in the Indies; for it is to be obſerved, that it is the Captains who, in that country, have the handling of the troopers pay, and engage at an exorbitant price for the ſubſiſtence of their horſes, for which, in time of peace, as well as war, they are allowed no leſs than 100 livres a month per horſe. A detachment runs after the deſerters; overtakes them at three leagues from the camp; and brings them all back, except ſeventeen, who, with their arms and horſes, go over to the enemy.

A month after this battle, on the 24th of February, Admiral Corniſh appears on the coaſt with four ſhips of the line from Europe, and on the 28th comes to an anchor in the road of Madras. On the 17th of March he appears with his ſquadron in the road of Pondichery.

In the mean time, the Engliſh army was drawing nearer and nearer to Pondichery Count Lally, to be at hand to protect it againſt any attempts of the ſquadron, and at the ſame time obſtruct the march of the army, had ſucceſſively fallen back from place to place, and now occupied an advantageous poſt in the way of the Engliſh to Pondichery, at two leagues diſtance from it.

On

On the appearance of Admiral Corniſh's ſquadron, Count Lally, who daily expected Count d'Aché's, according to the promiſe that commander had given him, on his ſailing for the Madagaſcar Iſlands the year before, fearing leſt the Engliſh ſquadron ſhould, in concert with the Engliſh army, make ſome attempt upon the place, before the arrival of the French ſquadron, takes it into his head to draw up on the beach, in ſight of the former, all the Europeans of the ſettlement, who were moſt of them by this time in military uniforms. To thoſe, who were not, and had not wherewith to purchaſe them, he orders cloth to be diſtributed for that purpoſe; he then proclaims a general review to be made under the walls on the ſea ſide, on the 20th of March, by all the European inhabitants without diſtinction, the gentlemen of the council, and the clergy, only excepted.

As Count Lally was preparing to repair to the review, in company with Monſieur de Leyrit, he ſees two hundred and fifty of the Company's inferior ſervants, all in arms, enter the court before his apartment in a tumultuous manner, in order to let him know, that it was no part of their duty to paſs in review, or go beyond the walls of the place; that all the military ſervice they were bound to was that of defending the caſtle, in which the archives

archives of the Company were kept; tha they knew no ſuperior in the Indies but Mon ſieur de Leyrit; that if he, Count Lally, ha a mind to ſee them, he might come down int the court; that, in a word, they would no obey, and would not repair to the place o rendezvous.

When this happened, there was not a ſingl ſoldier within the walls. But Count Lally im- mediately diſpatched one of his Aid de Camp for a company of grenadiers belonging to th regiment of Lorrain; and, to gain time, ſen Monſieur de Leyrit down into the court, to ha- rangue to the mutineers. Monſieur de Leyrit, who pretends to know nothing of this ſcheme, which had been concerted the evening before, orders them to obey, and offers to march on foot, at their head, to the place of rendez- vous. But all he ſays ſignifies nothing. The Lorrain grenadiers arriving in the mean time; Count Lally orders the Company's ſervants to be diſarmed, and ſends them all home. The day following, he baniſhes two of the moſt ſeditious to places twelve leagues from Pondichery, and to a place at four leagues diſtance Monſieur la Selle, a gen- tleman of the council, who, though the laſt of that body, had taken upon him to be the mouth of theſe mutineers.

From

From this time, Pondichery, without men, without money, without ſhips, and even without proviſions, might be given up for loſt. Its council had pulled off the maſk, and thought of nothing but how to ward off the imputation of mal-adminiſtration and want of good will, of which they were afraid Count Lally might accuſe them to their maſters, by throwing it all upon himſelf. They ſpent their whole time in nocturnal aſſemblies, and in projecting memorials to the Court. Monſieur Courtin, one of the heads of this cabal, glories, in his depoſition, that, from the month of May, he never ceaſed importuning Monſieur de Leyrit to ſet about a memorial againſt Count Lally. One Dumont, Monſieur de Leyrit's agent at Nega-patnam, wrote to him to be reconciled to the council, and draw up a joint memorial with them, which he would take care to forward to Europe. In a word, they deliberated in one of theſe aſſemblies, whether a ſcurrilous letter ſhould not be written by the council to Count Lally, to let him know, in expreſs terms, that he might expect *the moſt fatal* conſequences, if he continued to give Monſieur de Leyrit any more uneaſineſs.

But Monſieur Courtin carries his candour ſtill farther, in his depoſition againſt Count Lally. He therein expreſsly declares, that the

the Count placed an entire confidence in him; that he frequently ſpent whole days with him; and that in thoſe moments, in which Count Lally, giving way to the overflowings of his heart, uſed to conjure him, with tears in his eyes, to aſſiſt him, and intereſt himſelf in the ſtate of the expiring Pondichery, he uſed at the ſame time to make him acquainted with the grounds of his diſguſt at Monſieur de Leyrit's behaviour; and he adds in his depoſition, *that, as Count Lally had not required ſecrecy of him, with regard to what he thus confidentially ſaid to him,* he made it his regular practice, on leaving Count Lally's apartment, to wait upon Monſieur de Leyrit, and repeat to him, word by word, what he had heard from Count Lally's mouth; recommending to him, at the ſame time, to draw up a memorial againſt Count Lally. This fact is inconteſtible. Is it poſſible for a man to acknowledge himſelf in clearer and more expreſs terms the greateſt ſcoundrel living? Yet this Monſieur Courtin was conſtantly trumpeting himſelf as the honeſteſt member of the council of Pondichery. He has even dared to ſay at his confrontation, that he thought a difference ſhould be made between him and his fellow counſellors.

It is true, that Monſieur Moracin, convicted of perjury at his confrontation, to no leſs than four

four different facts, did not ſhew himſelf a man of ſeverer morals than Monſieur Courtin, when he wrote to Count Lally, that a man might have very little honeſty without being a knave.

Is it any way ſurpriſing, that Count Lally, having to deal with men of this kidney, ſhould have met with contradiction and oppoſition to all the meaſures he was for taking to prevent, or at leaſt retard, the fall of Pondichery?

While the Engliſh army was employed in maſtering the little poſts, ſtill held by the French, to the north of Pondichery, Admiral Corniſh's ſquadron attacked Karical to the ſouth, which was now defended by the ſame officer of the Company's, who had given up Chandernagor. Monſieur de Leyrit had obliged Count Lally to take the command of this place from an officer of the King's troops, and give it to this officer of the Company's, in order, he ſaid, to avoid diſputes with the counſellor who preſided there. But this officer of the Company's did not ſo much as wait for the enemy's bringing their cannon before it. Immediately on their ſending him a few bombs, he delivered up the place; a place wanting for nothing, and the only one fortified in the manner of Europe,

Europe, that the Company had in the Indies. Accordingly, he was broke and degraded by a court martial. The truth is, he deſerved death.

After this operation, the Engliſh made themſelves maſters of Valdore. Count Lally, encamped over againſt them, two leagues from Pondichery, by his good countenance prevented their making any other motion for three months together; and thereby gained time for introducing into the place about three thouſand oxen and ſheep, beſides a ſufficient quantity of rice to ſubſiſt the garriſon for ſix months. No one could conceive at this time, for it was now April, that the French ſquadron had totally deſerted Pondichery.

While Count Lally was keeping the Engliſh at bay, he contrived to conclude a treaty with a Myſorean Chief, by which this Chief bound himſelf to introduce into Pondichery three thouſand oxen, with a proportionable quantity of rice and butter, in conſideration of the French ceding to him the fort of Thiagar, adjoining to his territories, which Count Lally had conquered the year before. But the council of Pondichery oppoſed and traverſed this treaty. Monſieur de Leyrit made it his buſineſs to ſend Count Lally anonymous letters, which he ſaid had been

been ſent himſelf, to inform him that theſe Myſoreans had not one thouſand four hundred effective horſe. They arrive, however, with all their cavalry in Count Lally's camp, in order to ſign the treaty. But the council of Pondichery give them to underſtand, that the moment Count Lally's back, who was but a paſſenger, ſhould be turned, they would break the treaty between him and them. Upon this, the Myſoreans refuſe to conclude the treaty with Count Lally, unleſs the council of Pondichery give them a promiſe in writing, that they will abide by the conditions of it, though Count Lally ſhould be recalled.

This was the firſt inſtance ſeen in the Indies of the Blacks of the country refuſing to acknowledge a Commander in chief, and treat with him alone. The council of Pondichery meet; and reflecting on the ill conſequences, with which this their ſolemn refuſal of the means to retard the loſs of Pondichery might be attended to themſelves, ſign the promiſe the Myſoreans required. But behold the cunning of the men! They at the ſame time draw up, in ſecret, a verbal proceſs of the tranſaction, and proteſt againſt their own act. It is this very council, that has ſworn to the truth of this affair in a court of juſtice. Count Lally knew nothing

at

at that time of what they were doing; and he is ſtill ignorant of their motives for doing what they have done.

One thing is certain, and that is, that theſe cabals of the council of Pondichery created ſo much jealouſy in the minds of the Myſoreans, that, the very day after the treaty was ſigned, they deſerted Count Lally in the night, and ſet out for their own country.

Count Lally ſends meſſenger upon meſſenger after them. They are overtaken at fifteen leagues diſtance, and, after a negotiation of twenty days, prevailed on to return.

Theſe Myſoreans, to the number of 2700 horſe and foot, ſet out from Thiagar with between eleven and twelve hundred oxen. On the road, they meet with a detachment of the enemy, through which they are obliged to fight their way. Two thirds of their convoy diſappear during the engagement. They arrive at a league of Pondichery with between three and four hundred oxen, which the Intendant and the Clerk named for that purpoſe by Monſieur de Leyrit bring into the town, with one hundred, or one hundred and fifty crocks of mantegue, or butter of the country.

But

But how are theſe tricks and cabals of the council of Pondichery, to be reconciled with what the members of it now depoſe. They ſay, that theſe very Myſoreans, who, they allow, they did not chuſe ſhould come to Pondichery to ſave that place, might have ſaved it, notwithſtanding. They ſay, that theſe very Myſoreans, who, according to themſelves, did not amount to 1400 men, when Count Lally was for their coming, came, however, to the number of 4000. They ſay, that theſe 4000 men might have beat the enemy, who had in their camp 10,000 to oppoſe to them. They ſay, moreover, that 400 Europeans had nothing to fear from 20,000 of theſe Myſoreans. Now the Engliſh had 5000 Europeans! There is not a ſingle tittle of what the council has depoſed concerning theſe Myſoreans, that is not a moſt bare-faced lye or abſurdity.

The Myſoreans never encamped on the glacis of Pondichery; they never received any ſupplies of rice from it; they continued in the neighbourhood of it but ſeven and twenty days. Count Lally marched twice at their head to reconnoitre the enemy; and twice, at the firing of the firſt muſket, they fled, and left him alone with his guards

in the midſt of the plain. Count Lally employed them a third time; he ſent out with them all his European cavalry; but, inſtead of marching to the place of their deſtination, they turned another way with theſe European cavalry, which never returned, leaving their baggage behind them in the care of their louchards or riding ſervants who, ſeven days after, on hearing that their maſters were ſafely arrived with the European cavalry at Gingee, twelve leagues from Pondichery, ſet out by night, and without Count Lally's knowing any thing of the matter, to join them.

The truth is, the object of the treaty made with theſe Myſoreans was to victual Pondichery. Troops of this kind do not ſo much as appear in battle, where there are any Europeans to be dealt with.

The truth is, their Chief did not conſent to this treaty, of which he bore the whole expence, (a thing never before known of in the Indies) till Count Lally told him, that he daily expected a formidable ſquadron to ſecond his operations; but ſeeing nothing of the ſquadron, though the monſoon was on the turn, and fearing the reſentment of the Engliſh, who, in caſe the French ſquadron did not arrive, muſt be ſpeedily maſters of the whole

whole country, he recalled his troops, on pretence that he was himſelf attacked in his own territories. This is what he wrote to Count Lally. It is not, therefore, any ill treatment given by Count Lally to theſe Myſoreans, that made them abandon Pondichery, as depoſed by the council of that place. Theſe Myſoreans, therefore, did not fulfil the conditions of their treaty by coming to Pondichery with the proviſions, with which they had agreed to ſupply it, ſince they gave up the fort of Thiagar, (the price ſtipulated for theſe proviſions) when they retired. What are we to think of the council of Pondichery after all theſe ſhifts and turns?

Eight days after the departure of theſe Myſoreans, Count Lally reſolved on another bold ſtroke, which was to attack, in the night between the 2d and 3d of September, the whole Engliſh army. And, as the reſult of all the ſecret aſſemblies held by the council of Pondichery, and all the letters iſſued by theſe aſſemblies, were handed about the Engliſh camp, under the title of remonſtrances, even before they reached Count Lally, he took upon him to make, alone, the diſpoſition for this attack, which he now ſubmits to the judgment of perſons well acquainted with the nature of ſuch enterpriſes. He let the gates be ſhut at the uſual

hour, and afterwards had them opened for himſelf only, and repaired to the army. To all the principal officers he gave in writing circumſtantial inſtructions.

The attack was to be made on three ſides at the ſame time, on the firing of two rockets from the roof of the Jeſuits church.

The rockets are fired. Count Lally's right carries a little redoubt defended by two cannon, which covered the enemies left.

The center, where Count Lally commanded in perſon, attacks the center of the enemy, where the Engliſh General had an opportunity given him of uniting his whole ſtrength; the battalion of India, which formed Count Lally's left, having, inſtead of attacking the enemies right, thought proper to fall back, and wheel behind Count Lally's center. By this means the attack miſcarries.

And here it is proper to obſerve, that the troops of the Company never fought in the Indies, but when plunder was to be got by fighting; and they could expect none by fighting Europeans. In theſe famous campaigns, ſo thick ſtudded with victories, which Meſſieurs de Buſſy and Moracin cauſed to be ſo loudly trumpeted in the Ga-

zettes of Europe, they had none but Blacks to deal with. Theſe campaigns were, at bottom, no better than progreſſes, in which the Commander ſent detachments to the right and left of his rout to levy on the Princes of the country heavy contributions, half of which, and ſometimes a farthing, were not brought to the Company's account.

Theſe victories may be eſtimated by the printed memorial, which Monſieur Courtin publiſhed about a year ago. Monſieur Courtin tells us, that with 8 lame Europeans he has had to engage from 200 to 2000 Blacks; and that he, at length, fought his way, by the mountains of Thibet, through 5000 of theſe Blacks. What wonders, therefore, might not be expected from Meſſieurs de Buſſy and Moracin at the head, the one of 800, the other of 400 healthy able-bodied Europeans. It is true, that Monſieur de Buſſy was once defeated by theſe very Blacks, and loſt half his army, and with the other half was obliged to fly before them for the ſpace of eighty leagues. But it is the only inſtance of the kind remembered in the Indies; and Monſieur de Leyrit more than repaired this loſs. It was, indeed, by weakening the ſettlements in Bengal, and Pondichery.

In the height of all theſe ſucceſſes, Monſieur Dupleix, who did not get a penny by them, had to deal with Europeans in the Carnatic, and was every where defeated. He was conſtantly complaining to the Company of the ſoldiers, and even of the officers, who but too much reſembled their ſoldiers, ſent to him from Europe. And, indeed, theſe troops were ever backward to ſhew themſelves in the field; and, as often as the enemy came up with them, either fled or laid down their arms. They fled at *Caveripac*; they fled at *Bakour*; they fled twice in *Tanjore*; they laid down their arms at *Valconda*; they ſurrendered at diſcretion in the iſland of *Seringham*; they failed thrice before *Cudaloor*, though but a poſt; twice before *Arcot*; twice before *Trichenopoly*, at the laſt ſiege of which half of them were made priſoners. In a word, in ſpite of all the reinforcements ſent one after another from Europe to Monſieur Dupleix, there was no army in the Indies, when Monſieur de Godeheu landed there with 2000 men; and of theſe 2000 men there remained but 1000 at Pondichery, at the end of two years, when Count Lally landed there, though there had been no war in the mean time.

But of theſe priſoners, made five years before, there ſtill remained above 800 in the

Engliſh priſons, which Count Lally found himſelf obliged to exchange againſt the garriſons he had taken in Fort St. David, and before Madras.

This unavoidable exchange deprived him, immediately on his arrival, of the unqueſtionable ſuperiority he had over the Engliſh. He would have had 800 men more, and would have ſent to the iſland of Bourbon, according to his inſtructions, theſe 800 Engliſh, who would have been, in his hands, a curb upon the Engliſh General and Governor, when he found himſelf under a neceſſity of aſking of them conditions for Pondichery.

It will, perhaps, be objected to Count Lally, that the India Company, in ſpite of all the loſſes they ſuffered in the Indies, ſtill retained Pondichery. To this he ſimply anſwers:

The Engliſh Miniſtry, at that time, conſidered the poſſeſſions of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company as an object foreign to the ſtate. Nay, the generality of the Engliſh nation rather wiſhed to ſee that Company cruſhed to pieces, in order to make way for a free trade. In the laſt war, the Engliſh Miniſtry happened to be of a different opinion. They ſent ſucceſſively, to the coaſt

Coromandel alone, 4000 regular troops, and fourteen ſhips of the line. Monſieur de Leyrit, twelve months before the arrival of Count Lally, ſuffered Bengal to be loſt, when he might have ſaved it by an embarkation of 300 men; the Engliſh, once maſters of this ſettlement, the only lucrative one, found themſelves ſtrong enough to dethrone the ſovereign of the country, who offered to the French, and would have granted them, the ſame advantages, which the Engliſh derived from the ſovereign they ſubſtituted to him. The Engliſh, in a word, derived from this revolution ſeventy-five millions of livres, with which they began by paying all their India debts, employing the remainder in the attack of the French ſettlements. They did more; they took advantage of their ſquadron's wintering at Bombay, to take Surat. The French Company, on the contrary, ſent, to ſupport their ſettlements in the Indies, but four millions in money; 2000 men, and five ſhips of war; and theſe, beſides, arrived too late.

But to return. The army commanded by Monſieur Dure, a Lieutenant-Colonel, was encamped a league from Pondichery, and half a league before a hedge between ſix and ſeven fathoms thick, which ſurrounded the town for the ſpace of about two leagues and

and a half. This is what was called the bounds of Pondichery. All the ſettlements granted to the Europeans on the coaſt of Coromandel are ſurrounded with hedges of this kind. They ſerved to keep off the Morattoes, and naked cavalry, who, as they are full of brambles and briars, never attempt to croſs them. They are, however, here and there, lined with cannon, in order to hinder theſe Morattoes from ravaging the rice grounds and houſes within cannon ſhot of them. The witneſſes againſt Count Lally have not been aſhamed to repreſent in Europe theſe bounds, as an intrenchment, like that of Heilbron. The Engliſh had bounds of this kind at Cudaloor, Fort St. David, and Madras, leſs extenſive and better kept up than thoſe of Pondichery Yet they never took it into their heads, with five times the number of men that Count Lally had, to wait his approach behind them. Witneſſes muſt be hard put to, to have recourſe to ſuch abſurdities, which a ſingle glance at the plan of the place is ſufficient to overſet.

An officer of the India Company's, who, like ſeveral of the inhabitants, went over to the Engliſh camp on the 3d of September, rather than ſtarve in the town, returning two hours after with a paſs from the Engliſh Commander, in order to take away his cloaths,

cloaths, informed Count Lally, that the enemy threatened to attack Monſieur Dure the next day, and force him to fall back within the bounds of Pondicherry. This was only what Count Lally expected from one moment to the other, the two armies having lain ten days together within half a cannon ſhot of each other, ſo as to give occaſion to frequent interchanges of muſketry, by night as well as by day, between their advanced guards.

Count Lally ſends this officer to give Monſieur de Leyrit an account of what he ſaid he had heard in the Engliſh camp; for the event has proved that it was all a fiction. Monſieur de Leyrit, according to this officer's oath, makes anſwer, that it was no affair of his. Count Lally writes to the council to repreſent to them the great danger of leaving thus expoſed, beyond the bounds, the regiments of Lorrain and Lally. The council, likewiſe, make anſwer, that it is no buſineſs of theirs.

The troops, by thus lying without the bounds, increaſed the boundary of the place, and thereby favoured the entrance of ſome proviſions. A retrograde march would have leſſened this boundary. Count Lally, aware of the reproaches in ſtore for him, if he had ordered it, thought proper to

to wait the iſſue. He, therefore, wrote the very ſame day, the 3d of September, a letter of inſtructions to Monſieur Dure, to inform him of the ſteps he ſhould take to avoid a ſurpriſe, and to retreat in good order, on the approach of the enemy, within the bounds, which the cannon of the place commanded.

This fine army of Count Lally's conſiſted of the regiment of Lorrain of 300 men; the regiment of Lally of 200; and 200 Blacks encamped without the bounds. The battalion of the Indies, of 200 men, lay encamped under a fort at the other ſide of the river, three quarters of a league from the regiments of Lorrain and Lally, in order to favour the introduction of proviſions on that ſide, as being the ſide worſt guarded by the Engliſh. Count Lally had, beſides, 200 ſailors within the bounds, to be at hand, either to cover the retreat of the 500 men of Lorrain and Lally, that lay without them; or throw themſelves into the town in caſe of any attack upon it by the Engliſh ſquadron. Thus, this army amounted, in the whole, to 900 Europeans, and 200 Blacks.

The army of the enemy conſiſted of 3500 Engliſh foot, and 150 Engliſh horſe; 400 Germans, Swiſs, and French deſerters, and

500

500 marines; in all 4,500 Europeans, and 10,000 Blacks, ſupported by fourteen veſſels of the line in the road of Pondichery. Such is the army which made Monſieur Dure retreat, a little precipitately indeed, within the bounds of Pondichery. This operation, of which ſo much has been ſaid, coſt no blood; we loſt not a ſingle man by it.

The evening before this attack, the Governor of Madras had recalled the commander of the Engliſh troops, and had given the command of them to a Colonel, who had his leg broke by the firſt and the only cannon ball fired againſt the enemy.

From this day, the 10th of September, the place may be ſaid to have been not only inveſted, but ſtraitened. It is a maxim with military men, that a place is inveſted even from the day of a ſuperior army's appearing before it. Why, therefore, ſhould Count Lally be refuſed the merit of having, with a handful of men, and merely by making a good countenance, prevented the inveſtiture of Pondichery for four months together. The plain about it was open; there was not ſo much as a ſingle buſh between him and the Engliſh.

The

The four months of inveſtiture, which preceded the ſurrender of the place, were ſpent in conſtant expectations of ſuccours from Europe, in conſequence of two deputations ſent to inform the Company of the imminent danger of Pondichery; and in conſtant expectations of ſeeing the ſquadron of the Count d'Aché. All this time, the Engliſh made not the leaſt attempt upon the place; whereas Count Lally made two ſallies upon them, and in one carried off 84 men, in the other an officer and his whole guard. All the enemy did was to erect three batteries at 600 paces diſtance from the place, which did not ſo much as ſtir a ſtone from the parapet. In a word, there fell, during the whole of this famous ſiege, but one man, who was killed by a random ſhot on the eſplanade of Pondichery.

As to the interior of the place, theſe four months were ſpent in altercations between Count Lally, the council, and ſome of the principal officers, who wanted to build their fortunes on the ruins of it.

Count Lally had required of the council to raiſe a tax upon the White and Black inhabitants without diſtinction, in proportion to their fortunes. The council thought proper to lay the whole burthen on the Blacks.

Blacks. All the Europeans, monopoliſts and others, were exempted from it. Count Lally knows not what it produced; but he knows, that the council made a handle of it to ſpirit up the inhabitants againſt him. Nevertheleſs, it was abſolutely neceſſary either to ſurrender the place, or ſubſiſt the officers; or, at leaſt, give them a credit to live upon; it was neceſſary to pay the Blacks employed in repairing the ruinous parts of the fortification; in fine, it was neceſſary to pay the European workmen employed in the ſervice of the artillery and other works.

Count Lally impoſed two fines on two of the Company's ſervants; one of whom, appointed keeper of the magazines, by Monſieur de Leyrit, made it a practice to diſpoſe of the grain lodged in them, on his own account; the other, to write to the Engliſh General, that he had ever been more attached to the Engliſh than to the French; and that it would be matter of rejoicing and thankſgiving to ſee him arrive, as an amiable conqueror. This man, called Berthelin, was one of Monſieur de Leyrit's favourites, and conſtantly attended the toilet of a lady very far gone in that gentleman's good graces. Theſe two men were, beſides, connected, by blood and intereſt, with all the

the members of the council, who ſpirited up the whole town againſt the rigour of theſe fines, which brought the treaſury about 60,000 livres. Count Lally was reduced to the alternative of ſurrendering the place, or turning to ſome account the crimes of theſe wretches, for whom, in another circumſtance, he would have thought hanging too mild a puniſhment.

Count Lally had ordered a ſearch to be made for grain in all the houſes of Pondichery, his own not excepted. This ſearch was made by one of the principal military officers, and one of the Company's ſervants, attended by two ſerjeants. It is a cuſtomary thing to bury grain in this country, where it is ready money. They took four thouſand meaſures of it from a ſervant of Monſieur de Leyrit's, who had hid it in his garden, twelve feet under the ſurface.

The officers and ſoldiers were reduced to rice and water; the Counſellors of Pondichery, the Partners and Factors of thoſe of Mauritius, and of ſome Captains of men of war, to whom the ſhortneſs of the cruizes made on the coaſt by the Count d'Aché did not give ſufficient time to ſell their ventures, kept open wine ſtores; and were not aſhamed to take ſuch advantage of the neceſſity of the

the troops, as to make them pay from ſeven to eight livres a bottle for that article. They even raiſed it to twelve during the ſiege of Madras. Yet this wine coſt but five ſols. Monſieur de Leyrit had four thouſand bottles of wine in his cellars, when Pondichery ſurrendered. Monſieur Boyelleau, the Attorney General, had ſix thouſand belonging to a purſer of the ſquadron. Count Lally had with much ado prevailed on theſe Counſellors to part with ſome of this wine, at the rate of ſeven or eight livres a bottle, to be diſtributed amongſt the officers, half a pint a day to each. The eighth day this diſtribution ceaſed. What could Count Lally do in theſe circumſtances? ſhould he have that very day ſurrendered the place?

The Count d'Aché was daily expected. It was, however, of theſe ſearches, theſe fines, theſe taxes, which preſerved Pondichery for eighteen months, and gave time for ſuccouring it, that the council made a handle for ſpiriting up againſt Count Lally all the ſervants of the Company, ſome of the inhabitants in eaſy circumſtances, and ſome of the principal officers connected by intereſt with thoſe, whoſe monopolies Monſieur de Leyrit thought proper to favour.

Count

Count Lally ſuppreſſes, in this place, a great number of paſquinades againſt him, ſtuck up on the doors of the Churches; and the letters thrown into his apartment, in which he was allowed but twenty-four hours to live. He ſuppreſſes the inſidious ſteps taken by the council, to obtain his leave for finding out the authors of theſe ſcandalous pieces. Where was the neceſſity of the council's aſking leave to do their duty? Count Lally had requeſted them, a year before, to uſe their authority, to put an end to the indiſcreet diſcourſes held in the place by the Company's ſervants; and all the ſatisfaction he could get was, that they had never heard any diſcourſes of the kind. The memorial of Monſieur de Bourdonnais has already made the public ſufficiently acquainted with the tricks and underhand dealings of theſe fugitives, whom the Company uſed to employ in their India factories; and who, all to a few honeſt men confounded amongſt them, are the very ſame perſons, who now ſeek to ruin Count Lally, and employ the ſame means as heretofore to accompliſh their Black deſign.

In fine, on the 24th of December, Count Lally, who had been confined to his bed for twenty days paſt, ſeeing, that there remained in the

magazines but four pounds of rice for every officer and ſoldier, gives notice to the council, that it is high time to think ſeriouſly on the conditions to be required of the Engliſh commander, in order to have time to diſcuſs them with him. The council's anſwer is, that it will be time enough to think of them, when the place ſhall be reduced to the laſt extremity. Count Lally replies, that it will be then too late. He is, however, obliged to wait for the laſt extremity.

As an account of what happened between this day, the 24th of December, and the 16th of January following, when the place ſurrendered, would be but one uninterrupted iſſue of ſuch miſery and wickedneſs, as Count Lally could ſcarce expect to gain belief to, were he not provided with proofs of it in writing, has thought proper to give, at the end of this Journal, a ſummary of all the events that have any relation to the capitulation of Pondichery; and will here confine himſelf to a ſhort narrative of the exceſſes committed ſince its ſurrender.

The town of Pondichery ſurrendered the 16th of January 1761, and the inner fort the 17th. The council of Pondichery prevail on the Governor of Madras to ſend off Count

Count Lally, though at death's door, the day following. Count Lally requeſts of the Engliſh General to be ſent to Cudaloor, where he might be within reach of the French and Engliſh phyſicians and ſurgeons. The Governor of Madras inſiſts on his going to Madras, and gives him his palanquin for that purpoſe. He is not permitted to take any thing with him but two trunks and his bed, the council of Pondichery having told the Engliſh Governor, that he would find treaſures in his cheſts. They, indeed, contained treaſures, but theſe treaſures were his papers, which the council had their eyes upon, and Count Lally was deſirous of ſecuring. It was theſe very papers, which gave riſe to the reſolution that was taken, and with which he was threatened, to aſſaſſinate him, as well as the Intendant, and Monſieur de Gadeville, the Deputy Quarter-maſter-general of the army. Count Lally had put into the hands of the Intendant all the complaints made to him in writing of the unheard of vexations committed by the officers and Company's ſervants in the poſts where they commanded; he had put into his hands, all the papers of the Marquis de Conflans, containing the neceſſary inſtructions for the adminiſtration of affairs in Maſuli-patnam. The Chevalier de Gadeville was charged with all the papers, containing

the complaints exhibited to Count Lally, by the Blacks of Pondichery, of the vexations and cruelties they had ſuffered from the officers and ſervants of the Company. Theſe complaints the poor people uſed to put, by night, into a kind of letter-box, which Count Lally had ordered to be placed at the gate of the fort, as they no longer dared to come in perſon to him, ſince an officer had broke the arm of one of them, as he was leaving the Count's apartment.

This very ſame 18th of January, an officer in the Company's ſervice, who had been broke and expelled his regiment in Europe for a conſpiracy againſt the Colonel, enters at nine in the morning the court-yard of Count Lally's houſe, at the head of five and twenty officers or ſervants of the Company, in order to kill him in his bed; and, meeting one of the Count's Aid de camps on the ſteps of the ſtreet-door, immediately falls upon him. The Commandant of the regiment of Lorrain arrives to his aſſiſtance; the alarm ſpreads through the fort; and the Engliſh guard being within ſixty paces, the aſſaſſins diſperſe; but, after leaving an officer in the gallery leading to Count Lally's apartment to watch the hour of his departure, rendezvous again in a private houſe, where Monſieur

ſieur de Leyrit and one Defer, the murderer of the Intendant had lodged together for ſome days. Moſt of them dine there. Monſieur Moracin takes care, in the letter he writes Monſieur de Buſſy to give him an account of what happened at Count Lally's leaving Pondichery, to tell him, that the Count was too narrowly watched to get incognito out of Pondichery; and, as to the Intendant, that he was born to leave his bones in the Indies. This letter is amongſt the pieces reported in this trial.

Monſieur Mathon, ſuperior general of the foreign miſſions, is ſtill more explicit in regard to the murder of the Intendant, in his letter of the ſame date to his convent in Paris. *Monſieur Lally*, theſe are the words of this good prieſt, *will be ſure to ſay that the Intendant has been aſſaſſinated; nothing more was intended than a little caning, for not a man of them would have dared to attack the Intendant ſingly, as he paſſed for the beſt ſwordſman in Pondichery; but he reſented the inſult offered him, and drew on himſelf what followed.* That is as much as to ſay; "he challenged eighty men, and eighty men killed him."

This gang, as ſoon as they got up from table, aſſembled again, by five in the evening, at the gate of the fort, to the number of eighty, all of them officers or ſervants of the Company.

Count Lally, having, in conſequence of what had happened in the morning, applied to the Engliſh General for an eſcort, had obtained an officer and fifteen huſſars for that purpoſe. Defer watched his coming out at the very door of his chamber; and, the moment he ſaw the folds of it open, ſet out full ſpeed for the gate of the fort to alarm his accomplices.

Count Lally leaves his chamber a quarter after ſix, when it was almoſt night. He meets at the door Father Lavaur, who had but juſt come through the gang of aſſaſſins that waited for him; and, therefore, wiſhes the Count a good journey, and, above all things, adviſes him to take great care of his health.

Count Lally has ſcarce got out of the gate of the fort, when he ſees theſe eighty aſſaſſins advancing towards his palanquin; Monſieur de Moracin alone ten paces before them to the right. Count Lally immediately orders his palanquin to ſtop, and four of his guards to level their pieces at a dozen of the aſſaſſins, who were already within ten paces of him. This motion obliges them to halt, and gives time to the Engliſh officer and his fifteen huſſars to ruſh out of the fort to his aſſiſtance. Upon this the aſſaſſins diſperſe, and Count Lally proceeds on his journey.

Four

Four minutes after, the Intendant comes out of the fort, when the aſſaſſins rally for the third time that day, and fall upon him. Defer diſpatches him at one ſtroke, and lays him dead at the feet of two Engliſh centinels.

The next moment, Monſieur Boyelleau, Attorney General, arrives, before the Intendant's body can be carried to his apartment, which lay within eighty paces of the ſpot where he had been aſſaſſinated. But he leaves it where he found it, without inſtituting any verbal proceſs; repairs directly to the deceaſed's apartment; ranſacks his effects and papers; ſhuts and ſeals his doors; and departs without giving any orders for the interment of his body, or taking the ſlighteſt information againſt the aſſaſſin, who returned home in triumph, paſſing through Monſieur de Leyrit's apartment in his way to his own. The Capuchins, pariſh prieſts of the place where the affair happened, refuſe the Intendant chriſtian burial. At length, his ſervants, after he had four and twenty hours remained naked on the ſteps of his own door, and expoſed to the inſults of the officers and ſervants of the Company, remove him to a garden, and bury him there. Such is the tranſaction, which people now affect to conſider as an affair of honour, and merely accidental.

If it was no more, why was chriſtian burial refuſed the Intendant? Such is the affair of honour of an Intendant almoſt ſeventy, who could not ſee in the beſt day-light without ſpectacles, againſt eighty men of honour, who all depoſe that it was an affair of honour, and depoſe at the ſame time, that they were not preſent at it. The verbal proceſs of the council of Pondichery, their letters to the Miniſter and the Company, thoſe too of private perſons, made him an accomplice in the extortions charged upon Count Lally. Nevertheleſs, the witneſſes againſt the Count have not ſo much as mentioned the Intendant's name in their depoſitions. They ſhould, at leaſt, one would imagine, have contrived ſome reaſons to juſtify the firſt inſult which they offered the Intendant, and of which his death was the conſequence. What a ſcene of abominations!

But theſe ſame honeſt men, theſe ſame men of honour, took care to ſend immediate notice to their comrades, priſoners at St. Thomas, near Madras, that they had miſſed Count Lally. Monſieur le Verrier, a member of the council, made no myſtery of it in his letters to Monſieur de la Selle, another member of the council, then at Tranquebar. Theſe letters are in the hands of Count Lally's judges.

The

The priſoners at St. Thomas, on receiving from Pondichery the news of Count Lally's eſcape, aſſemble and reſolve to diſpatch him on the road. An officer in the Company's ſervice, provoked at this reſolution, writes to Count Lally to put him upon his guard. But, being diſcovered, he is purſued. Fortunately, however, he ge's to Madras, and there obtains a ſafe-guard, with which he takes refuge amongſt the Dutch at Sadras.

Even after Count Lally's arrival in the neighbourhood of Madras, the conſpirators againſt him at St. Thomas conti..ue their meetings ſo publicly, that the council of Madras think it their duty to give him a guard of fifty men, and at the ſame time forbid the priſoners of St. Thomas to come within half a league of his quarters, on pain of being confined with the common ſoldiers. It was a near relation of Monſieur de Leyrit's, who headed theſe conſpirators, all men of honour; and he made no ſcruple of owning it at the table of an Engliſh Colonel.

In the mean time, the effects of Count Lally, that remained at Pondichery, are ſearched and ranſacked in the moſt indecent and ſcandalous manner, and in preſence of a member of the council; but, they being found to conſiſt entirely of his common wearing

wearing apparel, part of which, however, is embezzled, the two Engliſh Generals, diſappointed of the treaſures and precious effects they were made to expect, treat the two councils as a knot of knaves, and make an apology to Count Lally by one of thoſe very men, who have ſworn againſt him at Paris, and whoſe letters he has produced, contradicting every thing affirmed by himſelf upon oath.

Count Lally was treated at Madras in the moſt unworthy manner by the Engliſh Governor and Council. He could ſcarce venture abroad for fear of being inſulted. His effects, on their arrival from Madras, where they had been detained ſix weeks, were again ſtopt at the Cuſtom-houſe for the payment of 30,000 livres lent him by an Armenian to carry on the ſiege of Madras. He had already remitted this money to Monſieur Chevreau, the treaſurer, who, on being confronted with the Count, depoſed to the receipt of it, as likewiſe to that of 1200 livres on another account, which Count Lally did not ſo much as remember.

At length, Count Lally, though ſcarce able to leave his bed, is put on board a crazy merchant ſhip, and at a bad ſeaſon. He is not permitted to take with him the ſmalleſt quantity of proviſions, in conſequence of which he is reduced to live three months, at the

the diſcretion of his trading captain, on broths made with freſh and ſalt pork, till his arrival at St. Helena, the military governor of which omits nothing to make him forget the unworthy treatment of his Indian countrymen.

Count Lally is replaced at Madras by the council of Pondichery, who have thought proper to inform all Europe, in print, of the gratitude, with which they were penetrated for all the civilities of the Governor and Council of Madras. In fact, they were not obliged to part with a ſingle handkerchief at Pondichery; nay, they were permitted to ſhare amongſt themſelves part of the few effects, that ſtill remained in the Company's magazines.

Count Lally arrives in London, and there hears of the cabal formed againſt him in France. He applies for leave to return to Paris on his parole, and obtains it. He lays his complaints before the miniſtry, who promiſe him ſpeedy juſtice. The cry of his enemies, and the clamours of the public, whom his enemies ſpirit up againſt him, prevail. The miniſtry think it their duty to yield to them. After twelve months ſpent in the moſt earneſt ſolicitatons to have his conduct examined in the moſt rigorous manner, he hears, that he is to be put under arreſt

arreſt. Upon this he immediately ſets out to make a voluntary ſurrender of himſelf, fully perſuaded, that he would, at leaſt, be permitted to juſtify his conduct. This, it muſt be allowed, was not acting like a man, whoſe conſcience reproached him with any crime.

The public, no doubt, will aſk: why this univerſal inveteracy againſt Count Lally, if there was nothing to charge him with?

Count Lally anſwers. In the firſt place, this inveteracy is not univerſal. None have been admitted as evidence againſt him, but thoſe very perſons, who have been conſtantly decrying him in public, and three fourths of whom had been puniſhed by him in the Indies for extortion or neglect of duty. Secondly, Count Lally did not chuſe to connive at theft and robbery in the Indies; he brought home with him proofs againſt all thoſe who had committed any crimes of the kind in that country; ſo that he had againſt him a multitude of perſons combined and reſolved to keep, coſt what it would, the plunder they had amaſſed there. Thirdly, he had to deal with Directors, who found themſelves under a neceſſity of juſtifying, in the eyes of the ſtockholders, their groſs neglect, to ſupply him with men and other means of defence, one of the things he thought it moſt incumbent upon him to complain of.

Count

Count Lally paſſes fifteen months in the moſt horrible confinement, without ſo much as knowing the reaſons for it. At length, he hears, that Father Lavaur, ſecretary and clerk of the cabal formed againſt him, is dead; and that there had been found, amongſt the papers of that father ſealed up after his death, an infamous libel, which had already been handed about Paris, and of which Count Lally had given the miniſter minutes, which minutes were actually ingroſſing at Monſieur de Buſſy's.

Count Lally hears, that, on the ſtrength of this libel, the Chatelet have already taken ſome ſteps againſt him; that four witneſſes have read to the Lieutenant Criminal a depoſition of forty pages in writing, and ſigned it as a judicial act. This is the firſt inſtance of ſuch a method of proceeding.

In a word, he hears, after having, for fifteen months together, reclaimed the parliament as his natural judges, that the King had, by an expreſs commiſſion, conſtituted them judges of the embezzlements and extortions committed in the Indies, as the cauſes of the loſs of Pondichery.

On examining the four depoſitions made at the Chatelet, there did not appear the leaſt ſign of embezzlement on the part of Count Lally

Lally. A ſecond commiſſion iſſues, in which, for the firſt time, the ſuſpicion of treaſon is mentioned. This new inſult, on the part of Count Lally's enemies, but adds to their calumnies, without increaſing his fears of the moſt ſcrupulous enquiry. A ſixty years faithful and zealous ſervice of his Majeſty clear him, beforehand, of ſuch a ſuſpicion. The conſtancy, with which he preſented himſelf for twelve months together to obtain juſtice againſt his calumniators, is an additional proof of his innocence.

It is, however, on this mention of a ſuſpicion of high treaſon in the ſecond commiſſion, that the rigour, with which he has been ſince proceeded againſt, is founded. Deprived of all manner of aſſiſtance, he finds himſelf, at the age of ſixty-ſeven, under a neceſſity of anſwering, from his memory, to queſtions about facts without number, that paſſed nine years ago, and in places ſix thouſand leagues off. He has been more conciſe in his anſwers, and more ſparing in ſummoning perſons to appear for him, than he otherwiſe would have been, in hopes of being allowed council, which, however, it has never been ſo much as deliberated to grant him.

In ſpite of all the artifices of his informers, there has not appeared, during the courſe of his trial, a ſingle witneſs, that could furniſh

the

the leaſt matter for a preſumption of high treaſon againſt him, though they were not afraid to inſinuate a ſuſpicion of it. But, enraged at ſeeing him triumph over this odious imputation of theirs, as well as that of extortion, they have now taken it into their heads to make him culpable in his military capacity. That is, after ſucceeding ſo far, as to cauſe him to be put under arreſt for extortion, without being able to prove any extortion againſt him, and afterwards accuſing him of high treaſon, without daring to ſwear to any, they are now for bringing into queſtion his conduct as an officer, not conſidering, that, by the laws, his conduct, as ſuch, does not fall under the cognizance of the civil magiſtrate.

Every enquiry into the military conduct of an officer, and eſpecially a General, requires a diſcuſſion, face to face, between the accuſer and the accuſed. This diſcuſſion has not, as yet, been allowed Count Lally, who, by the military laws, has a right to defend himſelf, and cannot be judged for military tranſactions but according to military forms. Otherwiſe, it would be in the power of two officers, whom a General might have had juſt reaſon to chaſtiſe during the courſe of a campaign; nay, in the power of a ſecond Lieutenant, a Serjeant or common Soldier, exaſperated at the loſs, the one of his portmanteau.

teau, the other of his knapſac, in an action, to come and indict their General in a civil court of juſtice, and ſwear that they ſuſpected him of an underſtanding with the enemy, to have this General, without any other proof, and on the bare title of the accuſation, put under arreſt, and denied the means of defending himſelf. The King's commiſſion does not ſo much as mention any ſuch enquiry. It no more belongs to the civil magiſtrate, than the deciſion of a litigious civil affair to a court martial. What is more, it cannot be ſaid, that there remains any doubt concerning his conduct as an officer, ſince nothing has been laid to his charge merely as ſuch. Had he been but barely ſuſpected of military miſconduct, he would have been impeached before a court martial, as the only competent judges of ſuch an impeachment. But, accuſed, as he is, of nothing but extortion, and a ſuſpicion of high treaſon, they are the only things on which ſentence is to be pronounced. Is he guilty? Is he innocent? To theſe two queſtions may be reduced the whole of this famous trial, to which calumny has ſubjected him, and which will ever remain an inſtance of the moſt odious and criminal perſecution.

But one thing alone would be ſufficient to diſcredit the men, who have informed againſt him,

him, and that is, the witneſſes againſt him not ſo much as daring to hazard the mention of any intelligence between him and the Engliſh, though, in all their depoſitions, they have ſought to compenſate for that deficiency by the words, *no doubt*. The moſt inveterate of the military witneſſes have depoſed, in expreſs terms, that they did not pretend to infer this pretended intelligence from his military conduct, though they took upon them to cenſure it in other reſpects. And, indeed, how is it poſſible to ſuppoſe this intelligence in a man, who took all he was worth with him to the Indies, and ſacrificed it to the defence of the French ſettlements there againſt the Engliſh? In a man, who left in the treaſury of Pondichery the whole of his pay, while in the Indies, amounting to 400,000 livres? In a man, in ſhort, the bettering of whoſe fortune depended more on the ſucceſs, than on the miſcarriage, of the expedition he commanded, and who has brought upon himſelf the hatred of his accuſers, merely by requiring their aſſiſtance againſt thoſe very Engliſh, with whom they now accuſe him of having had an underſtanding.

The foregoing is a full and faithful narrative of the expedition to the Indies. If all the facts alledged in it are ſupported by proofs, as, in truth, they are, what puniſhment

niſhment can be bad enough for men, who have taken upon themſelves to appear, at once, as informers, accuſers, and witneſſes againſt Count Lally in matters of ſuch high concernment; and, after all, have not dared to advance them on the trial; and now, pulling in their horns, confine themſelves to an impeachment of his military conduct, of which they were not witneſſes, and of which, even had they been witneſſes, they can by no means be allowed competent judges.

There is one more reflection to make, which ariſes, of itſelf, out the ſubject.

Count Lally complains of the high crime and miſdemeanor committed by the ſubalterns in his perſon, as their chief, and as one, beſides, honoured with the King's commiſſion; and in that of the Intendant of the army, as likewiſe repreſenting his Majeſty.

To this it is anſwered, that the intention of the officers and ſervants of the Company, in riotouſly aſſembling as they did, was not to aſſaſſinate them, but merely to inſult them; and it is added, that it was but natural for perſons exaſperated againſt Count Lally, to whom they attributed the loſs of their employments, thus to gather together to inſult him. As to their effects, they loſt nothing, ſince,

ſince, at that juncture, their houſes were to be ſpared.

Count Lally cannot allow this reaſon to be good in juſtice or policy; it cannot, in particular, ſtand good in regard to the Intendant, to whom, certainly, they cannot attribute the loſs of their employments; whom they own they inſulted notwithſtanding; and to whoſe charge they have nothing to lay, but his reſenting ſuch inſult. But, ſuppoſing the fact to be as they themſelves ſtate it, which it really is not, they ſtill own themſelves the aggreſſors. Now the laws have enacted pains and penalties againſt aggreſſors. They agree, that the Intendant was killed in conſequence of this inſult. Now the laws have enacted pains and penalties againſt murderers.

If it is agreed, that theſe men were exaſperated againſt Count Lally (they themſelves affirm it upon oath) ought their teſtimony againſt him to be admitted in juſtice? The laws forbid it, eſpecially as they themſelves confeſs their being exaſperated againſt him.

It is ſaid, that theſe three tumultous meetings in one and the ſame day; that the inſult offered Count Lally; that the murder of the Intendant; were merely accidental, and the

effects of a ſudden tranſport, that was very excuſeable. If ſo, why was the deſign of getting rid of Count Lally purſued after his eſcape from Pondichery? Why was not the Intendant allowed Chriſtian burial? Why was the ſeal taken from off his apartments, contrary to all the uſual forms of juſtice? Why were his papers ſecreted, inſtead of being ſent home to the miniſtry? Why was not the murderer ſtopt, though but for form ſake?

In fine, theſe very perſons were ſo thoroughly convinced, that the killing of the Intendant was a murder, that they have all depoſed, though without being queſtioned about the matter, that they were not preſent at it. What was criminal in the Indies, cannot, ſurely, be meritorious in Europe. But theſe very gentlemen, to a man, all depoſe, that it was an affair of honour. How dare they, if they had not been preſent, give teſtimony in favour of the murderer? In trials, where more perſons than one are accuſed, it muſt be the height of injuſtice to admit no evidence relating to ſome of the accuſed, but what makes for them; nor any relating to the reſt, but what makes againſt them.

Now, to ſum up the whole of Count Lally's civil and military conduct, what can be gathered from it?

It

It can only be gathered, that, while Monſieur de Leyrit continued to pay Count Lally's army, the Count, notwithſtanding the defeat of the Count d'Aché, and the undoubted ſuperiority of the enemy by ſea, made himſelf maſter of all the places, which that enemy poſſeſſed to the ſouth of Pondichery.

It can only be gathered, that, on Monſieur de Leyrit's ceaſing to pay the army, and the Count d'Aché's refuſing to leave the road of Pondichery, Count Lally was obliged to ſuſpend his operations for the ſpace of three months.

That, in ſpite of the ſecond defeat of the Count d'Aché, and his firſt deſertion of Pondichery after a ſtay of four months, Count Lally, the very day the Engliſh ſquadron quitted the coaſt to go and winter at Bombay, took the field; made himſelf maſter of Arcot, and all the poſts occupied by the Engliſh to the north of Pondichery; and that he even obliged them to ſhut themſelves up in Madras.

That with 2700 men he ventured to beſiege Madras, a well fortified place, garriſoned by 5000 men, and open to the ſea; and was not able to take it.

That the army, with which the Engliſh kept the field, attempted no leſs than four times to raiſe the ſiege of Madras, and was as often repulſed, and compleatly routed.

That, when Count Lally found himſelf under a neceſſity of raiſing the ſiege of Madras on the arrival to its aſſiſtance of ſix ſhips and 600 regular troops, the council of Pondichery give him to underſtand, after a formal deliberation, that they would give him no manner of aſſiſtance, and that his army muſt find ſubſiſtence ſword in hand.

That, in ſpite of the diſcontent of an army threatening every moment to go over to the enemy, and who mutinied twice on their not being paid, Count Lally made himſelf maſter of a fort, which till then had paſſed for impregnable, occupied by the enemy in the inland parts of the country; and that, two months after, he beat this ſame enemy, who came to attack him under the walls of Vandiwaſh, of which, as well as that of Arcot, he had before made them raiſe the ſiege.

It can only be gathered, that, as ſoon as the Count d'Aché appeared the ſecond time at Pondichery, with a ſum of about 440,000 livres, Count Lally, in ſpite of this Admiral's being defeated a third time, and his then

then totally deſerting the coaſt, after a ſtay of ſeven days only, took the field again in queſt of the enemy.

That, this enemy having been reinforced by a regiment of regular troops from Europe under the command of Colonel Coote, and Count Lally, on the contrary, diſappointed in his expectation of a reinforcement of 12,000 Blacks, which the brother of the ſovereign of the country was bringing to him, he could not with an army of 1250 men beat that of the enemy amounting to 2600.

It can only be gathered, that with 1300 Europeans, without any Blacks for want of money to pay them, he could not face, in the open field, an enemy of thrice his ſtrength, and, at the ſame time, beat off a ſquadron of fourteen veſſels of the line blocking up Pondichery, to the aſſiſtance of which he again found himſelf obliged to fly.

That afterwards, his army being reduced to 700 regular troops againſt 15,000 land forces and fourteen men of war of the line, he found himſelf under the neceſſity of ſurrendering to the enemy, after the place he was in had been inveſted and blocked up for nine months together; and did not ſurrender, till he had not a grain of rice, or morſel

of any other kind of food, left for his garriſon, already exhauſted by famine and fatigue.

That, after giving ten battles, and taking ten places, all with the ſame troops againſt an enemy conſtantly recruited from Europe, he at length yielded to ſuperior numbers.

That, from the day of the arrival of Meſſieurs de Buſſy and Moracin at Pondichery, and Count Lally's refuſing to let them have half his troops to join thoſe they had left behind them at their reſpective commands, in order to make war on their own private accounts, they traverſed all his operations; and, with the aſſiſtance of two profligate friars, endeavoured to incenſe the whole ſettlement againſt him.

It can only be gathered, that with four millions of livres there is no making head againſt ſeventy five-millions; that with 2000 men there is no making head againſt 5000; and that, without a ſingle boat, there is no making head againſt fourteen ſhips of the line.

In a word, it can only be gathered, that the whole council, and all the ſervants of the Company, had no other motive for riſing up againſt

againſt Count Lally, but his wanting to oblige them to contribute in money to the defence of Pondichery. He had a right to require it, as he had given the example. Beſides, theſe ſervants owed their fortunes to the Company, whereas Count Lally ſacrificed his to it.

Is it any way ſurpriſing, that, in order to preſerve fortunes, which Count Lally offered to prove had been fraudulently acquired, thoſe very men, to whom their maſters had communicated the complaints exhibited againſt them by the Count, ſhould combine to impeach him, without being able to bring a ſingle proof, of the very ſame crimes, of which he intended to impeach themſelves, and of which he was ready to produce the cleareſt evidence, and which it was their intereſt to ſtifle, or at leaſt invalidate. This is what they have attained by their wicked combinations, and by acting the abominable part of informers and witneſſes. But truth, which begins to break out on every ſide in favour of Count Lally, will at length make his innocence triumph.

MEMOIRS OF COUNT LALLY.

A SHORT REVIEW OF THE CAPITULATION OF PONDICHERY.

THE commander of a place beſieged cannot be juſtly blamed for capitulating, unleſs he does it, while he has any means of defence left; and, conſequently, can oblige the beſiegers to grant him his own terms, in caſe the good of the ſervice ſhould require his giving up the place to them.

Now it has been proved, that there did not remain a grain of rice, or morſel of any other kind of proviſions, in Pondichery, when Count Lally ſurrendered it.

It

It has been proved, that there was not, of the whole garriſon, fifty men able to crawl upon the ramparts, when Count Lally ſurrendered it.

It has been proved, that the Engliſh were well acquainted with the condition of the place. This they let Count Lally know. And, indeed, how was it poſſible for them not to be acquainted with it, ſince, beſides the illegal correſpondence carried on between Pondichery and the Engliſh camp, of which Count Lally was continually complaining, as appears by pieces produced in the courſe of this trial; beſides the ſcandalous and indiſcreet diſcourſes, which 200 officers or ſervants of the Company, going and coming between Pondichery and Madras in quality of priſoners of war, uſed to hold at the tables of the Engliſh; many of the inhabitants, and even of the officers, in order to avoid ſtarving, daily left the town to ſurrender themſelves voluntarily to the Engliſh; ſince, in ſhort, the Engliſh kept the place blocked up for nine months together, and the French were going to ſurrender it without waiting till it was actually attacked.

It has been proved, that Count Lally required of the Engliſh better terms, than the condition, to which Pondichery was reduced, permitted him to hope they would grant him.

It

It has been, in a word, proved, that the Engliſh granted the inhabitants of Pondichery much better terms than they had a right to expect, ſince they received them as priſoners of war to his Britannic Majeſty; left them all their moveable effects, a condition, which Count Lally had refuſed the Engliſh at Fort St. David, though ſtill in a ſtate of defence; and even allowed them money to purchaſe preſent ſubſiſtence.

Pondichery had been blocked up and inveſted for nine months together, by an army of 4500 Europeans, 10,000 Black horſe and foot, and fourteen ſhips of the line.

Count Lally, after keeping the Engliſh at bay for five months together, found himſelf, at laſt, under a neceſſity of retiring into the place with 100 regular troops, 200 ſailors and 200 Blacks, who, before the end of the month, were all gone for want of pay and ſubſiſtence.

Count Lally had tried every method to keep within bounds the garriſon, who no longer received any pay; and likewiſe the inhabitants, whom the council of Pondichery were conſtantly endeavouring to ſpirit up againſt him, on account of his pretended rigour in ordering a ſearch for grain, which the inhabitants made a practice of burying under ground.

The

The daily hopes of the Count d'Aché's arrival rendered ſuch a ſearch neceſſary; and, had not Count Lally flattered himſelf with theſe hopes, he would have ſurrendered the place three months ſooner; and then there would have been no ſearch; and he would have obtained conditions, which the Engliſh, it is true, would not have obſerved, ſince they had the candour to own in their manifeſto, that, had they been under a neceſſity of granting any, they would have afterwards found ſome pretext for breaking them.

On the 24th of December 1760, there remained in the magazines but eight days ſubſiſtence for the ſoldiers, at the rate of but half a pound of rice a day for every man, without any kind of wet proviſions, or any other kind of dry.

Count Lally had been confined to his bed for twenty days paſt. In this extremity he reſolves to write to Brigadier Landiviſiau, whom he had charged with the detail of the place, and tells him, that it was time to think of the terms they intended to aſk the Engliſh; and, as the capitulation was to take in the whole ſettlement, he injoined him, in conjunction with Monſieur de Leyrit, to call a mixed council, in order to deliberate upon theſe terms; adding, that he would not, by

any

any means, take it upon himſelf to name them, as he was perſuaded, that, let them be what they would, the council of Pondichery would not fail to diſapprove them. Beſides, it is cuſtomary in the Indies, for the inhabitants to have a ſhare with the army in all capitulations.

Monſieur de Leyrit and the council of Pondichery, aware that, conſidering the ſad condition of the place, and the enemies being acquainted with the condition of it as well as themſelves, they could not expect any advantgeous terms, would have been glad to ſee Count Lally take the capitulation entirely upon himſelf, and alone run the riſk of the arrival of Monſieur d'Aché, whom they expected, and who might poſſibly appear on the coaſt within two hours, nay a quarter of an hour, of his capitulating. But this was a riſk, to which Count Lally did not think proper to expoſe himſelf; and, accordingly, he particularly obſerved in his letter to the Brigadier, that the mixed council could not too ſeriouſly reflect on the double inconveniency, either of obtaining leſs diſadvantageous terms by ſurrendering the town the ſooner at the riſk of the French ſquadron's arriving, or to obtain no conditions at all by waiting to the laſt extremity in hopes of the arrival of that ſquadron, which

which would have ſaved it. It muſt be allowed, that the reſolution taken by Count Lally was the wiſeſt he could take.

Brigadier Landiviſiau, who at this juncture abuſed the confidence placed in him by Count Lally, took advantage of the condition to which the Count's weakneſs had reduced him, and had combined with Monſieur de Leyrit and Father Lavaur to deceive him, makes anſwer, that his orders to aſſemble a mixed council are too vague for him to obey them. On the 27th, Count Lally ſummons him in the King's name to obey, and aſſemble the council. The Brigadier then informs him, that he has obeyed; that he has communicated to Monſieur de Leyrit his reiterated orders for the aſſembling of a mixed council; but that Monſieur de Leyrit, as well as himſelf, was of opinion, that it would be time enough to think of it, when the place was reduced to the laſt extremity; and that then little time would be requiſite to draw up, propoſe, and diſcuſs what terms it would be proper to aſk the enemy.

This anſwer of Meſſieurs Landiviſiau and de Leyrit evidently proves, that they did not at that juncture expect good terms; and, accordingly, Count Lally replied, that it would be then too late to think of them.

The

The truth is, the mixed council was not aſſembled, and Count Lally was brought too low by ſickneſs to ſee his orders obeyed. It has, therefore, been proved by pieces produced in the courſe of this trial, that Count Lally was willing to make a capitulation, in concert with the council of Pondichery, for the whole ſettlement, civil as well as military; and that Meſſieurs de Leyrit and de Landiviſiau, and the council of Pondichery, refuſed to concur with him.

On this refuſal, Count Lally reſolved to retard as long as poſſible the ſurrender of the place, threatened Father Lavaur with orders to have his convent ſearched for grain, which he knew was buried in it. Father Lavaur, to avoid this ſearch, took upon him to ſubſiſt the garriſon till the 15th of January.

It was now what they call in the Indies the little monſoon, during which veſſels from Europe frequently appear on the coaſt. Count Lally was ſtill in hopes of the Count d'Aché's ſquadron, or, at leaſt, ſome ſhips of it, arriving to the relief of Pondichery; and, in fact, five ſhips would have been ſufficient, not only to cruſh the Engliſh ſquadron, which had juſt loſt nine of its largeſt veſſels by a hurricane, but render the French maſ-

ters

ers of the Indian ſeas, and give law to the coaſt for eighteen months, at leaſt.

In fine, on the 12th of January, Count Lally finding, that there remained in the magazines but a pound of rice for every ſoldier, on which the longeſt he could poſſibly be expected to hold out was three days, writes to Monſieur de Leyrit, that the extremity, he would have the ſettlement wait for, was come in good earneſt; and that he muſt now ſeriouſly ſit down to draw up articles of captulation, unleſs he intended to abandon the inhabitants to the diſcretion of the enemy.

Monſieur de Leyrit, after the example ſet him by Brigadier Landiviſiau, anſwers Count Lally, that the words of his letter are too vague for the council to pay any regard to it. Count Lally ſummons them to obey; cauſes his ſummons to be regiſtered; and ſends notice to Monſieur de Leyrit, that, if he perſiſts in his diſobedience, he (Count Lally) will, on his ſide, ſend Lieutenant Colonel Dure to the Engliſh Commander, to treat with him about the evacuation of the place by the King and the Company's troops.

He, at the ſame time, ſends one of his Aids de Camp to Monſieur de Leyrit, to let him

know, how much this his ſtrange behaviour perplexed and aſtoniſhed him; particularly his not coming, though their apartments lay in the ſame gallery, to conſult with him about the meaſures proper to be taken in ſo intereſting and critical a juncture. It muſt be allowed, that it was Monſieur de Leyrit's duty not to wait for this meſſage, eſpecially as Count Lally was confined to his bed. But the difficulty is ſolved by Monſieur de Leyrit's anſwer to the Aid de Camp. He ſends Count Lally word, that the council knew what they had to do; and that, if he, (Count Lally) had any thing to communicate to him, he might do it by Father Lavaur.

The 13th paſſes. The next day, Monſieur de Leyrit and the council of Pondichery anſwer Count Lally's ſummons, that had been ſerved on them the evening before, by another ſummons to him, on their part, to aſk of the Engliſh Commander, that very moment, a ſuſpenſion of arms; and to promiſe him, at the ſame time, that the day following, the 15th, they would propoſe articles of capitulation to him. This would have been little better than telling the Engliſh, that the French found themſelves unable to defend the place, if it ſhould be attacked the next night. This act of the council, and the inſolent expreſſions

in

in which it was drawn up, would never be believed, if the original itſelf, ſigned by this council, was not to the fore. The heads of all the ſeveral civil communities took offence at it, and acquainted the council with their indignation, in writing. Yet this is the very council, who have agreed in all their depoſitions to complain of Count Lally's tyrannizing over them, and that they paid a blind obedience to all his dictates.

It may now be aſked, why Monſieur de Leyrit and the council of Pondichery, inſtead of drawing up the articles which Count Lally required of them, cauſed this indecent ſummons to be ſerved on him, as if they wanted to prove, by an authentic act, a refuſal, on his part, to capitulate for all the inhabitants? But the dates of the letters prove; nothing more is requiſite than to verify them, to make it evidently appear; that theſe pieces of Monſieur de Leyrit and the council are but anſwers to the orders given them by Count Lally to think ſeriouſly about bettering the condition of thoſe very inhabitants. It is only in hell ſo many abominations could be forged; and it is only in the Indies hell could find workmen to employ them.

Count Lally, at length, tired out with all the ſiniſter proceedings, on receiving this ſingular

ſummons of the council of Pondichery, determines to call, without any more loſs of time, a council of war, compoſed of all the principal officers of the garriſon, and of all the heads of the ſeveral civil communities. He acquaints Monſieur de Leyrit with this reſolution by Father Lavaur. Monſieur de Leyrit, upon this, inſtead of coming to Count Lally, as it was his duty to do, aſſembles, on his ſide, the council of Pondichery.

The council of war draw up the articles of capitulation to be aſked of the enemy for the troops, and for the inhabitants, in general, as deemed ſoldiers in the Indies. They therein ſtipulate for the religious houſes and the hoſpitals, the exerciſe of the Catholic religion, &c. and declare to the Engliſh, that the place ſhall be given up to them on the conditions of the cartel concluded, between the two reſpective ſovereigns in Europe, for their ſubjects when priſoners of war. They ſtipulate, at the ſame time, by this declaration, that the council of Pondichery ſhall treat ſeparately with the Engliſh Commander for what more immediately relates to the inhabitants. All the members of the council of war gave their advice ſeparately in writing, with their motives for it, ſo as to prove, that there was no expecting, or even propoſing, other conditions than thoſe required of the

enemy

enemy by theſe articles. They, likewiſe put their names to the back of the minute of this declaration, which the day following, the 15th of January, was to be ſent to the Engliſh Commander.

The council of Pondichery, on their ſide, draw up articles of capitulation for the inhabitants. Count Lally names a Counſellor and an under-merchant to carry theſe articles, in conjunction with a Lieutenant Colonel, to the Engliſh Commander.

Father Lavaur is commiſſioned to communicate to Count Lally, for his approbation, theſe articles of the council of Pondichery. The firſt imported, that the Engliſh ſhould allow the town a ſuſpenſion of arms for fifteen days; and, in that interval, permit the garriſon and the inhabitants to provide themſelves with proviſions in the Engliſh camp; and that, if the Count d'Aché aid not arrive, before the expiration of that term, to the relief of the place, they would then conſent to capitulate.

This article appeared ſo extravagant to Count Lally, that he ſtruck it out with his own hand. In fact, to aſk beſiegers to feed you for fifteen days, is no better than

telling them, that you are actually ſtarving; to tell them, that you expect in that interval ſuch ſuccours, as will hinder them from taking you, is an idea worthy of a council of merchants only. Yet this is the idea of a military man; it is that of Monſieur Dure, Lieutenant Colonel Commandant of artillery and fortification in the Indies. He allows in his depoſition, and even glories, that he drew up for the council of Pondichery theſe articles of capitulation, without the knowledge of Count Lally; without the knowledge of his General; a thing incredible! and that, too, while he was ſigning the contrary in a council of war, to which he had been ſummoned. And, in order to leave nō room for doubting the duplicity and abſurdity of this ſame Monſieur Dure, Count Lally here gives, word for word, the opinion of that gentleman, with his motives for it, all in his own hand writing, and ſigned by himſelf. This opinion Count Lally has exhibited in the courſe of the trial. It is as follows:

My opinion is, that we ſhould ſurrender ourſelves priſoners of war on the terms of the cartel concluded between his Britannic Majeſty and his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, agreeable to the above declaration of Monſieur Count Lally; our condition not permitting us to expect better terms, as we have but two days proviſion left. At Pondi-

chery

chery the 14th of January, 1761. Signed Dure, Lieutenant Colonel Commandant of the artillery.

Would any man of common honeſty, after reading the above opinion of Monſieur Dure, and in his own hand writing, imagine, that the ſelf ſame Monſieur Dure could be ſo bold as judicially to depoſe, that a paper was put into his hands to ſign, while he was running in haſte to a battery, without his knowing a word of what it contained. Yet he has depoſed it. Count Lally ſtops here, and leaves the public to judge Monſieur Dure.

It is this ſelf-ſame Monſieur Dure, who was commiſſioned to carry to the Engliſh Commander the capitulation drawn up by Count Lally and the council of war. It is by him and Monſieur Courtin, the laſt a member of the council of Pondichery, who were jointly charged to carry the capitulation drawn up by that body, ſo many extravagant ſpeeches have been put into the mouth of the Engliſh Commander, whom theſe two witneſſes aſſure the world they found diſpoſed to grant them all the conditions they could have aſked, had they been commiſſioned by Count Lally to aſk any.

As to the other articles, contained in this capitulation, drawn up by the council of Pon-

dichery, Count Lally acquieſced in them. But the Engliſh did not think them the leſs ridiculous. Accordingly, the account given of them to the Engliſh Court by the council of Madras is, as follows: *The deputies of the council of Pondichery, authoriſed by Monſieur de Lally, preſented Colonel Coote with ſeven articles, in which they aſked every thing that a place in the beſt ſtate of defence could expect; they aſked, in a word, that the Engliſh garriſon ſhould but relieve the French garriſon, till the concluſion of a peace. But theſe conditions were all rejected by him as they deſerved.*

Count Lally, on his ſide, ſends to Monſieur de Leyrit, by Father Lavaur, the minute of the capitulation drawn up by the council of war. Monſieur de Leyrit reads it; and, without making the leaſt remark upon it, ſends it back to Count Lally.

The day following, the 15th, Count Lally ſends Monſieur Dure to the Engliſh Commander with the capitulation of the council of war. At the ſame time, he ſends Monſieur Courtin a member of the council of Pondichery, and Monſieur Tobin an under-merchant, with that of the council of Pondichery.

And

And here it is worth obſerving, that this under-merchant was joined to Monſieur Courtin, and inveſted with the ſame powers, merely becauſe he was maſter of the Engliſh language. It is likewiſe worth obſerving, that this under-merchant has depoſed, that he did not hear a tittle of the pretended diſcourſe, which this Monſieur Courtin has put into the mouth of the Engliſh Commander, and of which the abſurdity alone is ſufficient to prove the falſehood. For how could this Commander have told Monſieur Courtin, that Count Lally offered him the town at diſcretion, ſeeing Count Lally demanded, as conditions, the execution of the cartel? How could this Commander have told Monſieur Courtin. "I would willingly grant you conditions, but Monſieur de Lally will not accept of any?" Monſieur Courtin was not admitted to the preſence of the Engliſh Commander, but in virtue of Count Lally's commiſſion to him to aſk conditions. Monſieur Dure depoſes, that he did not aſſiſt at the conferences between Monſieur Courtin and the Engliſh Commander. Monſieur Tobin, Monſieur Courtin's colleague, depoſes the ſame thing. And Monſieur Courtin depoſes, that he had ſet aſide Monſieur Tobin as interpreter between him and the Engliſh Commander, and made uſe, in his ſtead, of the ſecretary of the Governor

of

of Madras. But this behaviour of Monſieur Courtin muſt be allowed very criminal. How could he know, if this interpreter of his, an enemy, faithfully tranſlated the anſwers of the Engliſh Commander? This Monſieur Courtin is weak enough to own himſelf guilty, in order to eſtabliſh an impoſture againſt Count Lally, and that on his bare word?

The Engliſh Commander gives his anſwer in writing to every article of the capitulation, which Count Lally demanded of him. He requires, that the garriſon and the inhabitants ſhould ſurrender themſelves, purely and ſimply, priſoners of war to his Britannic Majeſty, and promiſes to treat the inhabitants favourably, without contracting any other engagement. It is to be obſerved, that this is the very ſame anſwer, which Admiral Watſon had given Monſieur Renaut for the ſettlement of Chandernagor, and the other French factories in Bengal; and that it is the ſame, which Count Lally had given Mr. Winch for Fort St. David.

As to the other articles ſtipulated by the council of Pondichery, the Engliſh Commander refuſed them all, giving the deputies to underſtand, that he had taken particular notice, in his anſwer to Count Lally, of the treatment

treatment he was reſolved to grant the inhabitants of Pondichery.

Neither Monſieur Dure, deputed from the council of war, nor the gentlemen deputed from the council of Pondichery, nor Count Lally, nor the council of Pondichery, nor a ſingle inhabitant of Pondichery, expected better treatment; and an unqueſtionable proof of it is, that theſe deputies ſtaid quietly in the Engliſh camp, though but a ſmall half league from the place, from four o'clock in the afternoon till two o'clock the next morning; and that they ſupped there without giving Count Lally the leaſt notice of what kept them. Every corporal knows, that a perſon deputed from one enemy to another, though no better than a drum or a trumpet, is admitted the moment he preſents himſelf, and immediately ſent back with his anſwer.

Father Lavaur, who furniſhed the canvas for the impeachment which Count Lally's accuſers were to bring againſt him, knew nothing of this rule of war. Monſieur Courtin was equally ignorant of it. And Monſieur Dure, if he knew any thing of it, is not, as we have ſeen, very delicate in matter of perjury. Count Lally is poſſeſſed of three perjuries of this gentleman's, all in his own hand

hand writing; and all contradicting the depoſition of his now in queſtion.

The proof of this is, that the deputy, Monſieur Courtin, on coming back to Pondichery, went to bed without condeſcending to inform Count Lally, or even Monſieur de Leyrit, *whom at his confrontation he declares he always conſidered as his ſupreme and only Commander*, with the ſucceſs of his errand. It was, nevertheleſs, at eight that very morning, that the Engliſh were to take poſſeſſion of one of the gates according to the rules of war.

A capitulation is not cloſed, till the beſieged have ſubmitted to the terms, which the beſiegers think proper to impoſe upon them. Count Lally, therefore, might have renewed his fire, if theſe deputies had acquainted him, that the terms, which the Engliſh Commander was willing to grant, were not acceptible. They, conſequently, ſubmitted to them. And, if the Engliſh had inſiſted on the place's ſurrendering to them at diſcretion, or even upon more ſhameful terms, there would have been a neceſſity for ſubmitting, as there was no keeping them out. Monſieur de Leyrit and the council declare in their ſummons, that the garriſon was no longer in a condition to

defend

defend the place, though the fortifications of it had been compleat, againſt a ſimple eſcalade. The ſame Monſieur Courtin has depoſed, that, were it not for fear of his head, as he knew the place had but a few minutes ſubſiſtence left, (theſe are his words) he would have inſiſted on more advantageous terms. He agrees, therefore, that it is by the condition of a place, the right of the beſieged to inſiſt upon terms, or refuſe thoſe offered by the beſiegers, is to be determined.

Meſſieurs Dure and Courtin depoſe, that they did not ſo much as know, one the ſubject of the other's errand. They, nevertheleſs, ſet out together from Pondichery for the Engliſh camp. It was Monſieur Dure, who, the evening before, drew up the articles, of which Monſieur Courtin was the bearer. That is, therefore, as much as to ſay, that theſe two deputies, who ſet out from Pondichery together, remained ten hours together in the Engliſh Commander's anti-chamber, without either of them aſking the other, "What brought you here?" In things of leſs moment, ſuch witneſſes would be ſent to a mad-houſe. Monſieur Dure goes ſtill further. He ſays, that he did not ſo much as know the ſubject of his own errand; that he received a letter to carry; that he waited

nine

nine hours for an anſwer; and that he knows no more of the matter. Yet he gave under his hand, that, at nine in the morning, a gate ſhould be given up to the Engliſh. Such are the two witneſſes confronted with Count Lally on the capitulation of Pondichery; witneſſes, who contradict each other upon all the circumſtances relative to that capitulation; witneſſes, one of whom was by Count Lally convicted of and reprimanded for fraud, the other embezzlement; and both convicted of giving falſe teſtimony.

The fact is. Had Count Lally delayed but ſix hours longer to give up the place to the enemy, the French troops and inhabitants would have found themſelves under a neceſſity of quitting it, to give themſelves up to him at diſcretion.

The fact is, that, the council of Pondichery having refuſed to concur with Count Lally in this capitulation, Count Lally was obliged to wait this laſt extremity, fearing leſt the Count d'Aché's ſquadron ſhould appear on the coaſt the next quarter of an hour after he had capitulated without their concurrence. It is then the council of Pondichery would have ſupported their impoſtures, by the appearance of an underſtanding between Count Lally and the Engliſh; that they would have accuſed

accuſed him of being in a hurry to put the Engliſh in poſſeſſion of the place. They would have then depoſed, that the magazines were ſtill full; that the garriſon was in a condition to attack the Engliſh, and would have beat them; they would ſuppoſe the arrival of ſome deſerter or peaſant, by whom Count Lally might have been informed, that the French ſquadron had appeared on the coaſt.

There was, therefore, a neceſſity for Count Lally's proving, by ſome authentic act of the council of Pondichery, before he gave up that place, the actual condition of it, as well as of its garriſon. The council of Pondichery's concurring with Count Lally in the capitulation would have prevented their advancing, and thereby rendered uſeleſs, all the abominations they were then forging againſt him; and this is the reaſon why they refuſed to concur with him. It was impoſſible not to make a bad capitulation. They, therefore, wanted, that Count Lally alone ſhould make it, in order to be able to lay the blame of it entirely at his door. Count Lally's letters to Meſſieurs de Leyrit and Landiviſiau prove, that he ſaw into the iniquity of their deſigns.

The truth, in a word, is, that Pondichery obtained the ſame conditions, and the ſame treatment,

treatment, with all the places taken by Count Lally from the Engliſh, and by the Engliſh from Count Lally, during the whole courſe of the war, in conſequence of the inſtructions ſent by the Engliſh and French Companies to their reſpective factories in the Indies.

But Count Lally might have ſpared himſelf the trouble of anſwering all the abſurdities advanced by the two foregoing deputies, and exaggerated by the other witneſſes, whom theſe deputies have taken care to lecture on the pretended poſſibility of obtaining more advantageous terms for the inhabitants of Pondichery; and confine himſelf to the following fact.

The Governor of Madras, who had repaired to the Engliſh army in order to direct the capitulation to be granted Pondichery, had in his pocket the duplicate of the inſtructions given to the Counts Lally and d'Aché. This duplicate was that very duplicate, which Monſieur de Leyrit had received from court, and which he had communicated to his Fellow Governor of Madras. Count Lally knows, that Monſieur de Leyrit and Father Lavaur have given out, that theſe inſtructions were taken in a boat, which Monſieur de Leyrit had, four-

teen

teen days before the ſurrender of Pondichery, diſpatched privately with ſome other effects to Tranquebar. But what reaſon could Monſieur de Leyrit have for not keeping by him theſe inſtructions? What reaſon could he have for expoſing them in a boat to the Engliſh ſquadron then in the road, while the communication was open by land; and while more than 200 priſoners, beſides members of the council, officers, ſervants of the Company, Friars, and others, with paſſes from the Engliſh Commander, were quitting Pondichery to go to Madras, Tranquebar belonging to the Danes, and Pullicat and Negapatnam belonging to the Dutch. Nay, two months before, this ſelf-ſame Monſieur de Leyrit ſent thirty cheſts to Tranquebar, in a veſſel for which Mr. Law had obtained a paſs from the Engliſh Admiral.

Be it treaſon, be it indiſcretion in Monſieur de Leyrit, the fact is, that the Governor of Madras had the very duplicate of Count Lally and the Count d'Aché's inſtructions, which the court had ſent to Monſieur de Leyrit.

The fact is, that the Governor of Madras cites theſe inſtructions in his manifeſto, to juſtify the rigour with which he treated Pon-

dichery, when the Engliſh Commanders had put him in poſſeſſion of it.

The fact is, that theſe inſtructions, which the Engliſh cauſed to be printed and publiſhed, forbid Count Lally and the Count d'Aché to grant any conditions to the Engliſh ſettlements they might conquer; and injoined them to tranſport all the inhabitants, both civil and military without diſtinction, to the Iſland of Bourbon. Accordingly, theſe very Engliſh have made a merit, in the eyes of all Europe, of having treated, when they took Pondichery, the French Letter, than the French had orders to treat them, had they taken Madras.

Count Lally now appeals to the impartial world, if he could expect better conditions from the Engliſh, than thoſe which the Engliſh could prove he would have granted to them? He calls upon the moſt prejudiced to declare, what they can alledge againſt a fact of this nature, and ſo clearly proved.

Monſieur de Leyrit, therefore, is alone to blame for the Engliſh Commander's having refuſed Count Lally the terms he required, though this Commander had not been authoriſed to refuſe them by the condition, in which the place was when put into his hands. Monſieur de Leyrit, therefore, is alone reſponſible

ſponſible for the demolition of the houſes at Pondichery, as well the one hundred and four European houſes, as thoſe belonging to the Blacks, of which this factory conſiſted.

But what puniſhment can be bad enough for a witneſs, Monſieur Courtin is the man, who dares to depoſe, that the Engliſh commander ſhewed him the declaration of Count Lally and the council of war, by which they offered to ſurrender themſelves at diſcretion; whereas Monſieur Dure, his collegue, depoſes, that the Engliſh Commander ſaid, "I conſent to receive the troops and the inhabitants priſoners of his Britannic Majeſty, but it muſt be at diſcretion." Count Lally, therefore, did not offer to ſurrender at diſcretion. Nevertheleſs, theſe two witneſſes had ſeen, and one of them had even ſigned, the declaration of the council of war. What is more ſtill, the Engliſh Commander's anſwer had been interpreted to them. Monſieur Dure would have done very ill to take charge of it, without knowing what it contained; and for the ſame reaſon, that Monſieur Dure was to get interpreted by Monſieur Tobin the declaration written in French, as the Engliſh Commander did not underſtand the French, he ſhould have got interpreted the anſwer in Engliſh of this Commander, as he (Monſieur Dure) did not underſtand the Engliſh. A

man ſhould have a pardon in his pocket to advance ſuch abſurdities and contradictions.

In a word, it was not Count Lally, it was a council of war, that ſettled and ſigned the form, in which Pondichery ſhould be ſurrendered to the Engliſh, and the terms to be aſked of them. The laws have not injoined any ſet forms for a capitulation.

A capitulation, is generally, a paper written by the beſieged, in which they deſire to be allowed ſuch and ſuch terms on delivering the place to the beſiegers; and another paper written by the beſiegers, in which they allow or refuſe the beſieged ſuch and ſuch terms. Count Lally produces theſe reſpective writings. After all, a capitulation would ſtill be a capitulation, though there ſhould be no writing on either ſide, but merely words of honour.

Count Lally aſked for Pondichery all the conditions that any man could poſſibly expect, as well by Monſieur Dure, as by authoriſing Monſieur Courtin to propoſe thoſe extravagant terms, with which the council had charged him, though he (Count Lally) knew full well, that Monſieur Courtin would never obtain them. And, indeed, how could it be expected, that the Engliſh Commander ſhould grant Monſieur Courtin ſuch extravagant terms,

terms, when he refuſed to grant much more moderate and reaſonable ones to Monſieur Dure. It cannot, ſurely, be expected, that a man, who refuſes to grant a little, ſhould yet be willing to grant a great deal.

The opinion of a council of war has ever been deemed ſufficient to juſtify a General in all critical operations. The Princes of the blood, the Father of the King himſelf, have ſubmitted to councils of war. It is impoſſible to attack the capitulation, the declaration, the letter; in a word, the writing, by which Count Lally ſurrendered Pondichery to the Engliſh, without attacking all thoſe who ſigned that writing. It would be running counter to all the laws and cuſtoms of war.

But it is impoſſible to attack either Count Lally or the council of war, on the capitulation of Pondichery. They had taken the only method to prevent, as much as in them lay, not only the deſtruction of the houſes, but even the demolition of the fortifications, by putting it into the hands of his Britannic Majeſty inſtead of the Engliſh Company. His Britannic Majeſty's Commanders took poſſeſſion of it as ſuch; and, when they afterwards ſaw themſelves obliged to give it up to the Engliſh Company, on that Company's officers refuſing to ſubſiſt their forces, they formally oppoſed the demolition of it, as

being a *royal conqueſt*, (theſe are their words) and immediately depending upon his Britannic Majeſty. The proof of this aſſertion is to be found in the manifeſto of the council of Madras; and even in the verbal proceſs, which the council of Pondichery made on the ſurrender of that place, and two months after that event ſent to court. This council had not as yet forged all thoſe abominable lies, which they ſince agreed in Paris to depoſe againſt Count Lally, as ſoon as by their cabals they had contrived to put it out of his power to defend himſelf.

But what! Is it poſſible, that all the councils of war held by the Count d'Aché on board his ſquadron to juſtify his not ſailing to Madras, at Count Lally's requiſition, immediately after the taking of Fort St. David, ſhould be deemed ſufficient for that purpoſe? to juſtify his returning, after a four months ſtay on the coaſt, to the Madagaſcar Iſlands, before the ſeaſon required it; and his abandoning Count Lally for thirteen months together, in ſpite of the reſolutions and proteſts of the council of Pondichery? to juſtify his again abandoning Pondichery, the year following, after a ſtay of twenty-four hours only in the road of it, and returning to the Madagaſcar Iſlands, in ſpite of the repreſentations of the council of Pondichery,

Pondichery, and the joint and unanimous proteſt of all the ſeveral civil and religious communities of the ſettlement, purpoſely aſſembled to oppoſe his taking that ſtep? to juſtify, in a word, his not coming to the relief of Pondichery during the whole courſe of the fifteen months immediately preceding the ſurrender of it, though he knew it to be at the laſt gaſp; and even his not ſending four or five veſſels of his ſquadron, which would have been ſufficient to ſave it; and, that too, contrary to the opinion of the council of Mauritius, and even ſome of his own officers?

And can it be at the ſame time poſſible, that all the councils of war, all the reſolutions of the council of Pondichery, at which Count Lally aſſiſted, and by which he regulated his principal operations, ſhould not only be deemed null and of no effect towards his juſtification, becauſe he aſſiſted at them, and gave his opinion like all the other members; but that he ſhould even be made reſponſible for the events, that have happened in conſequence thereof?

Is it poſſible, that winds, waves, and other circumſtances peculiar to a ſea war, ſhould be deemed ſufficient for the acquittal of the Count d'Aché, in regard to the three battles, in which he happened to be worſted; and that it ſhould be made a crime

in Count Lally, that out of ten battles he loſt one, in which he had but 1250 men to fight 2600; that with 1500 men he could not drive from the neighbourhood of Pondichery 15,000, ſupported by fourteen veſſels of the line anchored in the road of the ſelf-ſame Pondichery; and oblige theſe forces to raiſe the blockade of it?

It would be odious to admit ſuch a contraſt; it is, even, impoſſible to conceive it. It ſhocks reaſon, wounds juſtice, and is repugnant to humanity.

Though Count Lally has not been heard as to his military conduct; though he has not been permitted to challenge, at the ſame time, his accuſers and witneſſes upon this head, as being foreign to the tenor of his Majeſty's commiſſion, and a ſubject upon which the Parliament did not propoſe to ſit; he is not the leſs ready to give an account of it, when he has gone through his trial for extortion and treaſon, (crimes, which his accuſers have endeavoured to fix upon him without one of them daring to point out any particular inſtance of his guilt) if the King is of opinion, that his military conduct ought to be enquired into by military men, whether his ſuperiors or equals, properly qualified to form a judgment of it.

The

The Count d'Aché, it is true, declared at his interrogatory, that he did not think himſelf obliged to anſwer upon that head; and his anſwering upon it was, accordingly, diſpenſed with. Count Lally, out of his regard to juſtice, contented himſelf with ſaying, that he was not afraid of being able to juſtify his military conduct, when he ſhould be ſupplied with the means of doing it allowed by the laws, but which he has not as yet been able to obtain.

The operations of a General are far more complex than thoſe of an Admiral; and, conſequently, require a much longer diſcuſſion.

An Admiral, wherever he goes, carries his magazines along with him. He is not liable to delays for want of ſubſiſtence. He does not ſtand in need of money. Wherever he is, there is his artillery, and that, too, ready mounted, without the expence or trouble of buying and feeding cattle to draw it. He has no defiles, no hollow ways, no mountains, no woods, no rivers, to paſs; no poſts to attack or defend; no fatigues to bear in marching and counter-marching; no earth to dig and remove. He has his enemy conſtantly in ſight, and can diſtinguiſh all his operations. He is not afraid of his men deſerting him. When to the windward of an enemy, he fights

fights him when, and as much only, as he pleaſes. When to the leeward, he may, if he fails as well, avoid him without danger or diſgrace. In a word, the ſucceſs of a ſea fight depends entirely on the ſkill and courage of the Commander, who has all the parts of his machine within his reach and under his eye, and can direct them by a ſingle ſignal, without any obſtacle from the ſtage on which he acts, eſpecially in the Indian ſeas, which are always calm, and where the winds, for ſix months together, blow regularly from the ſame quarter.

A General has none of theſe advantages. He has conſtantly all the oppoſite inconveniences to contend with. Hence it may be gathered, that an enquiry into the military conduct of a General requires a diſcuſſion, of which military men alone can be ſuppoſed capable. Such men, were they to enquire into Count Lally's conduct, would be aſtoniſhed at his operations in the Indies, conſidering the means with which he was provided for carrying them on. He was ſubordinate, in all his enterpriſes, to the motions of a ſquadron, which, every time it appeared on the coaſt, was unfortunate enough to fly before that of the Engliſh; thereby leaving them maſters of the Indian ſeas for three years together.

together. He was totally abandoned by this ſame ſquadron during the ſixteen months immediately preceding the loſs of Pondichery. He was ſubordinate to a Governor charged with procuring him the neceſſary funds, and who ſuffered him, notwithſtanding, to want them ſix weeks after his landing at Pondichery. He found himſelf at the head of an army every moment threatening to revolt for want of pay, and often for want of ſubſiſtence; an army, which twice deſerted its colours to go over to the enemy; an army, which had always ſea and land forces to ſtruggle with, an army in its front, and a fleet of fourteen ſhips in its rear; and that without receiving the ſmalleſt aſſiſtance from Europe; at the head, in ſhort, of a council of merchants, who, enraged at ſeeing a Commiſſary from his Majeſty, eſpecially a military man, come from Europe to enquire into their conduct, combined to make all his enterpriſes miſcarry, and gave out, before he arrived, that they would make the gentlemen of Paris (meaning the Directors) ſick of ſending to them any more rulers immediately inveſted with the royal authority; a council compoſed of men, who have been conſtantly in league againſt all ſuch rulers; a council compoſed of thoſe very men, who made an attempt on the life of Monſieur de la Bourdonnois; who obliged Monſieur de Godeheu to fly Pondichery

chery in about ſeven months after his arrival, though his inſtructions were to reſide there three years; and who, during his ſtay there, laid him under the neceſſity of taking uncommon precautions for the ſafety of his perſon; who drove from Pondichery Monſieur Clouet, appointed Commiſſary to enquire into their adminiſtration; who made an attempt on the life of Count Lally, and cloſed the ſcene by actually murdering the Intendant of his army. He was at the head of thoſe men, whoſe maſters, on Count Lally's departure from Europe, gave him, in writing, an account of their embezzlements, and never ceaſed threatening them during his ſtay in the Indies, and injoining the Count to chaſtiſe them.

All theſe facts are ſupported by proofs in writing, and theſe proofs are in the proper offices.

Count Lally finiſhes this ſhort review by an obſervation, which he cannot too often repeat. He was put under arreſt in conſequence of a cry of extortion raiſed againſt him by a cabal of men, whom he had himſelf accuſed, and offered to convict, of that very crime. Theſe men have not been able to furniſh the ſhadow of a proof againſt him upon that head. When he had been confined fifteen months, they took

took it into their heads to give out, that they ſuſpected him of having had an underſtanding with the enemy. This groſs artifice having failed of ſucceſs for want of proofs, they now confine themſelves to an impeachment of his military conduct, of which, though they had been witneſſes to it, they are not qualified to judge. But they will ſoon be confounded, ſince there is not a ſingle imputation of theirs, of which Count Lally has not ſufficiently cleared himſelf.

MEMOIRS OF COUNT LALLY.

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE REAL CAUSES OF THE LOSS OF THE INDIES.

SINCE the loſs of Pondichery, the public has thought of nothing elſe. It is ſtill the chief ſubject of every converſation. No ſtone has been left unturned to make Count Lally the author of that misfortune. It is time the deluſion ſhould ceaſe. Count Lally did not ſet out for the Indies without the ſtricteſt orders to enquire into the abuſes committed there, and puniſh them. The perſons guilty of theſe abuſes were even pointed out to him. At his arrival, he found

found every thing in the moſt ſhocking diſorder. He had to puniſh embezzlements, diſobedience, theft, baſeneſs, cowardice, mutiny. He had to bring back to their duty ſome officers, who neglected it. Hence the league formed againſt him by a number of men conſcious that they were ruined themſelves, if they did not ruin Count Lally. Hence that inveteracy, with which they have kept up the notion conceived by the public, that he was, alone, the author of the loſs of the Indies.

On his return to Europe, Count Lally offered the Miniſtry and the Company to prove the mal-practices, which he had been obliged to enquire into; and even bring back into the coffers of the Company ſeveral millions, which would have reſtored their commerce from the very firſt year of the peace.

Is it ſurpriſing, that the perſons guilty of ſo many enormities ſhould endeavour to ſtifle Count Lally's voice? It is, indeed, very odd, ſo odd as to do their underſtanding little honour, that they ſhould think of charging him with thoſe very crimes and diſorders, which they themſelves committed, as appears by the accounts laid by him before the Miniſtry and the Company.

In a ſcandalous memorial, preſented to the Miniſtry, theſe men have been very liberal in their promiſes to furniſh proofs againſt Count Lally; but, after four years ſpent in looking for them, they have not as yet been able to produce any. On the contrary, the proofs of Count Lally againſt them are to be found in pieces written and ſigned by themſelves. Yet, what can ſcarce be believed, the Directors of the Company have rejected theſe pieces, without ſo much as vouchaſing to caſt an eye on them. Nay, they have ſollicited the Miniſtry to acquaint Count Lally, even in the King's name, that they would not receive any of the eclairciſſements, with which he offered to ſupply them.

Theſe gentlemen have, moreover, declared to the Miniſtry, that they were ſatisfied with the conduct of their Council and other ſervants in the Indies, though Count Lally has by him more than twenty pieces ſigned by theſe very Directors, expreſſing their diſſatisfaction with theſe very ſervants, and requeſting him to ſee them puniſhed.

The gentlemen of this council arrive in Europe without either their books or their regiſters. Nay, they are not ſo much as called upon for them. They all faſten, as creditors, upon the Company, each certifying for the juſtice of the other's demand. The Di-

Directors admit theſe demands. They approve the accounts of Monſieur de Leyrit and Deſvaux, the Company's ſtewards in the Indies, who had driven away a Commiſſary, ſent there by the Company purpoſely to examine theſe accounts, againſt which half the council of Pondichery had ſolemnly proteſted. It is only the right of the officers to their pay, the price of their blood, which the Directors call into queſtion. But Count Lally, on his leaving the Indies, made the council's clerk give him an abſtract of their regiſters. Why did not the gentlemen of the Council bring ſuch an abſtract with them to Europe? Have they been employed theſe four years paſt in forging new regiſters? They run no riſk in doing it. Their regiſters will never be compared with the abſtract Count Lally thought proper to provide himſelf with. It is not, but that many of the members of the old direction, in particular the Marquis de Montmorency, Meſſieurs Cauſabon, Michel, Rothe, &c. have exclaimed againſt theſe ſhameful proceedings, ſo detrimental to the true intereſts of the Company. Nay, Monſieur Rothe, eſtabliſhed in quality of Commandant at Port l'Orient, can bear witneſs, that Father Lavaur, at his landing, had not as yet dared to conceive againſt Count Lally that ſupplement of horrid crimes, which he afterwards thought proper to inſert in his libel

at Paris, on finding himſelf ſupported by the clamours of the public.

The Miniſtry themſelves, when they cauſed Count Lally to be put under arreſt, charged him with nothing but extortion. The commiſſion iſſued by the King fifteen months after made no diſtinction between him and the other India men, in the enquiry his Majeſty ordered his Parliament to make into the extortions committed in the Indies. Count Lally was not ſo much as named in it.

He cannot believe, it is impoſſible any one ſhould, that a libel found amongſt the papers of Father Lavaur, after the death of that Father, ſhould not only produce an amneſty in favour of all the India men, except Count Lally; but make all the faults and all the crimes, that might have been committed there, fall upon him. The Miniſtry knew of this libel, when the firſt commiſſion was iſſued. The Miniſtry have had in their hands, theſe two years paſt, the charges brought againſt Count Lally by his enemies. In all that time, they heard of nothing but extortion. The ſuſpicion of high treaſon was an afterclap, by way of ſupplement to their former calumnies. This ſuſpicion was mentioned in the ſecond commiſſion. It was alledged againſt Count Lally as a motive

motive for refuſing him the aſſiſtance of council.

The calumnies, with which Count Lally's enemies have charged him in a multiplicity of libels, all tend to perſuade the public, that he was the author, not only of the loſs of Pondichery, but of the whole Indies. They tend to perſuade the public, that the loſs of Pondichery has occaſioned the decay of the Company's commerce, and the preſent critical ſituation of the Company itſelf. Here are two groſs impoſtures, which Count Lally thinks it incumbent on him to lay open.

Bengal was the moſt precious, indeed the only lucrative, ſettlement the Company had in the Indies. This ſettlement had been loſt a year before Count Lally's arrival. The loſs of it could not but be followed by that of Pondichery, which, exhauſted by a twenty years war, drew from Bengal the greateſt part of its ſubſiſtence. The Governor and the Council of Pondichery might have prevented the loſs of Bengal, the forces the French Company then had in the Indies being twice ſtronger than thoſe of the Engliſh Company. The Council of Pondichery are not ſo much as queſtioned about this neglect, though all the memorials of the miniſtry and the Directors, as well as all their letters to Count Lally, ſpeak

of nothing but the greatneſs of this loſs, and the impoſſibility of ſupporting the commerce of the Company in the Indies without Bengal.

The Company reaped no profit from its trade on the Coromandel coaſt, through the miſmanagement of the Council of Pondichery. This appears plainly by all the memorials of the Company. The lands poſſeſſed by the factories of Pondichery and Maſuli-patnam upon that coaſt were not ſufficient to defray the expences of theſe factories; and yet it was a common thing with the Company's ſtewards there to make immenſe fortunes.

The revenues of the four provinces made over to Monſieur de Buſſy, by way of ſecurity for the maintenance of 800 men about Salabetzingue's perſon, were not ſufficient for that purpoſe. Monſieur de Buſſy makes a demand on the Company of two millions, advanced by him for the maintenance of that body, to whom there was, notwithſtanding, due two millions more, when Monſieur de Buſſy threw up the command of it; not to ſpeak of what he made himſelf by it; for which, however, he was not a whit the tenderer of the Company in calling upon them for what he ſays he diſburſed on their account. The advancing to a Company, by one of their ſervants, two millions of livres, without taking any ſecurity; and two millions more to private perſons

removing to places ſix thouſand leagues from the place this ſervant is going to reſide at, are, ſurely, phœnomena, which ſuppoſe, that things of this magnitude, when thus left to mere chance, are not concerns of the firſt rank in the fortune of ſuch ſervant. This digreſſion was neceſſary to expoſe the groſsneſs of the impoſtures advanced againſt Count Lally by his enemies, who, true to their ſyſtem of recrimination, continue to give out, that he is offering ſums of money to every one; and name ſome perſons in particular, who had received money from themſelves. Count Lally challenges the Indies and the whole world to prove, that he has ſo much as the ſhadow of any fortune, but that of which he has given the Miniſters an inventory. He will be the firſt to condemn himſelf for every crime laid to his charge, that they can prove againſt him. Let his enemies but ſubſcribe to the ſame conditions, and the Company will have ſoon repaired all its loſſes.

The loſs of Pondichery, which it is the intereſt of the gentlemen of the old direction, and the Company's ſtewards, to make the proprietors conſider as one and the ſame thing with the loſs of their commerce in the Indies, has contributed nothing towards the preſent condition of the Company.

The Company owed fifteen millions of livres in the Indies, according to the ſtate of their affairs, which Monſieur de Leyrit put into Count Lally's hands on his arrival there. Their credit there was ſo bad, that laterally the Dutch refuſed to lend them 240,000 livres, though the council of Pondichery offered cent. per cent. for it.

The Company ſent cloſe upon ſix millions of livres to the Indies during the whole courſe of a four years war. The regiſters of Pondichery, and the depoſitions of the Company's Treaſurers, prove, that the expences of the factory of Pondichery, in time of war, did not fall ſhort of a million of livres a month.

The Council of Pondichery borrowed cloſe upon three millions by iſſuing bank notes, one half of which, called in and burned by Count Lally's directions, is legally due; but not ſo the other half. Count Lally refuſed to allow them. This is a criminal monopoly, which Monſieur de Leyrit has not been afraid to authoriſe in ſpite of all Count Lally could do to hinder it. Thoſe, who ſhould now preſent theſe bank notes or their value in bills of exchange, muſt have made in the obtaining of them a profit of 1000 or 1500 per cent.

The

The Council of Pondichery received about a million of livres by the different taxes impoſed on that ſettlement. This debt is a juſt one.

The arrears of pay due to the army may amount to 1.200,000 or 1.500,000 livres, at moſt.

Thus, the four years war on the coaſt of Coromandel coſt the Company as follows:

Sent to the Indies - - -	6.000,000 livres
Amount of bank notes unpaid	1.500,000
Borrowed of the colony -	1.000,000
Arrears due to the army -	1.500,000
Total - - - - - - - - -	10.000,000 livres.

Hence it may be eaſily gathered, that the revenues of the country, the conqueſts made by Count Lally, and the reſources employed by him, muſt have ſupplied what this ſum fails ſhort of a million a month, during the firſt twenty months that he kept the Engliſh at bay; and that, theſe reſources once exhauſted, it was impoſſible not to yield to an enemy, who was daily receiving ſuccours in men and money from Europe.

The Engliſh ſent twice as many men, twice as many veſſels, and ten times as much money to the Indies, as the French did. The taking of Chandernegor was, alone, worth them ſeventy-five millions of livres, with which they drove us out of the Indies. The loſs of Bengal is not ſo much as ſpoken of. Is it becauſe Bengal was loſt by a ſervant of the Company?

The preſervation of Pondichery required a reinforcement of men and ſhips, and, of courſe, an extraordinary expence. The Council of Pondichery, who now attack Count Lally on the ſcore of this loſs, are the ſelf-ſame Council, who wrote to the Directors before his arrival, that, let them ſend what men or ſhips they pleaſed, Count Lally could hope for no ſucceſs, if they did not ſend ten millions of livres along with him. Now it is notorious, that not only one third of the men and ſhips, deſtined to act under Count Lally for the defence of the Indies, was kept from him, but that theſe ten millions of livres, called for by the council of Pondichery, were reduced to two millions, which the Governor of Pondichery made away with, in the firſt five and twenty days after Count Lally's arrival.

The

The ſaving of Pondichery would not have paid the fourteen millions of livres due by the Company in the Indies; and, conſequently, would not have reſtored the Company's credit, which, for ten years paſt, had been totally ruined. The Engliſh reſtored Pondichery at the concluſion of the peace, and the Company may again begin its trade there. This enemy has taken care to cramp and confine that, which the Company carried on in Bengal, becauſe it was the only trade in India, by which the Company was any gainer.

The loſs of Pondichery may, therefore, be reduced to that ſuffered by the demolition of the fortifications and one hundred and four European houſes, which made the whole of this factory. The putting of the fortifications in a better condition, than ever they were in, cannot amount to more than two millions of livres; nor the rebuilding of the European houſes to more than one million. Beſides, the rebuilding of the European houſes is no affair of the Company's, moſt of theſe houſes having been built with the embezzlements and thefts committed on the Company by the owners of them. The ſame owners are rich enough to rebuild them.

As

As to the houſes of the Blacks, which were likewiſe razed, the ground on which they ſtood formed the principal value of them. The Engliſh made no allowance to the Blacks, whoſe houſes Monſieur Dupleix ordered to be deſtroyed at Madras, and yet they were rebuilt in twelve months.

The whole of what the Engliſh found at Pondichery, in artillery, ammunition, or merchandize, was not worth a million of livres. The ſiege of Madras alone, though the place was not taken, coſt the Engliſh, by their own confeſſion, above ten millions of livres.

This detail, founded on the moſt exact truth, is ſufficient to deſtroy the falſe idea inſinuated by thoſe, who appear againſt Count Lally in the double character of accuſers and witneſſes, that the loſs of Pondichery makes a difference of forty millions of livres to the Company. Theſe witneſſes have exaggerated that loſs, in proportion to the abatement they make in valuing their own fortunes, and calculating the embezzlements they have been guilty of.

A real misfortune for the Company, in the loſs of Pondichery, is its having convinced the Black Princes of the country, that the

the maritime ſtrength of England is much ſuperior to that of France.

Count Lally will not, in this place, take upon him to lay open the miſbehaviour of a Governor and a Council, who could and ſhould have prevented the loſs of Bengal; and who, by their negligence to take the neceſſary precautions for that purpoſe, and their criminal ſquandering of the Company's money, accelerated the loſs of Pondichery.

He contents himſelf with proving, that, with land forces equal, or even ſuperior, to thoſe of the enemy, it was impoſſible to ſave Pondichery without a ſquadron, as long as the enemy had one. And he flatters himſelf, that the public will, at length, open their eyes to the real cauſes of this loſs, which, by way of recrimination, the Council of Pondichery are now endeavouring to lay at his door, after having, previous to it, and in conjunction with all the European inhabitants, and by a ſolemn act, ſignified to the Count d'Aché himſelf, that the loſs of Pondichery was entirely owing to the deſertion of it by his ſquadron, and that, too, ſixteen months before the place fell into the hands of the Engliſh.

The

The whole queſtion, therefore, may be reduced to this, whether with 3400 Europeans, which the Company had in the Indies under the command of Count Lally, but diſperſed over a tract of more than two hundred leagues, Count Lally, without money to pay theſe Europeans, and without a ſingle boat, could defend a coaſt of three hundred leagues, againſt three armies belonging to the Engliſh; one from Bengal, which had made a deſcent in one of the provinces, where Monſieur de Buſſy commanded, and from thence marched againſt Maſuli-patnam; another on the coaſt of Coromandel, to make head againſt that commanded by Count Lally in perſon; and both reinforced by a third army drawn from Bombay, and ſupported, beſides, by fourteen ſhips of the line.

It is an axiom in war, and every officer muſt know the truth of it, *that with one army it is impoſſible for a General to make head againſt two.* Did the Count d'Aché's ſquadron protect Count Lally's operations? Did Admiral Pococke's protect the operations of the Engliſh? The anſwer to theſe two queſtions will be a ſufficient refutation of all the lies, which the poiſonous tongues of the league formed againſt Count Lally have dared to propagate againſt him.

It has, aſſuredly, been clearly demonſtrated, that the Count d'Aché was defeated the firſt time he came to an anchor on the coaſt of Coromandel, and that he came to take ſhelter under the walls of Pondichery.

It has been demonſtrated, by letters reported in the courſe of this trial, that the Count d'Aché did not ſecond Count Lally in the operations he had propoſed againſt Madras, after the taking of Fort St. David.

It has been demonſtrated, that the Count d'Aché, on his putting to ſea three months after this, was defeated a ſecond time; that he a ſecond time took refuge under the walls of Pondichery, and afterwards abandoned the Indian ſeas to the Engliſh, in order to retreat to the Madagaſcar Iſlands.

It has been demonſtrated, that he did not appear again, in leſs than thirteen months, on the coaſt of Coromandel; that on reaching it he was defeated a third time; and that, after a ſtay, and that too a forced one, of nine days only in the road of Pondichery, he deſerted that place, never to ſhew himſelf there again.

It has been made equally evident, that for three years together the Engliſh ſquadron did

did not quit the coaſt; and that, during the four months of its wintering in the two firſt of theſe three years, the Commander of it never forgot to leave ſome frigates on the coaſt, to intercept any ſuccours, which might be coming to Pondichery.

It is impoſſible to have the ſlighteſt notion of the ſituation of the Indian coaſt, without being convinced, that no European ſettlement upon it can poſſibly hold out without the aſſiſtance of a ſquadron. All the memorials of the Company, all the letters of the Miniſtry, all the reſolutions of the ſeveral Councils in the Indies, all the inſtructions given to the Counts Lally and d'Aché, conſpire to eſtabliſh this truth. A few reflections, however, may render it ſtill more ſtriking.

Monſieur de Leyrit, to refute the charge, brought againſt him by the Council of Chandernagor, of his not having ſent them 300 men, which would have been ſufficient to ſave Bengal, alledged in his juſtification, that he was afraid to weaken the garriſon of Pondichery, leſt Admiral Watſon's ſquadron, then employed in Bengal itſelf, at three hundred leagues diſtance, ſhould, in the mean time, fall upon that place.

This

This ſquadron conſiſted of two large ſhips and three frigates. The Engliſh had not 300 men at Madras. Monſieur de Leyrit had 1200 regular troops. He had thoſe very invalids, thoſe very ſervants of the Company, thoſe very inhabitants, with which Count Lally's accuſers pretend that Count Lally might have afterwards defeated 4500 Engliſh. Monſieur de Leyrit was ſcared out of his wits by five Engliſh ſhips; and thoſe accuſers of Count Lally pretend, that he ſhould not have been frightened at fourteen ſhips of the line. Monſieur de Leyrit wrote at the ſame time to the Company, that, all the Engliſh forces being in Bengal, he was under no apprehenſions for Pondichery. Why, therefore, did he refuſe 300 men to preſerve Bengal?

The Chevalier de Soupire, a Major-General, arrived in the Indies, eight months before Count Lally, with 1100 men, and found 1000 at Pondichery. The ſix ſhips, which came with him, returned to the Madagaſcar Iſlands, in conſequence of a reſolution of the Council of Pondichery, who were under apprehenſions of the little Engliſh ſquadron in Bengal coming to attack them. Theſe ſame apprehenſions induced Monſieur de Leyrit, to the great aſtoniſhment of the Engliſh, to keep the Chevalier de Soupire from attempting any thing againſt them for eight months together. This the Engliſh take notice of in the

the account of the war in the Indies, which they ſent to London. In fact, Madras was then open on every ſide, and had but 300 men to garriſon it. Fort St. David was in a ruinous condition, and garriſoned by no more than 60. In a word, the Engliſh could not bring above 200 men into the field, and the Chevalier de Soupire had 2000. Theſe are notorious and well-proved facts, and yet no attention is paid them: they are not ſo much as thought of.

The very day Count Lally landed at Pondichery, he marched againſt Cudaloor and Fort St. David, with fewer troops than the Chevalier de Soupire had. Beſides, Fort St. David, inſtead of 60 Europeans, had now 700, beſides 2000 ſepoys or Black ſoldiers, to defend it; and the fortifications of it had been repaired; notwithſtanding which, Count Lally, in ſpite of the Count d'Aché's defeat, continued the attack, and took it.

Monſieur de Leyrit and part of the inhabitants of Pondichery began already to exclaim loudly againſt Count Lally's attempt upon Fort St. David. They treated it as raſhneſs, conſidering that the ſquadron of the Count d'Aché had been obliged to bury itſelf under the walls of Pondichery, and could not aſſiſt Count Lally in the ſiege; whereas the Engliſh

ſquadron

ſquadron, eight days after the engagement, put to ſea again. It had been already decided in the trading council of Pondichery, that a General and King's Commiſſary ſhould be to blame, though he ſhould meet with ſucceſs. Accordingly, Monſieur de Leyrit loſt no time in ſtopping Count Lally's progreſs, by declaring to him in leſs than a month after his arrival, that he had not wherewith to pay his army, or even ſubſiſt it.

The very day Count Lally ſaw himſelf rid of the Engliſh ſquadron, by its going to winter at Bombay, he took the field again; drove the Engliſh even into Madras; and with 2700 European ſoldiers undertook the ſiege of that place, defended by 1600 regular troops, 400 of the Company's ſervants, inhabitants or invalids, and 3000 Black ſoldiers who, though deemed of no account in the field, are equal to Europeans behind a wall. It muſt be allowed, that Monſieur de Vauban, in treating of the attack of places, never calculated that proportion, in which every man of the beſieged is deemed equal to five of the beſiegers. In this caſe, the beſieged were almoſt double the beſiegers; and yet Count Lally would, perhaps, have taken Madras, ſince he ſucceeded ſo far as to open it, were it not for the arrival of a reinforcement to it of ſix ſhips and 600 men; and

did he not apprehend, leſt theſe ſix ſhips ſhould, in twelve hours, as very well they might, bear down upon Pondichery, then without a ſingle ſoldier to oppoſe an eſcalade, by which 300 men might have carried it.

Nevertheleſs, the not taking of Madras has been imputed as a crime to Count Lally by the very ſame council, which never thought of imputing as a crime to Monſieur Dupleix his having miſcarried thrice before Cudaloor, twice before Arcot, twice before Tritchanopoly, beſides having had two whole armies ſucceſſively made priſoners before it. But he was a ſervant of the Company's; and, as Monſieur Godeheu ſays in his letter of the 25th of November 1743 to Monſieur Dupleix; *I don't know how you will have treated the Son of one of us? The Father is a Director; that is ſaying enough.*

Count Lally, when he raiſed the ſiege of Madras, had 2200 men under arms, whom he left to the command of the Chevalier de Soupire. The Engliſh, in conſequence of the reinforcement they had received, were nearly as ſtrong. In leſs than ſix weeks after the raiſing of the ſiege, the vanguard of their ſquadron made its appearance on the coaſt. Upon this, they took the field; marched againſt

againſt the Chevalier de Soupire, who lay encamped under the walls of Conjeveram on the left banks of the *Palear*; drove him from his poſt; made him abandon all the country on theſe banks belonging to the diſtrict of Arcot, which Count Lally had conquered the year before; and even croſs the river. It is not to be preſumed, that the Chevalier de Soupire, as ſtrong in Europeans as the enemy, would have avoided a battle, did he not fear, leſt the ſix ſhips arrived at Madras, joined to Admiral Pococke's ſquadron, ſhould cut off his return to Pondichery.

In this poſition, what could Count Lally do? What ſhould he have done? His firſt ſtep was to return to the poſt, which the Chevalier de Soupire had abandoned. But it was now too late. The enemy had fortified it. The terror of their arms had even reached Pondichery. The inhabitants made it a crime in Count Lally to undertake this expedition, and leave Pondichery twenty leagues behind him, expoſed to the inſults of the Engliſh ſquadron. Had Count Lally ſent a detachment to quiet the minds of the inhabitants of Pondichery, he would have weakened himſelf, and expoſed himſelf to the danger of being defeated by the enemy. Therefore, the wiſeſt thing he could do was, to obſerve the motions of the Engliſh, and take

poſt between them and Pondichery, in order to be near enough to ſave that place by a forced march of four and twenty hours, in caſe their ſquadron ſhould make any attempt in his rear; and thereby gain time for the arrival of the Count d'Aché's ſquadron.

Count Lally might ſpare himſelf the trouble of giving, in this place, a detail of the numberleſs forced poſitions, to which the continual dread he was under from a ſquadron at his back obliged him. He might add, that, at this very juncture, his army was without pay. But he has undertaken to prove, that, though his army had been ſuperior to that of the Engliſh, as, indeed, it was not, the advantages derived by the Engliſh army from the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh ſquadron were too great to be calculated.

The three factories belonging to the French Company on the coaſt of Coromandel are Maſuli-patnam, Pondichery, and Karical. Theſe three factories occupied one hundred and thirty leagues of the coaſt, interſected by the poſſeſſions of the Engliſh, the Danes, the Dutch, and the Princes of the country.

Let any military man judge, what diſpoſition can be made with only 2200 men to defend

defend a coaſt of one hundred and thirty leagues, againſt a ſquadron of fourteen ſhips of the line, even if theſe 2200 men had no army to make head againſt. Let him judge, how, with 2200 men, it is poſſible to hinder ſuch a ſquadron from making a deſcent at one or the other of the extremities of ſuch an extent; and, at the ſame time, defend twenty-three places or forts up the country; a country from which, it is well known, no revenue or ſubſiſtence can be drawn without an armed force? No doubt, a few Europeans, with a great many Blacks, are ſufficient to defend theſe poſts; but the Blacks don't ſerve without pay; and Monſieur de Leyrit did not give them any.

Should Count Lally have ſent a detachment to the aſſiſtance of Maſuli-patnam, attacked by the Engliſh army from Bengal? In that caſe, the Engliſh ſquadron would have remained before Pondichery; the Engliſh army would have attacked that of Count Lally weakened by the detachment ſent to Maſuli-patnam, and the reinforcement thrown into Pondichery. Count Lally, therefore, would have no longer been able to keep the field in the preſence of this army. It was, therefore, neceſſary, that he ſhould employ his whole ſtrength in the defence of Pondichery, though, by ſo doing, he left the Engliſh maſters of the open country.

But the Engliſh ſquadron, then finding Pondichery too ſtrong for it, would have made for Karical our ſouthermoſt factory, thirty leagues from Pondichery, as it, in fact, afterwards did. Had there been a neceſſity for ſending part of the garriſon of Pondichery, to reinforce that of Karical, the Engliſh ſquadron would have returned to Pondichery, already ſtraitened by the Engliſh army; and, conſequently, have made it neceſſary to recall the detachment ſent to Karical, in order to reinforce Pondichery, and the army which protected it. But, in that caſe, the Engliſh ſquadron might have returned to Karical in twenty-four hours. It is aſked, if an army can keep up with a ſquadron? and if it is not abſurd to ſuppoſe, that a coaſt of one hundred and thirty leagues may be defended without a ſquadron. Accordingly, the Engliſh ſquadron, having met with no oppoſition, ſeized ſucceſſively all the eſtabliſhments we had on that coaſt to the right and left of Pondichery.

As ſoon as this ſquadron had maſtered the whole coaſt, it came to an anchor in the road of Pondichery, to the amount of fourteen ſhips of the line and three frigates, whoſe crews made very near 7000 Europeans. The Engliſh army, 4000 Europeans and 4000 Blacks ſtrong, appeared, at the ſame time, four leagues from Pondichery,

in order to form the blockade of it. Count Lally had but 1350 Europeans, and 600 Blacks to oppoſe to them. Some of the witneſſes againſt Count Lally have been mad enough to ſwear, that he might have gathered together in Pondichery 3000 Europeans, as well regular troops, as invalids, Company's ſervants, valets, and other inhabitants, &c. and that with this fine hoſt he might have engaged and beat the 4000 Engliſh, who beſieged it. But, beſides that this number is exaggerated by one third, what could have hindered the Engliſh ſquadron from landing, in the mean time, men enough to maſter Pondichery, ſtripped of all its Europeans? A body of 300 men would have been ſufficient for that purpoſe. And if theſe 4000 Engliſhmen had beat, as one may eaſily ſuppoſe they would, the ban and arriere-ban of Pondichery, what would become of the place itſelf in four and twenty hours?

The account taken by the Engliſh of the Europeans made priſoners of war in Pondichery makes them amount to 2060, including, along with the regular troops, the invalids, ſailors, Company's ſervants, friars, valets, workmen, and other inhabitants, with their wives and children. It is now aſked, what became of the 3000 fighting men, with which it has been impudently depoſed that Count Lally might have beat the Engliſh?

It is aſked, what is the world to think of Monſieur de Leyrit, who, in a printed petition preſented to the council of Madras, is not afraid to tell an enemy, that *he allows they have reaſon to be offended with Count Lally's treatment of the inhabitants of Fort St. David; but that they muſt at the ſame time allow, that Count Lally has ſufficiently repaired that injury, by inviting the Engliſh to come and take poſſeſſion of Pondichery, with more men to defend it, than the Engliſh had to attack it?* Such enormities would not be credited, were they not upon record in a public act. It was, however, a friar, it was Father Lavaur who drew up this act. This Jeſuit was the moſt holy man in all the Indies, and Monſieur de Leyrit paſſed for the honeſteſt.

Here, therefore, Count Lally proves from the muſters of the Commiſſary, that he had but 700 regular troops to defend Pondichery againſt an army of 4500 Engliſh, and an Engliſh ſquadron of fourteen ſhips of the line, containing 7000 Engliſh more and 10,000 Blacks. Now, if 2700 Europeans ſhould have taken 5000 men in Madras, a place open to the ſea, 11,500 Engliſh could not, certainly, but take 700 men in Pondichery blocked up by ſea as well as by land.

Count

Count Lally hopes he will be allowed to have proved, that it is impoſſible for an army to keep up with a ſquadron; and that, of courſe, a ſquadron muſt have time to poſſeſs itſelf, one by one, of all the places on a coaſt, before an army can come to their aſſiſtance by land; in a word, that an army, by attempting to watch the motions of a ſquadron within a ſtretch of thirty leagues only, would, in a month's time, be ſo worn down, as not to be able to fire a ſingle muſket.

All Count Lally has now to do, is to anſwer two conjectures, which his accuſers have ventured to throw out againſt him. The firſt is, that, had he taken Madras (as, according to them, he might have done) Pondichery had never been attacked. The ſecond is, that, had he not loſt the battle of Vandiwaſh (which, according to them, he ſhould not have riſked) Pondichery had never been taken.

It has been proved, that, for want of a ſquadron, the moſt the taking of Madras, and even the gaining of the battle of Vandiwaſh, could do, was to retard the loſs of Pondichery for ſix or twelve months. It is even to be remarked, that, from the very day the Engliſh took poſſeſſion of Pondichery, they had two years and a half before them to reduce it by famine,

famine, ſince the account of a peace being concluded did not reach the Indies till the expiration of that term.

In this ſuppoſition, how would it have been poſſible for Count Lally, deprived of all kind of communication with Europe and the inland country, to ſubſiſt Pondichery for theſe two years? How could he have paid his troops, who had already gone twelve months without pay? The Engliſh ſquadron alone would have been ſufficient to take Pondichery without the aſſiſtance of an army. A body of 500 Black horſemen would have been ſufficient to ſtarve it out by ravaging its corn grounds; and the uſual mortality among troops ſent to India, joined to the deſertion with which the want of pay would infallibly be attended, would in leſs than a year reduce the troops to nothing.

Monſieur de Buſſy's army, which originally conſiſted of no more than 800 men, loſt 600 in the twelve months immediately preceding the arrival of Count Lally in the Indies. Of the 1800 men, which, two years before, Monſieur Godeheu had brought with him to the Indies, there remained but 500 fit for ſervice, when Count Lally landed at Pondichery. Yet the coaſt of Coromandel had been in perfect peace ſince the arrival of Monſieur Godeheu.

Godeheu. There is no obtaining without lives any ſucceſs in war. Count Lally was in the caſe of loſing the Indies by ſucceſſes as well as by defeats, the moment he ſaw himſelf deprived of a ſquadron, and of all manner of ſuccours from Europe.

Count Lally, had he taken Madras, would have found nothing in it. All the merchandiſe in it had been deſtroyed by his bombs, which ſet the place on fire no leſs than nine times. Madras was open to the ſea, and conſequently no money would have been found in it. It is allowed, that all the Paleagars or petty Black Princes of the neighbourhood would have ſent him preſents, to the amount, perhaps, of one hundred thouſand crowns; but, after all, it is far from being certain, that all theſe preſents would have reached him. It is allowed, that, for the time to come, they would have paid the Company the tribute they owed the poſſeſſor of Arcot; but all theſe ſums put together would not have exceeded 800,000 livres; and it would have coſt as much to pay the detachments neceſſary to levy them. There was already as much, or more, due to the troops, and not a penny in the treaſury to pay them. The expence of the army already amounted to near a million of livres a month. Beſides, Madras could only be taken by ſtorm, ſince it had an

inner

inner wall, which gave the beſieged time to capitulate; and the ſtorming of it would have weakened Count Lally's army.

But, ſuppoſing Count Lally to have taken Madras, how would he have diſpoſed, without a ſquadron, of 2000 Engliſh priſoners, whom he had orders to ſend to the Iſland of Bourbon? What would he have done without money to ſubſiſt them? It will appear by the extracts from Monſieur de Leyrit's letters, that Mr. Pigot, Governor of Madras, having requeſted him to advance a month's pay to 700 men, whom Count Lally had taken at Fort St. David, Monſieur de Leyrit made anſwer, that he could not poſſibly comply with his requeſt. Now, this letter is dated the 1ſt of July, two months after Count Lally's arrival in the Indies. Count Lally, therefore, would have found himſelf under a neceſſity, for want of money and ſhips, to ſend back theſe priſoners, or employ half his army merely to keep guard upon them.

Suppoſing Count Lally to have taken Madras, he would, according to his orders, have ſet about demoliſhing it. Now, in the firſt place, there did not remain in Pondichery above fifteen tons of powder for its own defence. 2dly, The appearance of an Engliſh ſquadron, ſix weeks after he had taken

taken it, would have interrupted the work. Count Lally would not have dared to continue it; but, rather, would have found himſelf under a neceſſity of preſerving the place to prevent its falling into the hands of the Engliſh ſquadron. In this laſt caſe, he could not leave fewer than between eight and nine hundred men, that is to ſay about half his army, to garriſon it. Of what ſervice would the other half have been to him? It would ſcarce have been ſufficient to defend Pondichery againſt the Engliſh ſquadron.

The demolition of a place is a work of time; and, ſuppoſing Count Lally had the time, the money, and the powder, neceſſary for the demolition of Madras, which he really had not, it would have ſignified nothing, ſince, for want of ſhips, he could not remove the troops and the inhabitants; and, conſequently, the Engliſh ſquadron, had it appeared even within two months after he had taken the place, would have retaken it though demoliſhed; and it would have ſtill ſubſiſted as an Engliſh factory, for want of a French ſquadron to hinder the Engliſh from approaching it.

The taking of Madras, the preſervation or demolition of it, would not have hindered the Engliſh ſquadron from beating that of the

the Count d'Aché, as ſoon as it appeared on the coaſt, and making him fly it in four and twenty hours, as in fact he did.

Let it not be ſaid, that, Madras once taken, the Engliſh ſquadron would have abandoned the coaſt, for want of a ſettlement to have recourſe to as a place of arms on any ſudden emergency. The whole coaſt of Coromandel is but one continued road, without a ſingle port. A ſquadron commanding the Coromandel ſea may come to an anchor, and victual, in any part of it the Commander thinks proper. The Engliſh Admiral, by paying ready money, abounded with proviſions during his three years ſtay on this coaſt; whereas we, for want of money, could get none even in our own poſſeſſions, though, then, ten times more extenſive than thoſe of the Engliſh, ſince we were maſters of all the coaſt from the ſuburbs of Madras to Karical. Count d'Aché could ſcarce hold out on it four months. If, for want of a ſquadron and money, we could no longer defend our own poſſeſſions, how could it be expected we ſhould preſerve our conqueſts?

Monſieur de Buſſy, maſter, in the Decan, of the revenues of four large provinces and of a freſh country, could not, for want of money, keep up his little army, and prevent de-

deſertion. After advancing them two millions of livres out of his own ſavings, he ſtill owed them two more; and, therefore, never ceaſed writing to Count Lally, that he was under perpetual apprehenſions of being aſſaſſinated, earneſtly requeſting the Count to recall him, and remove (they are his own words) that cup from him. Monſieur de Buſſy, therefore, could not, for want of money and a ſquadron, hinder the deſcent made by the Engliſh in one of theſe four provinces. Now, if an inability of this kind is to be admitted in favour of Monſieur de Buſſy, why not ſtill more in favour of Count Lally, who had a much more numerous army to ſupport, and oppoſe to an army, as well as to a ſquadron, in an exhauſted country? If it ſhould be ſaid, that, in ſpite of all theſe obſtacles, Count Lally, with his army which was not paid, ſhould have beat the Engliſh army and the Engliſh ſquadron, even without the aſſiſtance of the Count d'Aché's ſquadron, it would be a crying injuſtice not to cenſure, at the ſame time, Monſieur de Buſſy, who, with an army that had no Engliſh by land or ſea to deal with, could not, out of the revenues of his own poſſeſſions, maintain that army, though it was ſmall, and yet had nothing to do but march peaceably along the high road, in order to conquer all the Blacks to the right and left. But it is notorious, that Monſieur de Buſſy did not neglect

glect to do ſo the year before Count Lally's arrival in the Indies; and it is equally notorious, that he did not pay, after a progreſs which produced twenty millions of livres, the arrears due to his little army; and that his demand on the Company of two millions of livres has not as yet been diſallowed.

Whatever reſpect between thirty and forty millions of livres may inſpire for the perſon of the man, who poſſeſſes them, Count Lally has not the leſs reaſon to maintain, that it would have been much more advantageous for the ſtock-holders, that this ſum had been brought into the Company's coffers, or employed, in part, to facilitate the ſucceſs of the Company's operations.

It is, therefore, plain, that there is no ſucceeding on a ſea coaſt without a ſquadron. The council of Pondichery, as it appeared by the trial of Monſieur de la Bourdonnais, had then ſolemnly reſolved, that it was impoſſible ſo much as to undertake the ſiege of Madras, though, at that time, but an open village, till Mr. Peyton's ſquadron, conſiſting of one veſſel of the line and three frigates only, was entirely driven from off the coaſt. This Mr. Peyton was, in fact, driven from off it by Monſieur de la Bourdonnais, who afterwards made himſelf maſter of Madras without the loſs of a ſingle

man;

men; and Mr. Peyton incurred the diſpleaſure of his maſter by not ſacrificing this his little ſquadron to the ſafety of Madras. Theſe are facts atteſted in all the accounts hitherto publiſhed of the war in the Indies.

If Count Lally, it is ſaid, had not attacked the Engliſh at Vandiwaſh, or if he had defeated them there, Pondichery had not been taken. The aſſertion is falſe; and a lie, into the bargain.

1ſt. It was the infernal intrigues of two friars, devoted to Monſieur de Buſſy, which made it neceſſary for Count Lally to fight that battle, as may be ſeen at length in his *Factum*.

2dly. Though it would have been no eaſy matter to beat an enemy twice as ſtrong, it would have been extremely mortifying to fly before him under the walls of Pondichery, where Count Lally could not poſſibly ſubſiſt his army. The loſs of a battle could not have been attended with any worſe conſequence; and this conſideration, alone, made it neceſſary to riſk a battle. After all, though Count Lally had gained the battle, and purſued the enemy under the walls of Madras, in leſs than a month he would himſelf have been obliged to fall back on Pondichery. This battle was fought

the 20th of January 1760; and Admiral Corniſh's ſquadron came to an anchor in the road of Madras the 28th of February following. But Count Lally had not, even then, wherewith to pay his Black troops for that month. He could not, therefore, have kept the field againſt an enemy, which had a great number of them, and paid them well. He could not venture himſelf far into the enemy's country, and leave Pondichery thirty leagues behind him, expoſed to the Engliſh ſquadron, which might have carried it in one night. A man muſt be wilfully blind not to ſee, that it is impoſſible for one army to make head againſt two; that it is impoſſible for a General, who has but 1500 men, with an army before him and another behind him, one of 4000, the other of 7000 men, to be maſter of his operations, and oppoſe every attempt made by two ſuch armies combined againſt him.

Three months and a half before this, Count Lally had gained a battle at this very Vandiwaſh; but the ſudden and unforeſeen departure of the Count d'Aché's ſquadron, the very day of his receiving the account of this victory, prevented Count Lally's reaping the ſlighteſt advantage from it. The Black Princes, ſeeing the Engliſh maſters of the ſea, concluded from thence, as it was very natural they ſhould, that the Count d'Aché had

had been defeated. They knew too well the importance of a ſea victory to put it in the ſame ſcale with any little advantage obtained by an army, the fruits of which might be every moment blaſted by a victorious ſquadron. And, accordingly, the Black Princes took part with the Engliſh againſt Count Lally.

Nay, this departure of the Count d'Aché occaſioned, fifteen days after, a general mutiny in Count Lally's army, which thereby ſaw itſelf abandoned, and deprived of all hopes of ever returning to Europe. Theſe are the very words uſed by the mutineers in aſſigning their motives for mutinying. The facts are proved by the letters, the verbal proceſſes, the proteſts, &c. of the whole ſettlement of Pondichery.

Count Lally had before gained nine victories; he had taken ten places. But how was it poſſible for him to preſerve places on the coaſt, and up the country, when obliged by a ſquadron belonging to the Engliſh to fly to the aſſiſtance of the capital ſettlement. How can an army, whoſe very ſucceſſes are ſufficient to exhauſt it, be maintained, at ſix thouſand leagues from every kind of reſource, during and after a three years war, in which not a ſingle man had a ſingle day's reſpite, without

a ſquadron to bring it recruits and other neceſſaries, which Europe alone can furniſh? A man muſt be mad not to allow it impoſſible, eſpecially after the inſtances of it furniſhed by our other poſſeſſions in Africa and America, though, in a manner, contiguous to our own continent.

Ships alone, therefore, can decide and realize the advantages and diſadvantages of all the military operations carried on by land in the Eaſt Indies.

But where is the neceſſity for having recourſe to all theſe proofs, while the opinion of Count d'Aché himſelf in writing is to the fore? When the Council of Pondichery propoſed to him to keep the ſea, he alledged as a reaſon for refuſing to comply, *that Pondichery would be loſt in caſe his ſquadron met with any misfortune.* It muſt be allowed, that, with regard to Pondichery, it was the ſame thing, whether his ſquadron met with any misfortune, or totally abandoned that ſettlement.

When the Council of Pondichery oppoſed the departure of the French ſquadron for the Madagaſcar Iſlands, this ſame Admiral made anſwer, that, *as the ſafety of Pondichery depended entirely on his ſquadron*, it was indiſpenſably requiſite he ſhould ſail for theſe Iſlands, to be

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the ſooner able to refit, and return to the coaſt the year following.

Count Lally does not hereby pretend to cenſure the Count d'Aché for not returning to the coaſt. It does not belong to his profeſſion to do ſo. He even thinks it beneath him to take any notice of the reflections, which this Commodore, raiſed to the degree of a Lieutenant General, has taken the liberty to make in his depoſition, and which were foreign both to his profeſſion and the buſineſs in hand; ſuch as ſaying, *that Count Lally had nothing in view but the deſtruction of his ſquadron, by conſtantly inſiſting on his fighting.* Count Lally was always at blows with the Engliſh; why ſhould he not inſiſt that the Count de Aché ſhould ſhare them, if the good of the ſervice required it. After all, two things are ſufficient to exculpate Count Lally; one, its being proved, that the Count d'Aché gave him no aſſiſtance; the other, the conceſſion made by the Count d'Aché himſelf, that the fate of Pondichery depended on his aſſiſtance.

It was Admiral Watſon, who took Chandernagor and Bengal. It was with him Chandernagor capitulated, though, at the ſame time, beſieged by an army. England has acknowledged herſelf indebted to Admiral Pococke for the conqueſt of Pondi-

chery, and rewarded him as the conqueror, though he left the Indies before his countrymen got poſſeſſion of that place. But he had obliged the Count d'Aché to quit the coaſt. Colonel Coote, who commanded the land forces, was but a ſubordinate inſtrument in the hands of Admiral Stevens, who ſucceeded Admiral Pococke. And, though Colonel Coote conducted his operations by land with great courage and ſkill, Admiral Stevens was ſo thoroughly convinced, that the conqueſt of Pondichery was entirely owing to his ſquadron, that he wrote Count Lally a very ſmart letter on the occaſion, in conſequence of his having ſurrendered the place to the commander of the land forces. It may even be added, that Colonel Coote obtained no reward from his court for the taking of Pondichery.

Count Lally ſuppreſſes, in this place, an infinite number of other circumſtances in ſupport of what he advances. They would furniſh matter for a *Factum*, but he is a ſtranger to the method of making one. He is not ſo much as allowed the means of giving his council ſuch information, as would enable them to compoſe one, that would infallibly open the eyes of the public to the infamous and criminal cabal, which has, for four years paſt, been at work to ruin his character.

Count

Count Lally thinks it incumbent on him to refute the charge of embezzlement, brought againſt him by his enemies before the Miniſtry and the public. Theſe ſame enemies, called upon to give evidence againſt him, (the firſt inſtance of ſuch a proceeding ſince the foundation of the French monarchy) have not, however, dared to depoſe any thing againſt him upon that head. Count Lally has even obliged them, when confronted with him, to acquit him ſolemnly thereof. It is true, that Meſſieurs la Selle and Moracin, members of the Council of Pondichery, have dared, and they alone, to advance, *that Count Lally had the handling of the Company's money*. Monſieur la Selle, indeed, had modeſty enough to recant at his confrontation, by ſaying, *that it was true Count Lally had not the material handling of the Company's money; but, as the Count was at the head of affairs, it was the ſame thing as if he had.* Count Lally defied him to produce any one of his orders relating to the Company's revenues; and no ſuch order has been as yet produced. The treaſurers even depoſe, that they never received any ſuch orders from Count Lally. Monſieur la Selle is, nevertheleſs, one of the managers of the trial, and of the witneſſes who have depoſed againſt Count Lally. Not a ſingle member of the Council would conſent to act in concert with this Monſieur la

Selle. Monſieur de Leyrit uſed to write to Count Lally, that he was a knave, and that he would do well to be upon his guard againſt him. The Directors themſelves had given pretty much the ſame account of him. Behold the honeſt man now confronted with Count Lally!

Monſieur Moracin, againſt whom Count Lally has brought charges equally grievous and well grounded, has dared to depoſe, that he had put into Count Lally's hands a ſum of 250,000 livres. Count Lally, on being confronted with him, challenged him to produce his receipt. Monſieur Moracin replied, by way of proof, *that he had given into the treaſury a bill of exchange for* 250,000 *livres, and that he had a receipt for it from Monſieur de Leyrit and the Council, who likewiſe gave him credit for it.* This Monſieur Moracin is, nevertheleſs, the man, who has been the principal manager of all the proceedings againſt Count Lally. It is he, who ſummoned the witneſſes; who inſtructed ſome of them; who, at laſt, became a witneſs himſelf. Hence the world may eaſily form ſome judgment of his teſtimony.

It is thus Count Lally has been repreſented to the public, and accuſed before the magiſtrates, as guilty of extortion. Behold the two ſtrongeſt proofs of it alledged by the witneſſes againſt

againſt him. Count Lally, notwithſtanding, was put under arreſt for extortion; and is now charged with having been a bad General, and having loſt the Indies by his military miſconduct; from whence it is inferred, that he had, *no doubt*, an underſtanding with the Engliſh in his military operations againſt them.

Theſe, it muſt be allowed, are ſtrange proofs againſt a Lieutenant General of the King's armies, detained for three years and a half in the moſt horrid confinement; deprived of council; and as yet refuſed the means of making his judges and the public acquainted with the true cauſes of the loſs of the Indies, of which theſe notes are no more than outlines.

The letter written by the Council of Pondichery to the Count d'Aché will, in ſome meaſure, compenſate for Count Lally's not being able to lay open all the acceſſary cauſes of the loſs of Pondichery. By this piece the public may form ſome judgment of the impoſtures employed to ſurpriſe its credulity, and to create the moſt unjuſt and odious prejudices againſt him. It is as follows:

REPRESENTATION MADE TO MONSIEUR LE COMTE D'ACHE BY THE GENTLETLEMEN OF THE SUPERIOR COUNCIL OF PONDICHERY, IN THE NAME OF A GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE WHOLE NATION, THE 17th OF SEPTEMBER, 1759.

The intention of his Majeſty, in ſending his ſhips to the Indies, was not to make a parade of them; but to ſuccour the ſettlements of the French Company there, and his ſubjects of which theſe ſettlements are compoſed.

This object becomes ſtill more preſſing, *ſince nothing leſs is now the queſtion than to ſave the ſettlements of the Company, and, of courſe, the Company itſelf, from certain ruin, and all the French ſubjects in the Indies from the loſs of their liberty and their fortunes.*

This ſo intereſting an object may be fulfilled two ways, both which the nation here propoſe to Monſieur le Comte d'Aché, but without pretending to determine his choice.

The firſt is, to take advantage of the bad condition, to which, it is known for certain, that the Engliſh ſquadron is reduced, *to cruſh it entirely. Of this bad condition of the Engliſh ſquadron a true and ſatisfactory account has been received from Karical and Nega-patnam.* The

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ſucceſs of this firſt method WOULD NOT ONLY BE ATTENDED WITH SECURITY TO US, but with a ſuperiority, from which we might derive many other advantages. Beſides, it would defeat all the expenſive efforts, which the Engliſh have already made, or may hereafter make, to augment their marine on this coaſt. If what there ſtill exiſts of it was once deſtroyed, what might afterwards arrive would be deſtroyed with ſtill greater eaſe. This, too, would at the ſame time prove *a heavy blow to their forces aſhore, by depriving them of the reinforcements they likewiſe expect.*

THIS FIRST METHOD IS THE ONLY ONE SUFFICIENT TO RESTORE OUR AFFAIRS.

The ſecond, which we are now going to propoſe, can only contribute to prevent the entire ruin of them. It is quite ſimple and eaſy; free from danger; and, to think only of the good of the ſquadron itſelf, indiſputably calculated to anſwer that end. It is, *that the French ſquadron ſhould not quit the coaſt, till the Engliſh ſquadron is equally obliged to quit it.* Otherwiſe, in the firſt place, THE DEFEAT AND FLIGHT OF THE FRENCH SQUADRON, THE HOPES OF WHOSE ASSISTANCE ALONE HAVE BEEN SO

SO LONG THE SUPPORT OF OUR AFFAIRS, will be taken for granted, and even reach Delhi. It has been already repreſented to the Count d'Aché, that five and twenty thouſand Blacks hold themſelves in readineſs to declare for THE NATION WHOSE SQUADRON SHALL BEAT THAT OF THE OTHER. 2dly Beſides, the confuſion, with which the French muſt be infallibly covered, and the LASTING IDEA, that will thence be conceived of their weakneſs, they muſt give up all thoughts of *expecting any friendſhip in the natives, or obtaining any preſents from them, now or hereafter.* 3dly. *All the negociations entered into for our ſecurity or advantage muſt miſcarry, and turn to our diſadvantage.* 4thly. The Engliſh, by availing themſelves of theſe advantages which we gratuitouſly beſtow on them, will be enabled to attempt, and with new aſſurance of ſucceſs, the execution of THEIR PROJECT TO BESIEGE US, WHICH THE DELAY OF OUR SQUADRON ALONE HAD ALREADY MADE THEM FORM *. 5thly. *Their firſt ſtep will be to reduce all the*

* The Council, therefore, expected, ſo early as the 17th of September, to ſee the place beſieged. Can any thing be more poſitive than every word of this letter? How, after producing ſuch a piece, could Count Lally's enemies have the face to commence a proſecution againſt him, upon any thing relative to the loſs of Pondichery?

country now in our poſſeſſion, from whence we draw our ſubſiſtence. What will then avail the troops pemmed up in Pondichery, though that place ſhould be better ſupplied with ammunition and proviſions than it is at preſent? And allowing, it ſhould be able to hold out for ſome months, from what quarter, after all, is it to expect relief? The whole country will join againſt us, and we ſhall be blocked up on the ſea ſide. *Can the Admiral, who is going to abandon us, take upon him to ſay that he will be able to* GIVE US TIMELY RELIEF, THOUGH HE SHOULD RETURN BEFORE WE WERE ENTIRELY LOST? Will he dare to oppoſe our ruin? Will he expoſe himſelf to new difficulties and greater dangers to do that, which he is now unwilling to perform with leſs riſk?

We hope that this ſtate of our caſe will convince the Count d'Aché, that THE ABANDONING OF US IN OUR PRESENT SITUATION IS THE SAME THING AS THE DEVOTING OF US TO CERTAIN DESTRUCTION. We muſt beg leave to tell him, that, in this caſe, WERE HE TO SACRIFICE ALL HIS SHIPS, IT WOULD BE NO MORE THAN ANSWERING THE END OF HIS ERRAND, and entitling himſelf to praiſe and reward. *Commodore Peyton, on a ſimilar occaſion, incurred the diſ-*

diſpleaſure of his country by not ſacrificing his ſquadron to the ſafety of Madras. In the war before this, Monſieur the Chevalier de Kſaim had himſelf received orders from Court to run his ſhips aground, if the ſafety of Pondichery required it.

But there is no neceſſity for Monſieur le Comte d'Aché's going ſuch lengths. What we propoſe to him, is altogether for the advantage of his ſquadron. In the firſt place, by deferring for fifteen days his departure for the Madagaſcar Iſlands, ſuppoſing him bound for theſe Iſlands, he will give new life to the town of Pondichery, who, were he to leave us immediately, will conclude, that his departure is owing to his having been defeated by the Engliſh. 2dly. His ſick and wounded will have time to recover. 3dly. He will be able to judge for himſelf, what reſolution the Engliſh will take, WHICH, CERTAINLY, WILL NOT BE THAT OF COMING TO ATTACK HIM. 4thly. He will thereby ſave what ſoldiers and ſailors we have to the north. *If the Engliſh are left maſters of the Coromandel ſeas, they need only ſend two of their veſſels to Ganjam, to carry off the ſhip we have there, Monſieur de Moracin, Monſieur le Chevalier de Pouët, with the officers and all their men; and they will not fail to do it: and from that day we muſt*

muſt throw up all hopes of being ever able to ſet foot in the north again.

5thly. In fine, we think it our duty to repreſent to Monſieur le Comte d'Aché, that his going to winter in the Madagaſcar Iſlands will be attended with more danger to his ſquadron, *than even a ſecond engagement.* His crews muſt either periſh at theſe Iſlands, or be driven from them by famine. The letters from thence import, that the return of the ſquadron muſt prove the ruin of them. Will the ſquadron be able to find new reſources at the Cape of Good Hope? Nothing can be more uncertain. Are not the means of aſſiſting them already exhauſted there? *Is the Count d'Aché for carrying, himſelf, to theſe colonies,* A GREAT PART OF THOSE MISFORTUNES, TO WHICH HE CONDEMNS THAT OF THE INDIES BY ABANDONING IT.

The beſt thing, therefore, he can do for his own as well as our intereſt is to go, in the beginning of October, and paſs a month or ſix weeks on the Eaſt coaſt, *that he may be back again on this by the beginning of January.* He will, even, hereby deprive the Engliſh of the benefit of wintering on that coaſt; and oblige them, perhaps, to make for Bombay.

Bombay. In the mean time, expreſſes ſhall be directly ſent to the Madagaſcar Iſlands, to haſten ſuch ſuccours as it may be thought proper to get from them, ſo as to give theſe ſuccours an opportunity of reaching this coaſt before the Engliſh. The Count d'Aché's wintering on the Eaſt coaſt may even afford him an opportunity of taking ſome rich ſhips coming from China or elſewhere. His wintering in the Ganges would be ſtill more advantageous in every reſpect. This may be thought of, in caſe the Engliſh ſquadron ſhould determine to winter at Bombay. *It might be thought of ſtill better, could the Count d'Aché have the good fortune to beat the Engliſh. To do this, does he want to have his hands ſtrengthened? We offer him all the aſſiſtance he can wiſh for.* Is he prevented by the wounds he has already received for his country? Let him make us a ſacrifice, which will, it is true, coſt him more than that of his blood. But then, what may we not expect from his generoſity? LET HIM GIVE LEAVE TO SOMEBODY ELSE to make an attempt, *which will not bear being any longer poſtponed*, while we employ aſhore our whole care to re-eſtabliſh that health, which is ſo dear to us.

Let him not fear, leſt his ſhips ſhould come to want maſts ſo much, as not to be able

to

to go to winter quarters. We take upon ourſelves to ſupply him directly with every thing he may want to refit them.

As to any other more mortifying event, WE TAKE UPON OURSELVES ALL THE BLAME AND OTHER ILL CONSEQUENCES THAT MAY ATTEND IT. *Though he himſelf were to be reſponſible for them, has he not more to fear, as well in regard to the certitude as the importance of the object, by abandoning Pondichery, the Company, the whole ſettlement, to the diſcretion of the Engliſh? Would he not in doing it run quite counter to the intentions of our maſters, and the real end of his errand? We hope, that, far from coming to ſuch a reſolution* WHICH NO CONSIDERATION CAN JUSTIFY, he will yield to the repreſentations, prayers, proteſtations, in fine, every means that can poſſibly be thought of to make an impreſſion upon him by a ſettlement, of which he is himſelf an illuſtrious member, *and whoſe ſafety he has in his own hands.*

Done in the Chamber of the ſuperior Council of Pondichery, the 17th of September, 1759. *Signed,* LALLY, DUVAL DE LEYRIT, RENAULT, GUILLARD, BOYELLEAU, LENOIR, DE LARCHE, DESVAUX, GEULLETTE, DE LASELLE, &c.

PROTEST MADE BY THE NATION ASSEMBLED IN THE HALL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PONDICHERY; SIGNIFIED TO MONSIEUR D'ACHE' THE 17*th* OF SEPTEMBER, 1759.

Monſieur de Leyrit, Governor of the French ſettlements in the Indies, and Preſident of the Council of Pondichery *, as well as all the members thereof who were deputed to you, having employed to no purpoſe all the methods they could think of to make you defer your departure for ſome days, in order to reaſſure the Blacks of the country ready to declare againſt us; and conſidering the general conſternation that has ſeiſed the town of Pondichery; it has been reſolved to aſſemble a national Council, WHICH HAS UNA-

* Though Monſieur de Leyrit ſpeaks here as Chief, Count Lally was actually in Pondichery, ſo that Monſieur de Leyrit could not be Preſident of the Council; and ſtill leſs, Commander of the French ſettlements. The Council, therefore, ſhould have ſpoken in the name of Count Lally, and not in that of Monſieur de Leyrit, But Count Lally choſe to wave his right of precedence, to think of nothing but the ſafety of the Indies, which was ever the ſole object of his attention.

UNANIMOUSLY PROTESTED AGAINST YOUR PRECIPITATE DEPARTURE, DECLARING YOU ALONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LOSS OF THIS SETTLEMENT. IT HAS LIKEWISE BEEN RESOLVED TO COMPLAIN OF YOUR ABANDONING IT TO THE KING, AND THE MINISTRY, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN JUSTICE AGAINST YOU, the Company having had no other view, in applying to his Majeſty for ſhips, than to ſave its ſettlements at the riſk of theſe very ſhips. And, in caſe it is not too late, a copy of this declaration ſhall be delivered to every Captain of the Count d'Aché's ſquadron.

Done in the Council Hall of Fort Louis at Pondichery, the ſevententh of September, 1759, *Signed*, LALLY, DUVAL DE LEYRIT, RENAUT, BARTHELEMY, Chevalier DE SOUPIRE, MICHEL LALLY, BUSSY, DUBOIS, CARIERE, VERDIERES, DURE, GADDEVILLE, DUPASSAGE, BEAUSSET, RENAUT. DE LASELLE, GUILLART, PORCHER, DESVAUX, Father DOMINICK, Capuchin, Pariſh Prieſt of the Pariſh of Notre Dame des Anges, F. S. LAVAUR, Superior General of the French Jeſuits in the

Indies, L. MATHON, Superior General of the foreign Miſſions, POTIER DE LORME, DUCHATEL, AUDOUART, AIMAR, COMBAUT D'AUTHEUIL, GOUPIL, KEISSER, J. G. BON, DE WILST, BANAL, RAULY, TERMELIER, SAINT-PAUL, J. B. LAUNAY, DESHAYES, FISCHER, DULAURENT, AUDOYER DU PETIT-VAL, DARCY, MADIN, DIORE', BERTRAND, LEGRIS, MIRAN, BOURVILLE, F. NICOLAS, DUPLAN-DE-LAVAL, BORE'E, DE LARCHE, BOYELLEAU, and GEULETTE.

COPIES OF SEVERAL LETTERS WRITTEN BY THE COUNT D'ACHE' TO COUNT LALLY, AND ONE TO MONSIEUR DE LEYRIT, WITH REMARKS ON EVERY LETTER, CONFIRMING THE CHARGE, BROUGHT BY THE GENERAL AGAINST THE ADMIRAL, OF HIS REFUSING TO SAIL FOR MADRAS AFTER THE TAKING OF FORT ST. DAVID.

It will ſcarce be credited, that the Count d'Aché who wrote the following letters, and who, on Count Lally's arrival at Verſailles, brought upon himſelf the eyes of a whole gal-

gallery, by running up to embrace him, and crying out: *Welcome, my dear General; be in no pain about the lies a knot of knaves have propagated againſt you; have they not ſaid as bad things of myſelf?* ſhould be the ſame Count d'Aché, who, at his interogatory, declared;

Firſt. That Count Lally was, in part, the cauſe of his loſing the battle he fought, when he firſt arrived on the coaſt.

2dly. That Count Lally rejected the propoſal, which he (the Count d'Aché) made him of failing to attack Madras immediately after the taking of Fort St. David.

3dly. That Count Lally had nothing in view but the deſtruction of his ſquadron.

4thly, In fine. That it was on receiving the news of the miſcarriage of the expedition againſt Tanjore he reſolved to riſk a ſecond battle; and that, of courſe, Count Lally was, in part, the cauſe of his ſecond defeat.

The obſervations added to every one of his letters will throw ſome light on theſe four aſſertions, which, though deſtitute of all manner of proof, the Count d'Aché has thought proper to hazard in his juſtification,

at the expence of truth, and that delicacy, which might be expected in a man of the rank he now enjoys.

FIRST CAMPAIGN.

LETTER I.

On board the Zodiack, Sunday the 29th of April, 1758.

SIR

OUR Admiral desires I may do myself the honour to request, in his name, that you will be pleased to give the most pressing orders, for the succouring of his squadron. We are going to leave the *Silphide* along with the *Bien-Aimé*, and put to sea as soon as possible, to get into the wind and work up to Pondichery. The English appeared to be sick of the battle, as soon as the *Comte de Provence* and the *Diligente* got within reach of them; but several of our ships fell to leeward; and, in spite of all the signals we could make, paid too little regard to the motions of our General, who did all that lay in his power to keep the wind. Add to this, that, having made a signal for the squadron to anchor this night, the *Bien-Aimé*, which formed the rear guard, instead of anchoring in the offing, ran ashore, we cannot conceive why; and, indeed, the thing will appear incredible, Were it not for this, Monsieur d'Aché

d'Aché would have no reaſon to complain, ſince the Engliſh were roughly handled in ſpite of all their advantages, as well in point of wind, as extroadinary weight of artillery, and the miſbehaviour of that diviſion, whoſe Commander was at Pondichery. After all *the King's ſhip has ſuffered greatly*; there is an abſolute neceſſity for our getting *ſuccours in men, in water, in proviſions, and other refreſhments.*

I am told that Monſieur de Breteuil is going to Pondichery; he will give you a more particular account of what has happened and of our preſent ſituation.

I am, &c.

Signed, Monteil - - - *Sub-Commodore.*

P. S. In the Count d'Aché's own hand-writing.

I am almoſt dead with fatigue. The blunder of the Captain of the *Bien-Aimé*, who has loſt his ſhip by a miſmanagement I cannot account for, has almoſt put me beſide myſelf. I have, however, ſome little hopes left. Poor le Bourdonnais and Dupleſſis are killed; my two nephews, Cenneville and Derſſe, and my three midſhipmen, wounded. Little Guy has loſt a leg. I have told you enough: I embrace you moſt cordially.

Signed, d'ACHE'.

REMARKS.

In this letter, written by the Count d'Aché, in the overflowings of his heart, immediately after the battle between him and the Engliſh on his appearing on the coaſt of Coromandel, he attributes all his misfortunes to the miſbehaviour of the Captain of the *Bien-Aimé*, who has ſince fully cleared himſelf, and that of ſeveral other Captains of his ſquadron, who fell too much to leeward *. He ſays nothing of the ſlowneſs of the *Comte de Provence* and the *Diligente*; notwithſtanding which he now depoſes, that Count Lally and Monſieur de Leyrit had ſigned a joint order to the Captain of the *Comte de Provence* not to join the ſquadron, till he had landed the equipages belonging to the regiment of Lally. Count Lally, when confronted with the Count d'Aché, called upon him for this order; but the Count d'Aché made anſwer, that he had only kept a copy of it. Count Lally then called for this copy; but the Count d'Aché could not produce it. The fact is, it was impoſſible there ſhould be a ſingle bale belonging to the regiment of Lally on board

* To fall to leeward, when one fights to the leeward, ſignifies, in polite terms, to fly before the enemy.

that

that ſhip. The fact is, that the Count d'Aché, when he put into Karical for intelligence, got no news there of the Engliſh ſquadron; that the people at Pondichery were equally ſtrangers to this ſquadron's being on the coaſt; that the Count d'Aché did not chuſe to land Count Lally in his own ſhip, which was a King's ſhip, leſt he ſhould be obliged to hoiſt certain colours due to a Governor on landing within his juriſdiction; that the Count d'Aché had given Count Lally warning of this at his firſt putting into *Rio Janeiro*; that Count Lally conſidered it as a matter of great indifference, though he took notice of it to the Miniſtry from that place; that, for this reaſon, the Count d'Aché landed Count Lally at Mauritius in a ſhallop. In a word, the fact is, that the *Comte de Provence* had orders to wait for the ſquadron, which the Count d'Aché was in hopes would anchor the day following at Pondichery; that Count Lally and the Count d'Aché had agreed to make an attempt, in concert, this ſame following day, on Cudaloor; and that, on that very day, the Count d'Aché was ſurpriſed by the Engliſh ſquadron. It is hard to gueſs, why the Count d'Aché ſhould employ all theſe ſhifts and evaſions to diſguiſe a fact known all over the Indies; a fact, of which an account had been immediately diſpatched to Court,

Court. Had the Count d'Aché dreamed of a ſingle Engliſh man of war being on the coaſt, he would not have let Count Lally have a canoe, and had a right to refuſe it. If the Captain of the *Comte de Provence* had forgot his duty ſo far, as to obey the orders of Count Lally and Monſieur de Leyrit to the neglect of thoſe given him by his own ſuperior, the Count d'Aché would have had him tried by a Court Martial; and he would have deſerved death. Beſides, this Captain's being at Pondichery did not hinder the firſt Lieutenant, who commanded in his abſence, from obeying the Admiral's ſignals. A Lieutenant Colonel, when in the preſence of an enemy, does not wait the arrival of his Colonel from the head quarters, to lead on the regiment. It is ſurpriſing how people can have recourſe to ſuch abſurdities.

LETTER II.

Pondichery, the 18th of May, 1758.

LET us but take courage, my dear General, and all will go well. You will take Fort St. David; and, that done, we will concert between us the propereſt meaſures for rendering ourſelves maſters of the ſea. The worſt of it is, that we cannot

cannot mutually aſſiſt each other. For my part, I wait for the Engliſh; and, bad a condition as I am in, I will ſtill give them a warm reception; and you may depend on our ſurpaſſing ourſelves to make them repent their preſumption. I am doing all I can to man our batteries, *but there are* 1294 *of our men in the hoſpitals*; and, amongſt thoſe who remain on board, many more who ought to be there too. No matter; all will go well yet. Diſpatch your citadel, and let me have the pleaſure of embracing you at your return. I ſhall communicate your letter to Monſieur de Leyrit. My compliments to all your gentlemen. Adieu, my dear General. I have fixed on *the Diligente* to carry ſome effects to Cudaloor. I beg of you to order her to be unloaded and ſent back to me as ſoon as poſſible.

I have the honour, &c.

Signed, D'ACHE'.

REMARKS.

This letter was written twelve days after Count Lally's landing at Pondichery. It does not, certainly, take any notice of the project, which the Count d'Aché ſays he twelve days after propoſed to Count Lally, *of going to attack the Engliſh ſquadron under Madras.*

Nay,

Nay, it takes notice of the impoſſibility he was under of going there. This preciſe number of 1294 ſailors in the hoſpitals could not, certainly, be replaced by 2000 ſoldiers, the moſt Count Lally had in his army; and who, beſides, were not ſailors. It will appear by what follows, that, as often as Count Lally offered the Count d'Aché any ſoldiers to ſecond him in the mixed operations he propoſed to him, this very Count d'Aché uſed to object, that it was ſailors and not ſoldiers he wanted. Theſe are palpable contradictions.

LETTER III.

Pondichery, the 28th of May, 1758, at Three in the afternoon.

YOU will hear, my dear General, from the deputies of the Council held this morning, the condition of my unfortunate ſquadron, and how much I ſtand in need of ſpeedy and effectual aſſiſtance. I am not inſenſible, my dear General, of yours; but mine is much more mortifying; for my loſing of a battle could not but greatly embaraſs your affairs. Let me, therefore, know what you can do; or, at leaſt your opinion; or, in ſhort, if you hope to be ſoon maſter of Fort St. David, and thereby enable me to go and meet the

the Engliſh, who, were I in a better way, would not parade it as they do. Adieu, my dear General. Let me always have a ſhare in your affections.

Signed, D'ACHE'.

REMARKS.

This letter confirms what the Count d'Aché had already alledged concerning the impoſſibility he was under of putting to ſea; and is ſupported by the reſolution of a mixed Council, which the Count d'Aché aſſembled to juſtify his taking ſhelter under the cannon of Pondichery, and there waiting for the enemy. Two Deputies having been ſent from Pondichery to inform Count Lally of this reſolution, he immediately, on hearing it, ſet out, though it was night, for that place, with 400 Europeans and 200 Blacks, and on his arrival re-aſſembled the mixed Council, whom he cauſed to repeal the ſhameful reſolution of the evening before; and, moreover, on Monſieur de Leyrit's refuſal to pay 60,000 livres, which had been promiſed the ſailors on their landing in the Indies, and on the nonpayment of which they openly threatened not to go on board again, he let them have that ſum out of his own pocket; upon which they returned to their duty. But the Count d'Aché, inſtead of going to meet the Engliſh, as by this letter he tells

tells Count Lally he would, ſteered a different way, and took advantage of this reinforcement brought him by Count Lally, to turn his back upon them, and run ſixty leagues further to the ſouth. Behold, in what manner the Count dAché, two days after, propoſed to Count Lally, according to what he himſelf advances, *to ſail againſt the Engliſh at Madras.* It is worth obſerving, that the Count d'Aché declares in this letter, that his loſing a battle could not but greatly embaraſs Count Lally's affairs; and it did ſo, accordingly.

LETTER IV.

From the Count d'Aché to Monſieur de Leyrit, who ſent it to Count Lally, dated the 1ſt of June, at ten in the evening.

ANNEXED I ſend you, Sir, the copy of a letter written me by Monſieur Porcher, Governor of Karical. It were to be wiſhed, that people did not ſo much overrate our ſtrength, and under-rate that of the Engliſh. Moreover, I ſhall do every thing in my power not to expoſe wantonly to diſgrace the King's Flag. I expect the *Silphide* will not delay rejoining me. I was in hopes ſhe would have put to ſea along with me.

I never

I never had more occaſion for her. I wiſh ſhe was better manned. But let her come at any rate, in order to increaſe the number of our ſhips.

I am, beyond all expreſſion, Sir, yours, &c.

Signed, D'ACHE'.

I believe it would be for the good of the ſervice, that, inſtead of continuing at anchor at Cudaloor, I ſhould get more into the wind, in order to intercept that Engliſh man of war, in her way to the ſquadron. Communicate this notion of mine to Monſieur le Comte de Lally.

REMARKS.

There is ſomething remarkable in every tittle of this letter from the Count d'Aché to Monſieur de Leyrit. It is dated the 1ſt of June, when, certainly, the Count knew nothing of the enemy's propoſing to capitulate the day following. Count Lally himſelf did not then expect it. The Count d'Aché, therefore, was, from the very firſt of June, for beating up to the ſouth, and getting farther from the Engliſh ſquadron, without waiting for the ſurrender of Fort

Fort St. David. He did not, therefore, think of ſeeing Count Lally, ſince he commiſſioned Monſieur de Leyrit, who reſided four leagues from him in Pondichery, to communicate his project to Count Lally, though Count Lally then lay within a league of him. And, in fact, it was the unforeſeen ſurrender of Fort St. David that very next day (the ſecond of June) which, with repeated inſtances by Count Lally, at length determined the Count d'Aché to come aſhore for ſome hours; *when Count Lally propoſed to him to ſail directly for Madras, and not allow the Engliſh time to look about them.* The Count d'Aché has now the face to advance, that it was he who made this propoſal to Count Lally, and that Count Lally refuſed to comply with it. The air of the Indies muſt be very contagious, for a man like the Count d'Aché, who had ſcarce allowed himſelf time to breathe it, verbally to depoſe the very reverſe of what he had before given under his own hand; and it is very extraordinary, that Count Lally, throughout the whole courſe of the proceedings againſt him, ſhould be obliged to oppoſe to every witneſs the hand-writing of that very witneſs, in order to convict him of his impoſture! It is true, that the reſolution to aſſaſſinate Count Lally was a ſure expedient, had it ſucceeded; for

for then Count Lally would have had no papers to produce againſt them.

The Count d'Aché had the evening before written to Monſieur de Leyrit, that he was for getting to the ſouth to avoid expoſing the King's flag to any diſgrace. He added, that his ſtrength was too much overrated, and that of the enemy too much underrated. Does there appear in this letter, or in any of the preceding ones, any ſign of the Count d'Aché's intending to ſail againſt Madras, thirty leagues to the north. It appears, that Monſieur Porcher, whoſe command lay very near the Dutch and Daniſh ſettlements, and who had received an account from thence of the real condition of the Engliſh ſquadron, was fully perſuaded, as well as the whole ſettlement, that the Count d'Aché might have attacked the Engliſh ſquadron to advantage. But the Count d'Aché, immediately after leaving Count Lally, put to ſea, and ſteered to the ſouth, without ſo much as vouchaſing a ſalute, even of a ſingle piſtol, to the King's colours then flying at Fort St. David, though it was in the road of that place he had been at anchor. Will it appear credible, after theſe pieces and this true ſtate of the caſe, that the Count d'Aché ſhould have written to Europe, and that the officer he diſpatched to Court ſhould have given out,

that it was (the Count d'Aché) who took Fort St. David; and that it ſhould be ſo mentioned even in the Gazettes?

LETTER V.

On board the Zodiack in the Road of Karical, the 9th of June, 1758.

SIR,

OUR Admiral deſires I may do myſelf the honour to inform you, that *he is going to hoiſt ſail again in order to run to the ſouthward*; and that, having well conſidered the advantages that muſt reſult from getting the ſtart of the enemy, by ſecuring, if poſſible, our reinforcements from Mauritius, he propoſes to ſtretch away even as high as the Bay of Trincanomaly, where the ſquadron will continue to cruize till the 18th or 20th, when Monſieur le Comte d'Aché will examine the means that may be ſtill left him of continuing there longer, if circumſtances ſhould require it. He, beſides, begs leave to obſerve to you, that, in ſpite of all Monſieur Porcher's care, the ſquadron muſt put to ſea with a far leſs quantity of refreſhments, than the condition of our crews require; all of them being ſtill greatly fatigued, and many of the men very weak and feeble; for which reaſon,

Sir,

Sir, all the Captains of the Council of war aſſembled on this occaſion, at the ſame time that they voted for this cruize, could not but take notice of the neceſſity there was for our friends aſhore uſing every poſſible means to get in readineſs, againſt our return to Pondichery, all the ſuccours we may want for the execution of further deſigns.

Monſieur d'Aché, Sir, deſires I may do myſelf the honour to requeſt, that you will give directions about the *water, wood, and proviſions*, he may want; but, above all things, that his ſick may be taken good care of in the hoſpitals of Pondichery. Moreover, amongſt the other things which it will be proper to have in readineſs againſt his return, he deſires I may make particular mention of two new rudders, one for the *Vengeur*, the other for the *Saint-Louis*. He hopes, that, when you ſhall give orders for the demoliſhing of Cudaloor, there may be found there pieces of timber large enough for that purpoſe. He, likewiſe, hopes, that the removing of the naval ſtores found at Fort St. David will give an opportunity of collecting many things, which may prove very uſeful to the ſquadron.

Above all things, Sir, he hopes, that, by adding the ſailors acquired by exchanging priſoners to thoſe recovered in the hoſpitals, means will be found to man the ſquadron better than it is at preſent, in as much as very little ſtreſs can be laid on the ſepoys, with whom we have been obliged to make up our complements.

Monſieur de Maudave wrote to Monſieur le Comte d'Aché to deſire, that the *Silphide* might be diſpatched to Monſieur le Comte d'Eſtaing. Upon this, Monſieur le Comte d'Aché deſires I may take notice to you, that, according to the general opinion of his Captains, it appeared to him more for the good of the ſervice, that the *Silphide* ſhould continue with the ſquadron of the cruize, on which we are now going. This veſſel may prove very ſerviceable, in as much as the *Diligente* is ſcarce able to ſtir; whereas the *Silphide*, though very ill manned, may ſtill occaſionally keep in awe any common veſſel; and, at all times, ſail a-head, and go on the look out.

Monſieur d'Aché is, moreover, of opinion, that with the aſſiſtance of the crew of the *Sainte Brigitte* it will be no hard matter to free Devi-cottah either with *the Diligente, or the two Boſs, or the Reſtitution.*

In

In fine, he deſires I may do myſelf the honour to tell you, that he has abided by the general opinion, *which is to remain as long as poſſible to the ſouth of Pondichery*, as well to wait *the Centaure*, and intercept the ſuccours expected by the Engliſh, as to keep *the wind of Admiral Pococke*, in caſe that Admiral, inſtead of withdrawing from before Madras, ſhould reſolve to fight us *before we can attack that place. The Comte de Provence* makes twenty inches of water every four-and-twenty hours; *the Diligente*, the ſame; and *it will be no eaſy matter* to repair them at *Pondichery*. However, while the ſquadron is on its cruize, there will be time enough to prepare ſuch things, as we may have the moſt preſſing occaſion for. Meſſieurs de Leyrit and Babinet will be able to gueſs what they are, and provide accordingly; and they will do it the ſooner and the better, when quickened by your orders.

Monſieur d'Aché ſays a thouſand kind things to you, and wiſhes you health to continue your conqueſts.

I am, &c.

Signed, the CHEVALIER DE MONTEIL.

Our Admiral has juſt received from Monſieur de Maudave a letter written to that gentleman by Monſieur Fiſcher, to acquaint

him, that he had received advice from Tranquebar of the Engliſh being at Ceylon, in order to be at hand to intercept the veſſels, that may be coming to us from the Madagaſcar Iſlands. If that is, in fact, the intention of admiral Pococke, we ſhall be able to find him. Beſides, it makes no alteration in the reſolution we have taken.

REMARKS.

This letter is in anſwer to two expreſſes, which Count Lally had diſpatched one after another to Karical, to endeavour to ſtop the Count d'Aché there, and bring him back to Pondichery. It is the Count d'Aché who ordered this letter to be written by his Sub-Commodore; and it is the ſame Count d'Aché who now depoſes, *that he propoſed to Count Lally to ſail for Madras after the taking of Fort St. David*; and adds, withal, *that he would have beat the enemy, but that Count Lally would not give his conſent.*

It is the Count d'Aché who ſays, that his reſolution was taken to get to a greater diſtance from the Engliſh ſquadron, and keep the wind of it, leſt the Engliſh Admiral ſhould take it into his head to come and attack him, before he was, himſelf, in a con-

condition to attack Madras; and that this was the unanimous opinion of his Captains: yet it is the ſame Count d'Aché who now depoſes, *that he wanted to ſail for Madras, in order to beat the Engliſh ſquadron*, though he took care to put, between him and it, a hundred leagues.

But all this could not diſcourage Count Lally. On the receipt of this letter, he repairs to Pondichery, and aſſembles the Council, who reſolve to ſend an expreſs by ſea to the Count d'Aché, and ſummon him to return to Pondichery. This is a fact proved by authentic pieces. The Count d'Aché receives this ſummons, and returns to Pondichery the 17th of June 1758.

On the Count d'Aché's return to Pondichery, Count Lally and Monſieur de Leyrit have a conference with him. They propoſe to him to ſail for Madras, while Count Lally led the army againſt it. To this the Count d'Aché anſwers, *Gentlemen, you are always at me to fight: I am ſcarce in a condition to keep the ſea.* Upon this, they propoſe to him juſt to ſail into the latitude of Sadras, half way between Pondichery and Madras, and fourteen leagues to the windward of the latter: which he refuſes. They then propoſe to him to ſail into the latitude

of Alemparwa at no more than ſeven leagues from Pondichery, in order to awe the Engliſh ſquadron, and hinder it from landing any part of the land forces on board it, or of its own crews at Madras; or cutting off Count Lally's communication with Pondichery. *Well then,* replied the Count d'Aché, *I am ſatisfied, but let me firſt be victualled for four months. Otherwiſe I will not ſtir a ſtep from Pondichery. Four months!* replies Monſieur de Leyrit. *Surely, Sir, you forget yourſelf. Alemparwa is ours. It lies but ſeven leagues from us; and that, too, to the leeward. We may ſupply you with proviſions there from day to day, as well as if you were at Pondichery itſelf.* The Count d'Aché cries out: *But, Gentlemen, ſuppoſe the worſt to happen,* meaning the beſt, *ſuppoſe I ſhould beat the Engliſh, where am I to take ſhelter? Any where,* rejoins Monſieur de Leyrit, *any where, Sir!* Thus ended this ſecond conſultation between the three Chiefs; for they had one the evening before. It was in conſequence of this reiterated refuſal of the Count d'Aché, that Monſieur de Leyrit determined Count Lally to invade Tanjore, by declaring to him, that he had not wherewith to pay or ſubſiſt his army for above fifteen days.

The upſhot of theſe two extraordinary conſultations was ſoon in the mouths of every man,

man, woman, and child, at Pondichery; and for a long time continued the jeſt and table-talk of all ranks.

LETTER VI.

On board the Zodiack, the 14th of June, 1758.

I AM cruizing, my dear General, on the coaſt of Ceylon, and endeavouring to cover the arrival of our ſhips, and intercept thoſe of the enemy.

Herewith I ſend you a little prize. I have been at Nega-patnam, where they did every thing I deſired. I reckon to be with you ſoon. Adieu, my dear General. If you don't love me, you are greatly to blame, for I love you with all my heart.

Signed, D'ACHE'.

REMARKS.

The ſhips ſpoken of in this letter were all a fable. The Count d'Aché would have been more in the way to intercept thoſe of the enemy, and protect the French, by keeping in ſight, and to the windward, of the Engliſh ſquadron, than by cruizing off the point of Ceylon.

LET-

LETTER VII.

Of the 6th of Auguſt.

I Should go diſtracted, my dear General, were you to hear from any one but myſelf the different events of my cruize. I put to ſea from this place in ſight of the Engliſh, as well to avoid riſking a battle at anchor, as to keep the wind of them, and continue maſter of my motions. I twice fell to leeward upon them in order to engage them; but, both times, moſt of my ſhips found it impoſſible to open their lower batteries. At length, on the 5th of Auguſt, enraged at all theſe diſappointments, I made a motion to cruſh their rear; but the wind having ſhifted, juſt as we came within cannon ſhot of each other, I took the reſolution to form to the leeward of them, and wait for them. The battle began at noon; but the fireworks thrown at us ſoon changed the aſpect of things. The mizen maſt of the *Comte de Provence* took fire, which obliged her to get out of the line, and cut it away. For my part, I had my rudder twice diſabled, and my powder room ſet on fire, ſo that it is a miracle I was not blown up. Theſe accidents, joined to the diſorder which they neceſſarily cauſed in my line,

line, determined me to retreat, with a view of forming again. But the Engliſh ſquadron, not daring to purſue me within reach of my guns, *I thought the beſt thing I could do was to make for Pondichery.* I had thirty-three men killed outright on board my own ſhip, and one hundred and fifty dangerouſly wounded. Such is the ſea news, my dear General, I have to give you. I have been for a long time in expectation of receiving from you an account of the ſucceſs of your enterpriſes. Be aſſured that I take as much concern in them as yourſelf.

I have, &c.

Signed, D'ACHE'.

REMARKS.

It will never be believed, that this letter is the letter of a man, who inſiſts on his having propoſed to Count Lally to go in queſt of the Engliſh, and fight them, immediately after the taking of Fort St. David. Beſides, it does not appear, how Count Lally could have hindered the Count d'Aché from attacking or beating the Engliſh; nor what aſſiſtance Count Lally could give the Count d'Aché, except that of as many ſoldiers as the Count d'Aché choſe to accept; and this is what Count Lally never ceaſed doing, as may be evidently proved by public acts.

Count

Count Lally will not, in this place, take upon him to diſcuſs all the unforeſeen events alledged by the Count d'Aché, to juſtify the ſuddeneſs of his retreat under Pondichery at thirty leagues from the field of battle. The accidents, which may happen by ſea, are no more to be put to the account of Admirals, as they cannot foreſee them, than thoſe which happen aſhore, to the account of Generals. But if Count Lally, after gaining ten victories, and taking ten places, is to be reproached with having at the head of no more than 2700 men miſcarried before Madras defended by 5000; if he is to be reproached with not being able at the head of no more than 1250 men to beat 2600 at Vandiwaſh; it muſt be the height of partiality to conſider, as a ſimple event, the Count d'Aché's having twice yielded to an equal force; a force, which the Engliſh, in order to heighten their victories, have even declared inferior to that of the Count d'Aché. It would be ſomething more than partiality, to regard, as merely accidental, the Count d'Aché's being worſted the year following with forces unqueſtionably ſuperior in every reſpect, and give him credit for the unforeſeen accidents, to which this third defeat might have been owing, at the ſame time that Count Lally will not be heard, though willing to prove, that he could not hold out Pondichery againſt an enemy which had twenty men to oppoſe him to his

one:

one; not to ſpeak of the want of every kind of reſource, which Count Lally had moreover to contend with.

Count Lally would never have thought of alledging theſe facts, however notorious, if the Count d'Aché did not lay him under a neceſſity of doing it in his own defence. The Count d'Aché has not bluſhed to depoſe, that it was on receiving an account of Count Lally's bad ſucceſs againſt Tanjore, that he reſolved to hazard an engagement with the Engliſh fleet. Nevertheleſs, the enemy had been two months looking out for the Count d'Aché; and he, by his own confeſſion, as long endeavouring to avoid them, in order not to expoſe the King's flag to diſgrace.

This letter of the Count d'Aché is dated from Pondichery the 6th of Auguſt. The battle mentioned in it was fought the 5th; ſo that there was no time loſt. It was on the 28th of July, that the Council of Pondichery, on the appearance of the Engliſh ſquadron, reſolved that the Count d'Aché ſhould put to ſea. But the Count, who choſe to remain under the walls of Pondichery, declared to this Council, that he would not be anſwerable for the event.

It was on the 2d of Auguſt, that the Count d'Aché got up to the windward from Karical, on

on the approach of the Engliſh ſquadron; and it is at Karical he pretends to have received an account of the bad ſucceſs of the expedition againſt Tanjore, which did not begin till the 3d; and this pretended ill ſucceſs, that is, the retreat of the French army from before Tanjore, is of the 10th. A man muſt be a prophet to foreſee things eight days before they happen, and it is notorious that the Count d'Aché had not that gift.

The truth is, it was the news of the defeat of the Count d'Aché, and the preſence of the Engliſh ſquadron which blocked up Karical, the only place by which Count Lally could keep up a communication with Pondichery, that made the council of war, aſſembled before Tanjore on the 8th of Auguſt, reſolve to drop that expedition, in order to run to the aſſiſtance of our own ſettlements, endangered by this defeat of the Count d'Aché. This citation, therefore, of the Count d'Aché, is a mere calumny, thrown away to no purpoſe. It is plain, that all he propoſed was to unite his voice to that of a gang of witneſſes, who had conſpired to treat the expedition of Tanjore as an unhappy event in itſelf, and attended, beſides, with very ill conſequences; which it by no means was.

The date of this ſame letter of the Count d'Aché's makes againſt him. He writes to Count Lally the 6th, the day after his engagement, that he is impatient to hear of the ſucceſs of his enterprizes. He, therefore, could not have heard at Karical, on the 6th, the news of their miſcarrying. He, therefore, knew nothing of it the 6th; and how could he, ſince it did not happen till the 10th?

Count Lally could point out another inconſiſtency in this letter of the Count d'Aché's, in which he ſays, that the Engliſh having never, after the engagement, dared to come within cannon-ſhot of him, he thought he could not do better than make the beſt of his way to Pondichery. This very timidity, which the Count d'Aché diſcovered in the Engliſh, ſhould have been a motive to him not to be in ſuch a hurry to get to Pondichery.

LETTER VIII.

From Pondichery, the 21ſt of Auguſt, 1758.

THE Council muſt have communicated to you, my dear General, the letter I wrote them in anſwer to one they received from yourſelf. You muſt perceive by this letter *the condition of my ſquadron, which is no longer*

longer in a condition to do any thing. All my Captains have made repreſentations to me on this head. They look upon their veſſels as loſt, if I don't conduct them into ſome port, where they may be repaired, their maſts and upper works being greatly damaged, and many of them beſides making a great deal of water. I was in hopes of ſeeing you arrive here, and being able, in conſequence thereof, to come to ſome immediate reſolution. I expect you, my dear General; and, on that account, have deferred my departure for ſome days, *ſtill proteſting, that I will be no longer anſwerable for what damage the enemy may do me.* My veſſels are not in a condition to wait a moment, or loſe the opportunity afforded by the retreat of the Engliſh to get off unmoleſted. They might, ſhould they take it into their heads to attack me, put it out of my power to reach the Iſland of Mauritius again. Be ſo kind, therefore, as to come to ſome reſolution. I wait your anſwer. Time runs on. I embrace you, my dear General, with all my heart.

Signed, D'ACHE'.

REMARKS.

It is hard to reconcile the bad condition, to which the Count d'Aché ſays his ſquadron

ſquadron is reduced, with all the damage he ſays he did the Engliſh. In fact, it appears by the letters already produced, which were received after the two battles he had been obliged to fight, *that he had handled the Engliſh roughly*; *that the Engliſh were ſick of it*; *that the Engliſh were afraid to come within cannon ſhot of him.* Why, therefore, did he leave theſe Engliſh, maſters of the ſea? Why does he ſay in this letter, that he is reſolved to avail himſelf of the diſtance they were at from him, to ſteal to the Madagaſcar Iſlands, proteſting, withal, againſt the delay given him by Count Lally's abſence? Had not Count Lally a right, after all theſe letters from the Count d'Aché, to inſiſt on his not abandoning the coaſt, and to offer him half his army, as he did in full Council by the Count d'Eſtaing, to ſail for Madras? He had eight veſſels; the Engliſh had but ſeven. The Engliſh had as few reſources in Madras, as the Count d'Aché had in Pondichery. The Engliſh had now been keeping the ſea for five years together; and it was notorious, that their ſquadron was in a worſe condition than that of the Count d'Aché.

The letters of Monſieur de Leyrit, which are juſt going to be exhibited, the reſolutions of the Council of Pondichery, and the repreſentations of the Count d'Eſtaing; all ſupport

the reaſons, which Count Lally had to oppoſe the departure of the Count d'Aché.

SECOND CAMPAIGN.

LETTER IX.

On board the Zodiack, the 15th of September, 1759.

I AM at length arrived, my dear General; not, indeed, as ſoon as I could have wiſhed, though, fortunately, time enough to let you have the ſlender ſuccours I have been able to force from the iſland of Mauritius. I employed every means, without exception, that I could think of, to be able to join you in time. There are no ſollicitations, no threats, that I had not recourſe to, to haſten the work, though ſtill kept back, by the ill will and unſkilfulneſs of a parcel of fellows of every kind, upon whom it in ſome meaſure depended. For my part, all I could do was, to endeavour to compenſate the delays, to which I was obliged to ſubmit. I was but nine and twenty days on the paſſage between Madagaſcar and Ceylon; and after taking, at Trinquemalet, ſuch precautions, as the good of my ſquadron required, I no longer thought of any thing but you, and the danger *with which I had*

I had reaſon to fear Pondichery was threatened. The 10th of this month, I had a very warm engagement with the Engliſh ſquadron, in the latitude of Tranquebar. We handled each other roughly. I received a dangerous wound. I ſend you ſome ſuccours, notwithſtanding. I let you have, with all my heart, ſome money I have on board my ſhips, in order to give you all the aſſiſtance in my power. What is ſtill more, I weaken my crews to reinforce you with ſome European ſoldiers, and the greateſt part of my Blacks. But, then, it is all I can do. You have no more to expect from me. The ſeaſon advances. My ſhips are in bad order. I am going to hoiſt ſail, my dear General; and I ſacrifice the pleaſure of ſeeing you to that of being the earlier on the coaſt next year. Adieu, my dear General. I embrace you with all my heart.

Signed, d'ACHE'.

REMARKS.

Such is the ſurpriſing letter written, after an abſence of thirteen months, by the Count d'Aché to Count Lally. In this letter, the Count d'Aché ſays, that he is juſt going to hoiſt ſail for the Madagaſcar Iſlands; that he is willing to part to Count Lally with ſome money he has got on board his ſhips; and that Count

Lally has nothing more to expect from him. Now this money conſiſted in 400,000 livres in ſpecie, and to the ſame amount in diamonds, in lieu of two millions, which the company had the year before deſtined for Pondichery; and half of which, had it not been detained at the Madagaſcar iſlands, would have enabled Count Lally to make himſelf maſter of Madras.

The Count d'Aché agrees, that he could foreſee Pondichery was in danger. This danger could be no other than that of being blocked up by the Engliſh ſquadron, which the 400,000 livres he was willing to part with, and the hundred and forty recruits he had brought for the company's troops, could by no means prevent.

Monſieur de Leyrit, the Council, and all the principal officers, repair on board the Count d'Aché, to prevail upon him to ſtay; but the moſt they can obtain from him is a delay of four and twenty hours. This delay they avail themſelves of, to repreſent to him, that abandoning the coaſt is the ſame thing with devoting Pondichery to certain deſtruction. Count Lally, on his ſide, ſends to acquaint the Count d'Aché, that the Engliſh were in full march to attack our army under Vandiwaſh, requeſting him to wait,

at

at leaſt, the iſſue of that event. He let him know, at the ſame time, that he had received diſpatches from Court, with orders to communicate them to him. The reader will be ſurpriſed at the Count d'Aché's anſwer. Here it is.

LETTER X.

On board the Zodiack, the 17th of September, 1759.

I *AM heartily concerned, Sir, that the dangerous wound I have received will not permit me to ſettle with you what ſteps it may be proper to take in our preſent circumſtances.* It would give me the greateſt pleaſure to be able to act in concert with you. It is what I have long wiſhed for; but I have let you and the Council know the mind I am now of, which no conſideration, certainly, could have made me alter, as, before I took my reſolution, I maturely weighed all the reaſons that could be brought againſt it. *I have engaged the Engliſh ſquadron, and diſabled it from attempting any thing till the next ſeaſon.* I have brought to Pondichery the ſuccours I took under my convoy. I have even weakened my crews to reinforce the garriſon of that place to the beſt of my power. What more can I do? Muſt I not look to the ſafety of my ſquadron; by doing

which, I ſhall do more for the ſafety of Pondichery than my preſence, henceforward of no uſe, can do. Be perſuaded, Sir, that it is not for want of good will, I have taken this reſolution. I have as much as any man. But it is the advice of my Captains, it is prudence, it is my zeal for the good of the thing that moves me to it; a principle, which I will never ſwerve from.

I have the honour of being,

Signed, d'ACHE'.

REMARKS.

This letter is not in the affectionate ſtyle, with the preceding letter. The Count d'Aché had but juſt received the letter of the Council, by which they oppoſed his departure. He declares, *that he had diſabled the Engliſh ſquadron from attempting any thing till the next ſeaſon.* Why, therefore, did he leave the Engliſh maſters of the ſea; and by doing ſo give the Princes of the country reaſon to conclude, that it was the Engliſh ſquadron which had diſabled the French ſquadron from keeping the ſea? Why did he not wait for the inſtructions from Court, which Count Lally had orders to communicate to him.

The

The Engliſh knew no ſeaſons in the Indies. Their ſquadron never ceaſed, in whole or in part, winter or ſummer, to block up Pondichery. The ſame expedients which they uſed to keep the coaſt, and yet eſcape the equinoctial hurricanes, which are leſs frequent and leſs dangerous on this coaſt than on the coaſt of Britanny, were propoſed to the Count d'Aché. The Count d'Aché pretends, that he has three times beat the the enemy; yet this enemy obliged him three times to fly the Indian ſeas; the laſt time never to ſhew his face there again.

It will be granted, that victories in the Indies very much reſemble defeats in Europe. Accordingly, the people of Europe may depend on their having ſeized the truth, when they have taken the very reverſe of all the accounts received from the Indies. Of this the proſecution carried on againſt Count Lally is a ſtriking inſtance.

On this ſudden departure of the Count d'Aché, the whole ſettlement aſſembled, and unanimouſly ſigned a proteſt, by which *they render him alone reſponſible for the loſs of Pondichery*, and threaten to *apply to the King himſelf for juſtice againſt him.* The currents had, in the mean time, carried him to the north. This proteſt having reached him on the high ſeas, he holds

a council of war on board his ſhip; returns in five days to Pondichery; comes aſhore for two days; loſes the fineſt opportunity of cruſhing the Engliſh ſquadron, which, thinking him ſailed for the iſlands, appears in diſorder the 27th at day-break in ſight of Pondichery. In a word, he ſails the 1ſt of October never to return again; and on his ſailing writes the following letter.

LETTER XI.

On board the Zodiack, the 1ſt of October, 1759.

I Moſt heartily congratulate you, my dear General, on the advantage our troops have this day obtained. No doubt, we have paid dear for it; but it is ſtill doing a great deal. I am going to repair your loſs by ſending you five hundred men; we will, on our arrival at Mauritius, forward you all the ſuccours we can find there. You may depend on my not abandoning Pondichery, as long as I can be of any uſe to it.

I muſt recommend to your kindneſs the officers, who go aſhore with the ſailors. I leave to yourſelf the manner in which it may be proper to treat them.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Signed, d'ACHE'.

This

This very moment I have received repreſentations from Monſieur de Leguille in regard to the men I give you. It is againſt his opinion. You may gueſs by this what difficulties I am under; ſince, to reinforce and oblige you, I act contrary to the opinion of a general officer of his majeſty's ſea forces. Monſieur de Gadeville will tell you the reſt.

REMARKS.

Count Lally had ſent Monſieur de Gadeville on board the Count d'Aché with an account of the victory mentioned in this letter; and had informed him of it an hour before by a diſcharge of one hundred pieces of cannon. The Count d'Aché was then preparing to hoiſt ſail. The gaining of a battle appeared to Count Lally a ſufficient motive to make the Count d'Aché ſtop; at leaſt, till all the circumſtances of the battle, and all the conſequences of the victory, could be aſcertained, that he might be able to carry the news to Mauritius, and from thence forward it to Europe by the firſt ſhips. This victory ſhould have engaged the Count d'Aché to come aſhore, and confer in perſon with Count Lally, then confined to his bed, and with the Council of Pondichery, in order to conſult with them on the means of turning it to ſome account

count, by determining the princes of the country to declare themſelves, according to cuſtom, for the victorious party. And, in fact, Baſſalet-Zingue, brother of Salabet-Zingue ſovereign of the whole country, was then in full march to join Count Lally, with 12,000 men. But, hearing that the Count d'Aché had abandoned the ſea, he turned back; and with the petty princes in the neighbourhood of Pondichery, (who, ſince they have had any Europeans upon the coaſt, know full well, that the ſuperiority of theſe Europeans over one another aſhore is ever decided by their ſuperiority at ſea) continued neuter; ſo that Count Lally reaped no kind of benefit from this victory.

It muſt be owned, that the Count d'Aché actually ſent Count Lally 450 ſailors, or rather cabbin boys, the ſcum of his ſquadron. Accordingly, 200 of them deſerted to the Engliſh ſquadron; many of them ended their lives by the hands of the executioner; and 50, with whom Count Lally garriſoned Vandiwaſh, let the enemy into it. The remaining 200 were thoſe who lay within the bound-hedge of Pondichery, when the Engliſh obliged Monſieur Dure to retreat within it; and whom Monſieur Moracin has honour and honeſty enough to ſtile, *the beſt troops in the Indies.*

Monſieur

Monſieur de Gadeville returns. Neither the zeal, with which the Count d'Aché, in his preceding letter, ſays he was animated for the good of the thing; nor even curioſity; nothing, in a word, as he himſelf had previouſly declared, can make him alter the reſolution he had taken, after having firſt well weighed all the reaſons that could be brought againſt it. One would be apt to imagine, that Count Lally and the Count d'Aché ſerved two different maſters.

CONCLUSION OF REMARKS.

Theſe remarks may be concluded by a very ſtriking contraſt. The Count d'Aché is defeated on his arrival in the Indies. Count Lally takes Cudaloor, Fort St. David, and Devi-cottah. The Count d'Aché is defeated a ſecond time, and ſails for the Madagaſcar Iſlands. Count Lally, the day after his departure, makes himſelf maſter of Arcot, and all the places or forts of that province, as far as Madras, in which he pens up the Engliſh. The Count d'Aché receives a reinforcement of four ſhips; comes to Pondichery again at the expiration of thirteen months; is beat a third time; abandons Pondichery and the Indies, never to ſhew his face there again. Count Lally gains a victory the very day that the Count

Count d'Aché deſerts him; holds out Pondichery for ſixteen months, without ſhips, without men, without proviſions, without money, without any kind of ſuccours from the Madagaſcar Iſlands or Europe. Is it not, therefore, to be preſumed, that, if Count Lally had been aſſiſted by the Count d'Aché, as the Engliſh General was by Admiral Pococke, Pondichery would never have experienced the fate to which it was at laſt obliged to ſubmit? To finiſh this parallel in two words: the Engliſh ſacrificed their ſquadron to take Pondichery; the Count d'Aché would not ſo much as riſk his to ſave it.

EXTRACTS FROM SOME LETTERS WRITTEN BY MONSIEUR DE LEYRIT TO COUNT LALLY, CONCERNING THE REFUSAL OF THE COUNT D'ACHE' TO SAIL FOR MADRAS, AFTER THE REDUCTION OF FORT ST. DAVID.

The 12th of MAY, 1758.

MONSIEUR de LEYRIT, by his letter of this date to Count Lally, tells him, *that the ſquadron of Monſieur d'Aché ſhould be the palladium of the company's ſettlements, and inſure the ſucceſs of all his (Count Lally's) enterpriſes. He ſends Count Lally a copy of the letter, which he had juſt receïved from the Count d'Aché, in which the Count d'Aché acquaints him, that,*

that, the Engliſh being under ſail, they may poſſibly fall upon him; that the crews of his ſhips are quite reduced; and that the Zodiack, the beſt manned of them all, had not 200 *men.*

REMARKS.

Monſieur de Leyrit agrees, that the ſafety of the Company's ſettlements, and the ſucceſs of Count Lally's enterpriſes, depend on the Count d'Aché's ſquadron. This loſs, which the Count d'Aché exaggerates to Monſieur de Leyrit, and the fear he expreſſes of the enemy's falling upon him, proves, that the Count d'Aché had not beat this enemy, as he wrote to Court he had. They prove, at the ſame time, that the Count d'Aché could not, eighteen days after this, have propoſed to Count Lally to go and attack the Engliſh ſquadron under Madras.

The 18th of MAY, 1758.

By his letter of this date, *he acquaints him with the danger to which Karical was expoſed, threatened as it was by the Engliſh ſquadron; and the neceſſity of ſuccouring it.*

REMARKS.

It was this very conſideration, that determined Count Lally to evacuate Seringham, a poſt

poſt within land, in order to protect the coaſt, in lieu of the Count d'Aché's ſquadron, which was unrigged.

The 27th of MAY, 1758.

By his letter of this date, he tells him, *that the Engliſh ſquadron could not double Alamparwa.*

REMARKS.

Count d'Aché, therefore, was not then in ſight of the Engliſh ſquadron, as he ſays he was in his other letters of the ſame date.

The 28th of MAY, 1758.

By his letter of this date, *he informs him of the reſolution taken by Monſieur d'Aché, to run in under the cannon of Pondichery.*

REMARKS.

This was not, certainly, acting like a man, who, as he himſelf affirms, four days after, that is the 2d of June, propoſed to Count Lally to go in queſt of the Engliſh, and beat them.

30th,

The 30th of MAY, 1758.

By his letter of this day, he ſays, *that Monſieur d'Aché intended to remain at anchor, and wait for the enemy in that poſition; that they find it the greateſt difficulty in the world to get the ſailors together, who expreſs a great deal of diſguſt and want of ſpirit*; and he adds, *God preſerve the ſquadron to us, for I can foreſee nothing but ruin, in caſe we ſhould be unhappy enough to loſe it.*

REMARKS.

Monſieur de Leyrit, therefore, could foreſee, from the firſt month of Count Lally's arrival, that without a ſquadron there was no expecting any ſucceſs in the Indies. The whole queſtion, therefore, is reduced to this; whether the ſquadron of the Count d'Aché was loſt to the Indies or not?

The 1ſt of JUNE, 1758.

In his letter of this date, he ſays, *that Monſieur d'Aché had put to ſea that morning, and that he* (Monſieur de Leyrit) *did not hear of it till noon, when he was gone.* He adds, *that they heard nothing of the Engliſh ſquadron.*

And

And, in a ſecond letter of the ſame date, he ſays, *that the Engliſh ſquadron had not ſo much as appeared in the latitude of Alamparwa; and that it lay to the leeward of that place.*

REMARKS.

That is to ſay, nine or ten leagues to the leeward of Pondicherry; and, of courſe, under an impoſſibility of getting there in two days. How, then, could the Count d'Aché and ſome ſuborned witneſſes have the face to advance, that the Count d'Aché, by getting into the wind the 1ſt of June, in order to make the latitude of Fort St. David, had offered battle to the Engliſh ſquadron, and that the Engliſh ſquadron had refuſed it?

The 2d of JUNE, 1759.

By his letter of this date he ſays, *that Monſieur d'Aché, by his letter of the 1ſt of June, was for ſailing to Karical, thirty leagues to the ſouth.*

REMARKS.

The Count d'Aché had not as yet thought proper to acquaint Count Lally with this reſolution,

which proves, that the Count d'Aché had not the taking of Fort St. David much at heart; an event he could not foreſee, when he took this reſolution. All Count Lally can ſay of the matter is, that this was not the courſe which led to the Engliſh ſquadron; and that the Count d'Aché, by ſteering a contrary one, might have come up with the Engliſh ſquadron in five hours.

The 6th of JULY, 1758.

In his letter of this date, he ſays, *that the Engliſh ſquadron was anchored at Sadras, a place eighteen leagues to the leeward of Fort St. David.*

REMARKS.

The Count d'Aché was then at Karical, forty-four leagues from the Engliſh ſquadron; and Count Lally was maſter of Fort St. David and Devi-cottah.

The 22d of JULY, 1758.

In his letter of this date, he ſays, *that there was a report at Tranquebar of the Engliſh having received a reinforcement of five*

ſhips; that, if it was ſo, Monſieur d'Aché would have reaſon to repent his not having riſked a ſecond battle.

REMARKS.

The Count d'Aché was then come back to Pondichery, whither the Council had ſummoned him to return. The news of theſe five veſſels was falſe; but the concern, which Monſieur de Leyrit ſuppoſes the Count d'Aché muſt be under, for not having riſked a ſecond battle, proves, that the Count d'Aché had been ſollicited to ſail in queſt of the enemy. How, therefore, could the Count d'Aché depoſe, that, twenty days before, he had offered Count Lally to go and beat the Engliſh ſquadron under Madras? This ſquadron was but ten leagues from the Count d'Aché; it was come two thirds of the way to meet him. How, then, and in what reſpect, could the Count d'Aché ſtand in need of Count Lally's leave to go and beat it?

The 27th of JUNE, 1758.

In his letter of this date, he ſays, *that the Count d'Aché ſtill perſiſts in his reſolution of returning to the Madagaſcar Iſlands; and that he*

he does not think the aſſembling of a Council make him alter it.

REMARKS.

Surely, this cannot be the Count d'Aché, the ſame man, who depoſes that he offered Count Lally to ſail, the 3d of June, for Madras, and beat the Engliſh ſquadron; and yet, on the 27th of June, is for returning to the Madagaſcar Iſlands. Count Lally had ſet out from Pondichery the 20th of June, on the Count d'Aché's refuſal to ſail againſt Madras; and, on the 25th, wrote to Monſieur de Leyrit, to deſire he might uſe his endeavours with the Count d'Aché to prevail on him to co-operate in the expedition againſt Madras. The Count d'Aché did not arrive at Pondichery till the 6th of May; and was, notwithſtanding, for returning to the Madagaſcar Iſlands the 27th of June; at which time he could not foreſee the engagement of the 5th of Auguſt, nor that he would have the worſt of it; ſo that no inference can be drawn from his behaviour, but that he was already, at the expiration of ſix weeks, reſolved to abandon Pondichery.

The 1ſt of JULY, 1758.

By his letter of this date, he acquaints Count Lally, *that he was ſtill employed in*

making the preparations required by him for the attack of Madras; and he adds, *that Mr. Pigot had requeſted him to advance his Engliſh priſoners a month's pay, but that it was not in his power to do it.*

REMARKS.

This letter proves that Count Lally never ceaſed thinking of Madras. It even proves, that Monſieur de Leyrit had ſquandered away three millions of livres in the ſpace of two months, ſince he could not advance ſo ſmall a ſum as between eight and nine thouſand to the Engliſh, whom Count Lally had made priſoners in Fort St. David.

The 13th of JULY, 1758.

In his letter of this date, he ſays, *that he was ſtill entirely taken up with the preparations neceſſary for the ſiege of Madras.*

REMARKS.

This letter, and that immediately preceding it, ſufficiently prove, that Count Lally did not refuſe the Count d'Aché to march againſt Madras.

The 21ſt of JULY, 1758.

In his letter of this date, he ſays, *that he was at a loſs how to ſubſiſt the ſquadron*; *and he complains, at the ſame time, of he want of ſubordination in the officers of the company's troops, and of the embezzlements committed by them in the poſts where they were ſtationed.*

REMARKS.

It is a ſure thing, that the Count d'Aché's ſquadron, which did not ſtir from the road of Pondichery, could not but eat up the neighbouring country, which it would not have done, had it ſailed for Madras. As to the embezzlements committed by the officers of the company's troops, Monſieur de Leyrit had more than reaſon to complain of them. They are now, however, the beſt officers and the honeſteſt men living.

The 26th of JULY, 1758.

In his letter of this date, he ſays, *that Monſieur d'Aché, on the appearance of the Engliſh ſquadron, had reſolved to run in under the walls of Pondichery.* And Monſieur de Leyrit adds to this letter of his another letter, which is not ſigned, in which it is ſaid, *that*

it were to be wiſhed, that Monſieur d'Aché would ſail in queſt of the Engliſh ſquadron.

REMARKS.

Count Lally was then fifty leagues from Pondichery. Therefore, the Count d'Aché cannot ſay with truth, though he has not been afraid to depoſe it, that it was Count Lally, who put the Council of Pondichery upon engaging him to go in queſt of the Engliſh ſquadron.

The 28th of JULY, 1758.

In his letter of this date, he ſays, *that the Council of Pondichery had decided, that Monſieur d'Aché ſhould put to ſea.*

REMARKS.

By what has already appeared, it muſt be evident, that no ſmall ceremony was requiſite to make the Count d'Aché quit ſight of the ramparts of Pondichery.

The 31ſt of JULY, 1758.

By his letter of this date, *he informs him of the chimerical revolutions in the Dekan, of which*

which Meſſieurs de Buſſy and Moracin informed him; and he adds, *that the fears of theſe gentlemen could have no dangerous conſequences, if the ſiege of Madras had taken place at the time, that he (Count Lally) had propoſed to himſelf to undertake it.*

REMARKS

Is is poſſible to prove more evidently, that Count Lally was for attacking Madras, after the ſiege of Fort St. David? This letter is dated the 31ſt of July. Fort St. David was taken the 2d of June. The propoſals of Count Lally and Monſieur de Leyrit, as likewiſe the refuſal of the Count d'Aché, are of the 2d, 17th, and 18th of this ſame month of June. It is thus, that Count Lally's enemies convict each other of falſeſhood and calumny.

The 4th of AUGUST, 1758.

In his letter of this date, he ſays: *All the advantage the Engliſh could boaſt over the Count d'Aché was their remaining maſters of the field of battle; for that they had been as roughly handled as the French.*

REMARKS.

There is an anachroniſm in this letter, which is dated the 4th. It ſhould be dated the 6th, the battle having been fought the 5th. This battle was, in fact, but a mere cannonade; and, in the three battles between the Count d'Aché and the Engliſh, there was not a ſingle ſhip taken or ſunk on either ſide. Monſieur d'Aché, indeed, loſt, the night of his retreat after the firſt engagement, a ſeventy-four gun ſhip; but the Engliſh contributed nothing to this loſs.

The 9th of AUGUST, 1758.

In his letter of this date he ſpeaks to him as follows: *The delays you have met with in the ſiege of Madras, which you could not foreſee when you gave your orders to Meſſieurs de Buſſy and Moracin, cannot but cauſe ſome alterations therein.*

REMARKS.

They, in fact, cauſed a great deal, as Count Lally, who did not expect to be refuſed by the Count d'Aché, had given theſe two gentlemen notice, that he reckoned to beſiege Madras immediately after Fort St. David, and had ordered them to join him with a body of about 1300 men, which they had under their com-

command; and with the aſſiſtance of which he could have taken Madras. He had informed the Court of this ſtep, and the Court had approved it. But, on the Count d'Aché's refuſing to co-operate with him, and reſolving to abandon the coaſt, he contented himſelf with taking about 400 men from them. The remaining 800 or 900 were left in the provinces, where theſe gentlemen commanded, to reinforce the garriſon of Maſuli-patnam, which, at Count Lally's arrival, had but 400 men to defend it. It is neceſſary to obſerve this circumſtance, of which written evidence has been produced in the courſe of the trial. It ſerves to confound the impoſture of the witneſſes, who dare to depoſe, that Maſuli-patnam was taken in conſequence of Count Lally's ſtripping it of its garriſon. Maſuli-patnam was taken by ſurprize in April 1759; and that in conſequence of the Count d'Aché's refuſing to ſail againſt Madras, and his abandoning the coaſt the 2d of September 1758.

The 13th of AUGUST, 1758.

In his letter of this date, *he ſpeaks of nothing but the apprehenſions Monſieur d'Aché was under, leaſt two fire-ſhips, with which he affected to believe the Engliſh ſquadron was provided, ſhould ſet the French ſquadron on fire.*

RE-

REMARKS.

Monſieur de Leyrit was, no doubt, under a miſtake; and the Count d'Aché could expreſs no ſuch apprehenſions after ſaying and writing, *that he had handled the Engliſh as roughly as they had handled him; and that they did not dare to come within cannon ſhot of him.*

The 18th of AUGUST, 1758.

Monſieur de Leyrit, in a letter of this date to Count Lally, makes uſe of theſe very expreſſions: *You will ſee, Sir, by this anſwer, the Count d'Aché's poſitive refuſal to go and attack the Engliſh ſquadron. The Council intend to do all that lies in their power, to oppoſe his departure; and even to proteſt againſt him, in caſe he ſhould perſiſt in his reſolution to ſail, before the bad ſeaſon makes it neceſſary for him to do ſo. Though Monſieur d'Aché appears determined not to put to ſea, in order to attack the Engliſh ſquadron with the ſuccours you offer him; nevertheleſs, as I preſume it is neceſſary that he ſhould again leave the road, in order to riſk a third battle; or, at leaſt, to keep the Engliſh at bay; I reckon I ſhall be under a neceſſity of making freſh inſtances to him to-morrow.*

RE-

REMARKS.

It muſt appear very ſurpriſing, that ſo many *inſtances* ſhould have been requiſite, in the Indies, with a man, who depoſes at Paris, that he would not be ſuffered to go in queſt of the Engliſh, and beat them. Monſieur de Leyrit and the Council will not be ſuſpected of having taken ſo much pains with the Count d'Aché, merely out of a compliment to Count Lally. The danger, therefore, muſt have been very preſſing.

The 19th of AUGUST, 1758.

In his letter of this date, he ſays: *I ſaw Monſieur d'Aché this morning. I again preſſed him, but he would not yield to my arguments. All my inſtances were loſt upon him.* Monſieur de Leyrit adds: *I cannot, therefore, ſee, how you can make any attempt upon Madras.*

REMARKS.

Monſieur de Leyrit gives his opinion here, in very expreſs terms, that, without Monſieur d'Aché, *there was no making any attempt upon Madras.*

The 20th of AUGUST, 1758.

In his letter of this date, he ſays, *that he expected freſh ſuccours from Europe*; and that he *thought of nothing, day or night, but our ſad condition.*; *and that it was impoſſible for him to give us any relief.*

REMARKS.

It is very odd, that, after ſuch letters from Monſieur de Leyrit, people ſhould expect miracles from Count Lally, and conſider it as a crime in him that he did not work any.

The 21ſt of AUGUST, 1758.

In his letter of this date, he ſays, *that he was ſtill in pain for Pondichery, having heard that* 700 *Engliſh were marched out of Madras, though he had then with him the Chevalier de Soupire with* 1000 *regular troops*; *not to ſpeak of the inhabitants, and the Count d'Aché's ſquadron, which then lay in the road.*

In ſhort, Monſieur de Leyrit acquaints Count Lally by another letter of the ſame date, *that the Count d'Aché, in ſpite of his inſtructions, could not be prevailed on by the repreſentations made to him that the fate of the colony*

colony depended upon his ſtay, nor by the proteſts of the Council againſt his departure, to defer it for more than five days.

REMARKS.

All Count Lally can add to theſe two letters is, that this ſame Pondichery, which, with 1000 men and the Count d'Aché ſquadron, was frightened out of its wits by 700 Engliſh, has pretended, that Count Lally, with 700 men only, and without the Count d'Aché's ſquadron, ſhould not ſtand in any dread of 2200.

The repreſentation and proteſt of the Council, produced in another place, may ſerve as a ſupplement to what has been ſaid in this, of the Count d'Aché's behaviour in the Indies, and of the aſſiſtance his ſquadron gave Count Lally's army. Count Lally does not inſiſt on this refuſal of the Count d'Aché to act againſt Madras, but becauſe there was ſtill time enough to repair the loſſes that the company had ſuffered by the inaction, in which Monſieur de Leyrit had, for eight months together, kept the Chevalier de Soupire.

GENE-

General Remarks.

After perusing these pieces, the public will, no doubt, be surprised, that Count Lally should be charged with the smallest share in the loss of Pondichery.

It was Father Lavaur, whom the Council of Pondichery employed to draw up the representations made by the Council to the Count d'Aché. Count Lally has the minutes of them in the hand-writing of this father.

For five months together Count Lally had been struggling between life and death, and was constantly removing from one part of the country to another, to see what effect a change of air would have upon him. Monsieur de Leyrit speaks in these representations, as chief of the French settlements. They were carried to sign to Count Lally, then confined to his bed.

Is there a line, is there a word in these representations, which does not prove, that the Council, and the settlement in general, were under the strongest conviction, that the safety of Pondichery depended entirely on the Count d'Aché's squadron? It is by these pieces Count Lally desires to be heard. They cannot but dissi-

pate

pate the odious prejudices, which calumny has endeavoured to raiſe againſt him.

Great, no doubt, muſt be the indignation of the public, when it hears, that thoſe men, who have ſurpriſed its credulity by a multitude of infamous libels againſt Count Lally, are the very ſame, who have put their names to theſe acts againſt the Count d'Aché; when it hears, that theſe very men, after having thus vented their rage againſt Count Lally; after having acted againſt him as informers and accuſers with the king and the miniſtry, have ſince had the face to appear as witneſſes againſt him; that they are, in a word, thoſe very men, who, in all their depoſitions, have not only agreed not ſo much as to mention the name of the Count d'Aché, though obliged to it by oath, on the complaints exhibited to the court, and its decree thereupon being read to them; but who have even affected to forget that the King had ſent a ſquadron to the Indies. The reign of impoſture is but ſhort. Count Lally hopes, that juſtice will revenge him of the colluſions of this cabal, and the calumnies with which it has been ſo long endeavouring to overwhelm him.

MEMOIRS

OF

COUNT LALLY.

APPENDIX.

SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF THE PROSECUTION CARRIED ON AGAINST COUNT LALLY, FROM HIS ARRIVAL IN FRANCE TO THE TIME OF HIS WRITING THE PRECEDING PIECES.

COUNT Lally took ſhipping at Madras the 10th of March, 1761; landed in England the 23d of September following; and on the 27th of the next month obtained leave to return to France. The firſt thing he did, after his arrival in France,

was

was to comply with his engagements, as commander and commiſſary for his majeſty, and give an account of his conduct. He preſented a faithful picture of the crimes and abuſes, which had occaſioned the loſs of Pondichery, and which it was in his power to prove by authentic pieces. But anſwer was made him, that to undertake the examination and diſcuſſion of theſe different objects, it was neceſſary to wait the return of the Council of Pondichery. Nevertheleſs, the members of this Council, perſuaded that Count Lally, when arrived in Europe, would lay open their miſdeeds, had moſt carefully applied themſelves to find out the means of warding off ſo terrible a blow. Excited by a ſpirit of revenge and the deſire of impunity, they had availed themſelves of the ſtay, allowed them in the Indies after the commander's departure, to forge ſeveral pieces, which were to ſerve as a baſis to the blackeſt calumnies. Father Lavaur preſided at their meetings, and directed all their ſteps.

A verbal proceſs *of the taking of Pondichery, and what happened during laſt days of the blockade, and at the ſurrender of the place*, holds the firſt rank amongſt theſe clandeſtine pieces. It is ſaid in this act, *that it was paſſed in the houſe of Monſieur Law, and in the apartment of Monſieur de Leyrit.* This verbal

proceſs is ſubſcribed by the Governor and Council of Pondichery; who, no doubt, meant to give more weight and authority to it, by getting it ſigned by Monſieur Mathon, Procurator of the Foreign Miſſions; brother Dominick, a Capuchin, and Apoſtolical Vicar; and Father Lavaur, Superior of the Jeſuits.

This piece is worthy of its authors and approvers. They alter the truth in it in every eſſential circumſtance. They conceal and diſguiſe ſuch facts and papers as contribute to the juſtification of the General; and take a great deal of pains to gain belief to the infamous and ſcandalous reports, which the Council itſelf made it its buſineſs to propagate in Pondichery, with a view to perſuade the inhabitants, that Count Lally wanted *to facilitate to the Engliſh the approaches neceſſary to aſſault the place, and give up all the inhabitants to be plundered and put to the ſword.*

This verbal proceſs was ſent, the 12th of February 1761, to the Council of the Iſland of Mauritius, to be from thence forwarded to the Company. The authors of this ſcandalous piece have been ſince heard in teſtimony againſt Count Lally, and have left on record, in their depoſitions, all the lies it contains.

They

They, at the ſame time, drew up ſeveral other verbal proceſſes relative to the events, which had happened in the Indies, during Count Lally's reſidence there. Theſe works of darkneſs, the dates of which are more than liable to ſuſpicion, and which never appeared any where but in Europe, betray, every one of them, the ſpirit by which they were dictated.

But the Cabal did not confine itſelf to the drawing up of theſe obſcure pieces. The enemies of Count Lally had formed the horrid project of blackening him, if poſſible, in the eyes of the whole univerſe, by charging him at once, with cowardice and treachery. For this purpoſe, the Council of Pondichery engaged the Governor of Madras to print and publiſh a Manifeſto, ſetting forth his motives for demoliſhing the fortifications and houſes of Pondichery.

To this piece were added ſeveral others relating to the blockade of Pondichery; and, likewiſe, the declaration Count Lally ſent to Colonel Coote before the ſurrender of that place; the anſwer of the Engliſh General to that declaration; and the ſeparate repreſentations of Monſieur de Leyrit and Father Lavaur, to prevent the deſtruction of Pondichery. This Jeſuit took upon him to ſee

that the work was properly printed; and even ſupplied the Engliſh with printers and a printing-houſe.

In the margin of Count Lally's declaration, which is one of the pieces contained in this collection, are ſeveral calumnious notes againſt him. The mention made in the beginning of it of the taking of Chandernagor, as a violation of the treatiſes of neutrality, is ſtiled *low and weak*. They accuſe him, in the following notes, of having ſurrendered the town at diſcretion, without endeavouring to obtain any favourable conditions for the inhabitants. Nay, they carry their impudence to ſuch a height as to affirm, that favourable conditions would have been granted to him, had he aſked a capitulation *before the trenches were opened*; *and even afterwards, had he only made a ſhew to defend himſelf one or two days longer.*

How is it poſſible, after the faithful account given of the circumſtances of the capitulation, not to loſe patience at the ſight of this note-maker's impoſture? Is it not enough to recollect what has been inconteſtably proved by authentic pieces? 1ſt. That Count Lally did all that lay in his power to forward the holding of a mixt council, in order to deliberate ſeriouſly on a capitulation,

pitulation, whilſt it was poſſible to obtain any tolerable conditions. 2dly. That the Council of Pondichery, conſidering this ſtep which Count Lally adviſed, as too haſty and precipitate, thought proper to wait to the laſt extremity, and declared this their opinion and reſolution to him in expreſs terms. 3dly. That this fatal moment being arrived, the General aſſembled a council of war compoſed of the commanders of all the ſeveral corps, who approved the capitulation by opinions written and ſigned by themſelves, and containing their motives for thinking of it as they did; and even acknowledged, that the place was at the laſt gaſp, and had no kind of ſubſiſtence left. 4thly. That, in theſe critical moments, and when it was impoſſible to hold out any longer, Count Lally required for the garriſon and the inhabitants every thing, that the circumſtances of the place left him any pretext to inſiſt upon. What, therefore, are we to think of the author of theſe notes, who has thus dared to miſrepreſent well known facts; facts, which the Count has produced a multitude of writings to eſtabliſh?

The repreſentations addreſſed by Monſieur de Leyrit to the Governor of Madras wear equal marks of falſehood and deceit. He, in them, has the face to advance, that Count

Lally *wrote to Colonel Coote, who commanded the Engliſh troops, to invite him to come the day following and take poſſeſſion of our place.* Monſieur de Leyrit puts ſeveral captious queſtions in the ſame paper, by way, he muſt be ſenſible, of fiſhing for ſuch anſwers, as might authorize the informations of the council of Pondichery againſt the French General.

But all theſe machinations, far from producing the advantage which their authors hoped to derive from them, have only ſerved to throw new light upon Count Lally's defence. Three things ought to be allowed him as unqueſtionably eſtabliſhed, even by the words of the Manifeſto publiſhed by the Council of Madras.

The firſt is, that, whatever conditions might have been required, and even obtained from Colonel Coote, the ſparing of the fortifications of Pondichery could not poſſibly have been of the number. The decree for that purpoſe had been irrevocably pronounced by the Engliſh Company. This appears plainly by the Manifeſto, which contains the ſpeech of the Governor of Madras to the Council of Pondichery. *We ſhall now,* ſaid Mr. Pigot, *lay before you the orders we have received from the Directors of the Company we ſerve.* Behold in what terms they expreſs themſelves. IF

IT

IT SHOULD EVER BE YOUR GOOD FOTUNE TO TAKE ANY OF THE FRENCH SETTLEMENTS, WE GIVE YOU POSITIVE ORDERS TO RAZE THE FORTIFICATIONS OF THEM.

A ſecond point equally unqueſtionable is, that the Manifeſto, and the pieces annexed to it, radically deſtroy the infamous ſuſpicion, which the Council of Pondichery has ſince endeavoured to eſtabliſh, of an underſtanding between Count Lally and the Engliſh. To be convinced of this, one need only read the anſwer made to the repreſentations of Father Lavaur by Monſieur Dupré, appointed Governor of Pondichery ſince the taking of the place. They contain the bittereſt complaints of Count Lally's harſhneſs to ſuch of the Engliſh as had fallen into his hands, and of the rigorous treatment he was reſolved to give the reſt, in caſe he had ſucceeded in his enterprizes againſt them. *I could alledge*, theſe are the very words of the Engliſh Governor, *the harſh uſage it appears they were to receive; I could lay before you, as proofs of your General's rigour, numberleſs inſtances of the ſeverity, I might call it cruelty, with which he has treated ſuch of my countrymen as had the misfortnne to come under his power*, &c.

Theſe ſo violent exclamations againſt Count Lally's behaviour are evidently irreconcileable with the horrid ſuſpicions of correſpondence with the enemy and of treaſon, invented by his enemies in ſupport of a deſperate cauſe, and when they found, that all the informations, in which they charged him with embezzlement, were deſtroyed by irreſiſtible evidence.

3dly, In fine. It is proved by the ſame Manifeſto, that the Engliſh had formed the project of making themſelves maſters of the iſlands of Mauritus and Bourbon. The conqueſt of theſe ſettlements was recommended *in the ſtrongeſt terms to the ſecret Committee of Madras*, by a letter of the 23d of November 1759. It even appears, that, at the time this letter was written, they took it for granted in London, that their forces were in poſſeſſion of Pondichery. But, by its holding out to the laſt extremity, they did not get poſſeſſion of it till the 16th of January 1761; when it was too late for the Engliſh to execute any enterprize on the iſlands of Mauritius and Bourbon; and thus, in conſequence of this long reſiſtance, theſe precious eſtabliſhments, which will ever remain the key to the Indies, have been preſerved to France.

Beſides

Beſides theſe acts, of which we have been giving an account, the Council of Pondichery, before its departure from that place, wrote a great many letters to Paris, in which Count Lally was painted in the blackeſt colours. The authors of the Cabal engaged the Viſcount de Fumel, who had openly declared againſt Count Lally, to write likewiſe, and in the ſame ſtile. All theſe libels, containing the moſt ſhocking pictures of Count Lally, were addreſſed to Monſieur de Buſſy, who took care to have them circulated in Paris, in order to prepare the way for greater impoſtures, and create a general indignation againſt that commander.

As ſoon as the members of the Council of Pondichery arrived in London, they thought proper to ſend before them to Paris Monſieur Landiviſiau, with orders to rail againſt Count Lally to the utmoſt of his power; and he played his part perfectly well. The court and city ſoon reſounded with his cries. Many perſons can ſtill remember the exceſſes to which he ſuffered his paſſion to carry him; and, particularly, the following words, which he was not afraid to utter publicly at Fontainebleau, "That either he or Count Lally muſt come to the block." But his preſumption

tion failing him, he lowered his note on the trial. It may even be ſaid, that, on this occaſion, he made ſome kind of reparation to Count Lally, by declaring in his depoſition, and at his confrontation, that he did not mean to infer from the facts he had mentiond any kind of treaſon in the General. The progreſs of this defamation was extremely rapid. It was levelled equally at the civil and military conduct of Count Lally.

Count Lally ſpared no pains to diſſipate entirely the ſcandalous reports ſpread againſt him. He offered to juſtify, as far as it could be expected, all his operations in the Indies. But he was told, that theſe matters could not be examined till the Council of Pondichery was returned.

At length, this Council arrrived in Paris. It is impoſſible to deſcribe the number and variety of the intrigues put in practice in this city by theſe ſlanderers and their emiſſaries. Frequent aſſemblies, in which they contrived and agreed upon the moſt odious imputations againſt Count Lally; anonymous libels, in which theſe abominations were recorded; ſuch were the methods, to which they had recourſe to impoſe upon the public and the ſtock-holders. Father Lavaur, who had ſo well

ſerved

ſerved this cabal of ſlanderers in the Indies, was their Council and Director in Paris.

It is proper to take notice, in this place, of an important anecdote, by which the perfidy and duplicity of Father Lavaur may be clearly ſeen. He compoſed in the Indies two different memoirs. The firſt extolled Count Lally to the ſkies; the ſecond was a defamatory libel againſt him. We can name one perſon in particular, by whom the firſt was ſeen in the Indies; it is the Marquis de Montmorenci; and this nobleman can aſſert, that it ſpoke very favourably of the firſt expeditions of Count Lally, of which the Marquis himſelf was a witneſs. It is probable, that one or the other only of theſe Memoirs was to make its appearance as circumſtances ſhould require. The commodious doctrine, which permits the ſupporting of contraries, never received a more happy application.

When this Jeſuit was ſure of the progreſs of the Cabal, and of the almoſt univerſal odium it had excited in Paris againſt Count Lally, he no longer heſitated to ſide openly with the ſlanderers. Extracts of his libel were diſperſed. Nay, the whole work was given to ſome perſons, and Count Lally contrived to get a copy of it, which he preſented

tended to the Miniſter of the finances, who at firſt ſeemed to approve the complaint which he intended to exhibit; but, notwithſtanding, ordered him to ſtop his proceedings and promiſed to do him juſtice.

In the mean time, Count Lally's enemies took advantage of his ſteddy ſilence to gain credit to their impoſtures. They found it an eaſy matter to inliſt in their ſervice about fifty officers or ſervants of the company, whom intereſt rendered dependent upon them. Many of theſe officers and ſervants of the Company were, beſides, perſonally exaſperated againſt Count Lally, either becauſe he had attempted to put a ſtop to the malpractices of ſome of them in their civil employments, or found himſelf under a neceſſity of inflicting military puniſhments on others for military offences. They aſſembled very exactly in a private houſe, which ſerved them for a place of rendezvous. Here the ſeveral actors, who were to appear on the ſtage againſt him, received their parts. At the iſſue of theſe conferences they ſpread themſelves over the coffee houſes, the public walks, and all the other places of general reſort in Paris, where they boldly uttered falſehoods, which it was not in the power of any one to contradict. They even raiſed a mob, which had the impudence to inſult Count Lally under

under his windows; inſomuch that he was obliged to have recourſe to public authority to put a ſtop to theſe diſorders. It is, nevertheleſs, the authors of all theſe doings, who have been ſince admitted to give evidence againſt him.

In ſpite of the groſs contradictions into which many of them have fallen, it is plain, that it could be only to execute a formal conſpiracy, that ſo great a number of informers united againſt him. It is even certain that moſt of their depoſitions are but mere extracts from Father Lavaur's Memoirs, which are, as it were, the dictionary of all the calumnies uttered in the courſe of this proſecution.

The Council of Pondichery, after having put ſo many ſprings in motion to raiſe a general clamour againſt Count Lally, thought they might now venture upon an attempt of another order, by declaring themſelves publickly the accuſers of this Commander. They preſented the Miniſter of the Finances a Memorial containing the moſt grievous imputations againſt him, and accompanied with a letter, in which they declared, *that the Council and the wretched ſettlement of the Indies were, from firſt to laſt, cruſhed under the authority of a deſpotic maſter, who had been ever a ſtranger to all the laws of* PRUDENCE, HONOUR, AND

AND EVEN HUMANITY; adding, that Count Lally, *was, alone, accountable for the whole ſtewardſhip and adminiſtration, as well of the interior as the exterior concerns of the Company; and, likewiſe, for all the revenues of the lands and territories poſſeſſed by the Company; ----- that he was accountable for the loſs of Pondichery, ſince it had ſurrendered merely for want of proviſions, and he alone had in his hands the means of ſupplying it*; viz. *money to purchaſe them; the fruits of the Company's lands; the produce of the Company's crops; and troops, withal, to protect them.*

The Council, as if all theſe facts had been proved to be true, which, however, have been ſince proved falſe by written evidence, promiſed to clear up and eſtabliſh many others; and made uſe of theſe words: *You will not find in our Memorial, my Lord, a detail of all the ſums he remitted to Europe by the hands of the Danes, the Dutch, and even the Engliſh. This will appear hereafter. We have made it a law with ourſelves not to mention any facts in this Memorial, but ſuch as are clearly made out.*

In fine, the Council reſerved to itſelf *to draw an hiſtorical picture of his military operations; affirming, that there were nine capital articles which proved ſomething more than mere want of capacity.*

It is to be obſerved, that theſe ſlanderous imputations relate chiefly to extortions and embezzlements ſaid to be committed by Count Lally. But, if the innocence of his conduct is eſtabliſhed by unqueſtionable proofs in writing, moſt of which too are the work of thoſe who accuſe him; if there is not to be found, in the voluminous report of the enquiry made into his conduct, the ſlighteſt trace of the extortion laid to his charge; if, on the contrary, this report makes equally evident both his probity and diſintereſtedneſs, and the criminal miſconduct of his adverſaries; what judgment ought the public to form of a Cabal of impoſtors, who have conſpired to propagate ſuch infamous falſehoods? In what light muſt his judges conſider the promiſe made, four years ago, by thoſe who have informed againſt him, but which has not as yet been, and never will be, made good, to produce an account of the ſums which he remitted to Europe by the hands of the Danes, the Dutch, and even the Engliſh? What indignation can be adequate to ſuch black and wicked impoſtures?

The libel, which contained them, was only a recrimination formed and ſupported by the ſlanderers, to divert the thunder ready to light on their own heads, and to eſcape

cape the proſecution, with which they themſelves were threatened. They knew that Count Lally had long ſince given information of their miſconduct; and offered to exhibit the proofs of it. The Directors had communicated to them the Memorials relating to it, which they had received from Count Lally. They had examined them at their leiſure; and, in order to elude an enquiry, the conſequences of which they had ſo much reaſon to fear, they imputed to the Count the ſelf-ſame exceſſes, of which he had accuſed themſelves and had it in his power to convict them.

It was in conſequence of this ſyſtem they maintained, that Count Lally was, alone, accountable for all the money that had been brought from Europe, as well as the revenues of the ſettlement, and the whole of the effects laid up in the magazines.

But one need only read Count Lally's letters to the company, and the papers he exhibits, to be convinced, that the Council was accuſed, and even convicted, of theſe embezzlements, with which they reproach Count Lally with equal raſhneſs and falſehood; that all theſe diſorders proceeded from a vicious adminiſtration, which had ſubſiſted a long time before Count Lally ſet his foot in the Indies, and the proofs of which the Company

Company had under its eyes, in the regiſters and accounts of its treaſurers. Add, that the Council, in imputing to Count Lally alone the loſs of the Indies, contradicted itſelf, ſince it had maintained in the national proteſt, which has been cited, that the Count d'Aché, by abandoning the coaſt, had rendered himſelf alone anſwerable for all the misfortunes of the ſettlement.

The members of the Council, encouraged by the ſucceſs of theſe their firſt proceedings againſt Count Lally, preſented a petition to the King, beſeeching his Majeſty to appoint the tribunal, in which a criminal proſecution might be carried on againſt him. Count Lally was at the ſame time informed, that they had obtained an order for confining him in the Baſtile. The liberty he ſtill enjoyed alarmed his enemies. They apprehended, that, as long as he was in the way of being informed of their intrigues and ſiniſter practices, he might too eaſily find means to baffle them. Count Lally, though thus timely warned of the diſgrace which they were preparing for him, took no pains to avoid it. On the contrary, preferring a confinement, the rigour of which he foreſaw without ſuſpecting the length of it, to a flight, which thoſe, who informed againſt him, would, no doubt, have conſtrued into

a tacit acknowledgement of the juſtice of their imputations, he repaired to Fontainbleau, in the month of November 1762, and there did himſelf the honour to write the Duke de Choiſeul the following letter, in which one may eaſily diſcover the language of innocence and truth, and that noble confidence, which a blameleſs conduct alone can inſpire.

"My Lord,

The rumours, which prevail in Paris, have brought me here. My enemies will never be able to terrify me, ſince I depend on my own innocence, and am ſenſible of your equity. The King is maſter of my liberty, but my honour is under the ſafeguard of the laws, of which he is the protector. I do not aſk you, my Lord, who are my ſlanderers; I know them; but what their ſlanders are, that I may obviate them, and repel them with ſuch proofs, as will cover the authors of them with ſhame. I have brought here my head and my innocence, and ſhall continue here to wait your orders.

I am &c."

This is not, we inſiſt upon it, the ſtile of a man, who had forgot himſelf ſo far, as to commit extortion and betray his country.

try. However, Count Lally was arreſted, and conducted to the Baſtile. His confinement was matter of triumph to his enemies, who, upon it, became more clamourous than ever. They advanced in their clandeſtine Memoirs, that Count Lally's military conduct proved *ſomething more than mere want of capacity.*

But they ſoon openly impeached him of *High Treaſon.* Their emiſſaries propagated this calumny, and even went ſo far as to calculate the millions he had received for betraying Pondichery.

Fifteen months elapſed before Count Lally was interrogated. And all this time he was kept in the dark in regard to the tribunal, to which he might have recourſe to confound his ſlanderers. But the death of Father Lavaur put an end to his ſuſpence. Monſieur l'Abbé Terray, the Parliament's Commiſſary, in taking an inventory of this Jeſuit's papers, found amongſt them the defamatory libel of his, which we have ſo often mentioned. This libel was put into the hands of the Attorney General, who exhibited a charge againſt Count Lally of extortion, oppreſſion, abuſe of authority, and even *High Treaſon.* An arret was thereupon iſſued, which referred the proſecution to the

Chatelet, with a reſervation of the cuſtomary right of appeal to the ſupreme Court.

The Lieutenant-Criminel took ſome depoſitions. But it was conſidered, on the one hand, that an affair, which contained details of the greateſt extent, ought not to be left to two degrees of juriſdiction; and, on the other hand, that, Count Lally having firſt exhibited complaints againſt thoſe very perſons who had now impeached him, it was proper to ſet on foot a general enquiry into all the crimes and abuſes, which might have contributed to the loſs of the Indies. Accordingly, a commiſſion iſſued the 12th of January 1764, by which the King, "aſſuming to himſelf, as far as there might be occaſion, the complaints already exhibited, and the proceedings already had thereupon, referred to the Great Chamber fully aſſembled the cognizance of all the crimes and abuſes, which might have been committed in the Eaſt Indies, relative to the Government and Trade of the India Company, as well before as ſince the ſending of the troops there under Count Lally, in order that the ſaid crimes and abuſes, with all their circumſtances and dependencies, may be enquired into in the ſaid Great Chamber at the ſuit of the Attorney General, and the

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profecution for them there carried on and terminated againſt the PERSONS GUILTY THEREOF, THEIR ACCOMPLICES, AND ADHERENTS, ACCORDING TO THE RIGOUR OF THE LAWS."

The motive for iſſuing this commiſſion, ſufficiently evident in itſelf, is thus expreſſed in the preamble. "As in a great number of Memorials preſented to us..... it has been ſet forth, that theſe ſo numerous, and, at the ſame time, ſo fatal loſſes, had been occaſioned by embezzlements, extortions, miſapplications of the public money,..... our juſtice requires, that theſe delinquencies ſhould be judicially inquired into."

Thus, as it appears by the very terms of this Commiſſion, the object of it was merely to diſcover the crime, by whomſoever it might have been committed. It was not levelled at any particular perſon; it was to take in *all the crimes and abuſes, in general, committed in the Eaſt Indies, relative to the Government and Trade of the Company, as well before as ſince the ſending of the troops there under Count Lally.*

On the 12th of July 1764, a new Commiſſion iſſued, importing, *at the ſame time that it directed that of the 12th of the preceding month*

month of January to be carried into execution, that the profecution begun by the Lieutenant-Crimine ... ſhould be continued, carried on, and terminated, as well againſt Count Lally, as againſt his accomplices, &c.

The firſt Commiſſion of the 12th of January 1764, is referred to in the preamble of this ſecond Commiſſion; and it is added; "the King has been ſince informed, that, ſo early as the 6th of July 1763, the Attorney General had obſerved, on occaſion of ſeveral pieces found at Father Lavaur's, that there might reſult from ſome of the ſaid pieces againſt le Sieur de Lally a great number of facts of the greateſt importance, and reduceable to certain heads, ſuch as abuſes of authority, miſdemeanours, extortions, embezzlements, and other crimes, even of High Treaſon; that he had exhibited a complaint thereof, of which he had act by the Arret of the 6th of July 1763, which referred to the Chatelet the profecution of the ſaid Sieur de Lally, his accomplices and adherents, ... that, in execution thereof, ſeveral witneſſes had been heard by the Lieutenant-Criminel; and that it appears neceſſary, that theſe proceedings ſhould be likewiſe continued, carried on, and terminated, in execution of the Commiſſion of the 12th of January 1764, as well againſt the ſaid Sieur de Lally, as his accomplices, &c."

This

This laſt Commiſſion injoins, by a ſpecial clauſe, the execution of the firſt. But it is abſolutely neceſſary to obſerve, that theſe judicial proceedings have been confined to the imputations againſt Count Lally and his pretended accomplices. No enquiries have been made into the abuſes, of which he had himſelf firſt complained; and which prevailed in the Indies, as well before as ſince the ſending of troops there under his command. Theſe abuſes had been committed by ſeveral of the perſons employed by the Company in its ſettlements; moſt of whom, after making their depoſitions, returned to theſe ſettlements, with certificates atteſting that nothing could be laid to their charge. This advantage they would never have enjoyed, if, conformably to the firſt Commiſſion, the proſecution had been carried on againſt them; ſince, in that caſe, the proofs, which Count Lally could produce againſt moſt of them, would have laid the Judges under a neceſſity of iſſuing warrants to apprehend them. Thus Count Lally, a man honoured with the titles of Commander and King's Commiſſary, was the firſt to give information of crimes and abuſes, which he offered to eſtabliſh by point-blank proofs. But no regard was paid to his information. He has, alone, experienced the rigour of a proſecution; and this

profecution had no other foundation than a recrimination contrived by his enemies. A addreſſed to the Miniſtry by the Council of Pondichery; an anonymous libel found amongſt Father Lavaur's papers; ſuch have been the foundation of a criminal proſecution carried on againſt a Lieutenant General of the King's armies; for accuſing him of extortion, and even endeavouring to fix upon him *a ſuſpicion of High Treaſon.*

The charge of extortion left him a right in law to claim the aſſiſtance of Council; and ſuch aſſiſtance was never more requiſite, conſidering the immenſe extent of the object; conſidering that the proceedings were rather literal than vocal; and that the accuſed was obliged to collect, combine, and produce a vaſt number of pieces tending to his juſtification, moſt of which lay ſcattered here and there in ſeveral places. But theſe words, *even of High Treaſon,* inſerted in the impeachment, imported the ſuſpicion of a crime, which the letter of the law does not comprehend in the number of thoſe, relatively to which a communication with Council is allowed; ſo that Count Lally has not as yet been able to obtain ſo precious a privilege. The involving of him in proceedings of ſuch an extraordinary nature, and the ſub-

ſubjecting of him to a rigorous confinement, was not enough to ſatiate the malice and vengeance of his enemies. But, by impeaching him as ſuſpected of *High Treaſon*, they thus endeavoured to deprive him, if poſſible, even of the means of defending himſelf.

But, though Count Lally has been refuſed the comfort of conferring with Council, he has, while the Attorney General was collecting proofs againſt him, been allowed the uſe of pen, ink and paper. He has devoted, to the expoſition of the many facts and proofs in his favour, the diſmal leiſure procured him by a forced ſolitude. Very exact notes, taken by him immediately after his long confrontations and interrogatories, have enabled his defenders to repel the ſhafts of calumny, and eſtabliſh his innocence.

Add to this, that the informers againſt Count Lally, even thoſe who had ſigned the petition, beſeeching the King to name the tribunal in which they might proſecute him, have been heared in juſtice againſt him. From accuſed, which they were in the beginning, they became accuſers; and not ſatisfied with this firſt transformation, they have ſince appeared in the ſhape of witneſſes. What is more, theſe depoſitions of theirs are, for the moſt part,

volumes

volumes compoſed in ſuch a ſtile, and put together in ſuch an order, as neceſſarily ſuppoſe a very remote preparation. Many of theſe witneſſes appeared with papers in their hands, which they faithfully followed in their narratives. The proceedings in the Chatelet contain an acknowledgment of this important fact. Now, what more concluſive proof can there be of the exiſtence of that conſpiracy, againſt which Count Lally has never ceaſed to cry out? A witneſs ought to declare the truth, as it occurs to him the moment he declares it; and is to know nothing of the facts concerning which he is to be examined, till the moment he is examined. How then ſhould he, on pretence of aſſiſting his memory, be permitted to preſent himſelf with a ready prepared depoſition; to ſubſtitute a ſtudied libel to the extempore declaration required of him; and to give an anſwer, as it were, to queſtions before they are aſked? But it is impoſſible, that impoſture ſhould not betray itſelf one way or another. Though the informers have agreed with each other in ſeveral of their lies, they have, in others of them, been guilty of ſuch palpable blunders and contradictions, as ſhould be alone ſufficient entirely to invalidate their teſtimony. It is what we propoſe to demonſtrate in another

place,

place, in which every head of accuſation ſhall be ſeparately and ſucceſſively diſcuſſed. But we think it firſt requiſite to exhibit the general defence ariſing from the joint conſideration of thoſe facts, of which we have already given an account.

GENERAL DEFENCE OF COUNT LALLY.

This defence may be reduced to two principal points. 1ſt. That the witneſſes, who have depoſed againſt Count Lally, are totally unworthy of credit; from which it follows, that their declarations cannot conſtitute any proof. 2d. That the facts, which have been exhibited, demonſtrate an abſolute inexiſtence of the *Corpus Delicti*.

To eſtabliſh the firſt of theſe propoſitions, it is thought proper to cite ſome fundamental ideas, which Judges ſhould never loſe ſight of, when the life and honour of a ſubject are at ſtake. The laws, which have enacted different formalities in the proſecution of crimes, have likewiſe multiplied the precautions for guarding innocence againſt the attacks of calumny. A criminal proſecution is, in itſelf, one of the greateſt misfortunes, that can befall

befall a ſubject. This is the idea the Roman Legiſlators had of it *. Perſuaded, that it was dying twice to loſe one's reputation, they were very far from authoriſing indiſcriminately all the accuſations which tended to deprive the ſubject of ſo great a bleſſing. Before they proceeded on the accuſation, they allowed the accuſed to oppoſe what they called a prejudicial exception. This exception conſiſted in examining, if the accuſer had really a right to appear in that character. When he had not the qualities required by the law to intitle him to credit, he was rejected †. It is by a deduction from theſe principles, that all the Crown-Law writers in the world decide, that perſons accuſed are at liberty to employ all the means approved of by the Law, in

* *Primo enim, quoniam Romani nihil præſtantius putabant quàm integrum eſſe vitæ, ſceleriſque purum, adeo ut bis illis mori videretur qui famam amiſiſſet, admodum providi erant in hujuſmodi cauſis quæ tantum ponderis habebant, ut Romani civis caput, vel fama in diſcrimen veniret - - - - - non quemvis ad accuſandum profilire patiebantur, ne effrænata accuſandi licentia in calumniam abiret.* Boehmer. exercitat. 92. ad libr. 44. Pandect. de exceptione præjudiciali, cap. 2. §. 5.

† *Hinc eam ipſam ob cauſam repellebantur à foris ſervi, famæ maculâ ſeu calumniâ notati, judicio publico damnati, & qui ſunt ejuſmodi farinæ homines: quod ſi igitur quis ex horum numero in jus vocaſſet aliquem, hic, antequam ejus nomen inter reos deferretur, præjudicium poſtulare poterat de accuſatoris ſtatu quo clarum fieret utrum illi accuſare liceret necne.* Boeh-

in order to avoid the horrors of a criminal profecution *.

Theſe Legiſlators, who in receiving accuſations obſerved ſuch reſerve, were not leſs ſcrupulous as to the nature of the proofs which followed them. They did not conſider any declarations as worthy of that name, but ſuch as comprehended all the characters of that evidence, which forces conſent, and which no reaſonable mind can reſiſt. This is the expreſs import of a famous law, the due obſervance of which cannot fail of being to the ſubject an aſſured defence againſt the attacks of calumny. *Sciant cuncti accuſatores eam ſe rem deferre in publicam notionem debere quæ munita ſit idoneis teſtibus, vel inſtructa apertiſſimis documentis, vel indiciis ad probationem indubitatis, et luce clarioribus expedita.* L. 25. cod. de probat.

Thus, in the terms of this law, it is not ſuſpicions; it is not conjectures; it is not ſimple preſumptions; which, in criminal matters, ſhould determine the Judges to condemn the accuſed.

There

* *Quare & quotquot ſunt rerum criminalium ſcriptores uno ore ſuadent omnes reo vias eſſe operiendas, quibus quantum fieri poſſit, declinare queat atque evitare inquiſitionis incommoda funeſtiſſima, quibus ullâ ex parte, fama, vita, corpus, & facultates ipſius effici poſſunt.* Boehmer. ibid. §. 8.

There muſt be proofs ſufficient to create that moral certainty, upon which alone judicial deciſions ought to be founded. The Juriſconſults of all civilized nations have done homage to this truth, which flows directly from the mere light of reaſon *. Now, the principal proofs brought againſt the accuſed being generally grounded on the depoſitions of witneſſes, it follows from theſe eſtabliſhed principles, that the authority of depoſitions ought to be weighed with the moſt ſcrupulous attention. *In teſtimoniis dignitas, fides, mores, gravitas examinanda eſt.* L. 2. §. de teſtibus. Judicial deciſions are conſidered as truth itſelf. How, then, can they be built upon declarations made by men liable to ſuſpicion, or unworthy of credit? Accordingly, it is univerſally acknowledged, that the firſt and moſt indiſpenſibly requiſite condition for the admiſſion of witneſſes is, that they ſhould be irreproachable, and above all ſuſpicion †. Judges are to lay no ſtreſs on

* *Majoris cauſæ requiritur majoritas probationis, ſintque adò probationes certæ ut non poſſit perſuaderi contrarium.* Mornac, ſur la Loi 25. cod. de probat.

Nemo unquam condemnandus per præſumptiones. Molinæus ad Leg. favorabiliores de Reg. Juris.

Peſſimum & periculoſum eſt quemquam judicare de ſuſpicione. Boehmer. loc. cit. §. 6.

† *Regulam multò magis procedere in criminalibus in quibus nadum teſtes idoneos, ſed etiam omni exceptione majores requiri.* Farinacius, de teſtibus, tit. 6, quæſt. 62. n. 20 & 22.

on their declarations, unleſs they have a certainty of both theſe points, 1. That they have had an opportunity of knowing the truth; 2. That they intend to declare it. It is by the light of theſe principles that we may determine the degree of credit any teſtimony is entitled to, and the nature of the exceptions, to which it is liable *.

If the depoſition is inſpired by the intereſt the witneſs may have in giving it; if there are the juſteſt motives to believe, that it is the effect of enmity, and a deſire of revenge; if, independent of theſe peremptory exceptions, the declaration, conſidered in itſelf, carries evident marks of impoſture; the Magiſtrates ſhould treat it as an information worthy of contempt, or rather expreſs their indignation againſt the perſon who gives it. Self-intereſt, and the advantage a witneſs may have in the ſucceſs of the proſecution, are the moſt deciſive reaſons a perſon accuſed can alledge to invalidate the teſtimony of thoſe, who appear againſt him †.

Authors

* *Non aliter enim certa noſtro animo ingenerari poteſt opinio & fides, quam ſi conſtat, tùm quod poſſit teſtis veritatem facti referre, tùm etiam quod vera dicere velit, ex quibus duobus principiis fides teſtibus conciliatur, ut plene in judicis quibuſcumque probare queant.* Boehmer. loc. cit. §. 2.

† *Teſtis habens in cauſâ intereſſe commodum vel incommodum, repellitur á teſtimonio dicendo - - - - - - - multo magis in criminalibus*

Authors mention ſeveral caſes, in which the intereſt of the party depoſing ſhould oblige the Judges to reject his teſtimony. If, in declaring facts which make againſt the accuſed, he has taken pains to clear himſelf of any ſuſpicion; if he has had in view to diſtinguiſh himſelf; to acquire glory; to avoid ſhame; or, in fine, to ſecure himſelf from any conſiderable loſs; it is evident that no proof can reſult from his depoſition *. And, indeed, according to eſtabliſhed principles, no fact is to be taken for proved, till it plainly appears that the witneſs, who depoſes to ſuch fact, had an opportunity of kowning the truth; and has a real intention to declare it. Now, far from there being this ſo eſſential a certainty in the caſe before us, the intereſt of the witneſſes is ſufficiently evident to convince the Magiſtrates, that they do not ſpeak for the intereſt of truth.

Hence

nalibus, in quibus cùm certum ſit in jure probationes requiri exactiores & lucidiores quam in civilibus, hoc ideo ratione commodi & intereſſe teſtem repelli a teſtificando, & admiſſum nec etiam facere indicium. Farinacius, tit. 6. quæſt. 60. n. 4 & 5.

* *Amplius, ut de commodo & intereſſe teſtis agi dicatur, non ſolum quando tractatur de illius exculpatione & exoneratione ---- ſed etiam ſi tractatur de conſequendo honorem & laudem, vel de vitando dedecus & vituperium, hoc enim caſu teſtis examinatus nihil probat.* Farinacius, tit. 6. quæſt. 60. n. 21.

Hence that general rule taught by all the Juriſconſults, that the accuſer is not to be heard in judgment againſt the accuſed. It would be, according to the Doctors, the abſurdeſt thing in the world.* When the accuſed eſtabliſhes his innocence, the accuſer is liable to make good to the accuſed the coſts of the ſuit, and all the other damages attending the calumny. He, therefore, has the moſt powerful motives for wiſhing, that the accuſed may be caſt; for which reaſon alone his declarations againſt the accuſed deſerve no credit.

It is the ſame thing with regard to the informer, who, without becoming a civil party in the affair, ſtirs up the public miniſter to proſecute an accuſation. The ſame reaſon of incapacity forbids any credit to be given to his depoſition. It is evidently his intereſt, that the accuſed ſhould be declared guilty, becauſe, if he ſhould be declared innocent, the perſon, whoever he is, who has been the inſtigator of the criminal proſecution carried on againſt him, cannot

* *Propterea accuſatorem contra accuſatum recipi in teſtem valdè abſurdum reputatur in jure..... pudet contra omnem æquitatem eoſdem ad teſtimonia contra miſellos ferenda producere quos prius habuerant delatores.* Farinacius, ibid. n. 64.

Ejus depoſitio contra accuſatum nullum prorſus faciat indicium. id. n. 65.

not hope to eſcape the pains and penalties enacted againſt ſlanderous informers.

That the teſtimony of an informer is inadmiſſible on account of his perſonal intereſt in the ſucceſs of the information, is a point that may be eſtabiſhed by a cloud of authorities. Nay, it would be ſufficient to ſet forth the recourſe, which the laws have allowed the accuſed, if acquitted, againſt the informers, becauſe it from thence alone infallibly reſults, that no regard is to be paid to the teſtimony of informers. It is enacted, in expreſs terms, by an ordinance of the year 1304, that the names of the informers ſhall be entered in a particular book, and that they ſhall, if convicted of calumny, be puniſhed by the judges. * It is enacted by a poſterior law, that no informations ſhall be received, till the informer has given ſecurity for the payment of the coſts, damages, and intereſts, which the party accuſed may, if acquitted, have a right to expect. † At preſent, indeed, Informers are diſpenſed from the

* *Accuſatoris, vel denuntiatoris nomen in inſcriptione ponatur, & ſi calumniatur reperiatur, ad cognitionem Seneſcalli, vel Judicis puniatur.* Ordinance of Philip VI. anno 1304.

† *Denuntiator non admittatur niſi prius de damnis reſundendis idoneam cautionem dederit.* This law was made in 1328.

the obligation to give this ſecurity; but it is certain, that the informations ought ſtill to be taken in writing. * It is formally enacted by the Ordinance of 1670, title 3. article 6. *Our attorneys and thoſe of the Peers ſhall keep a regiſter to receive and enter the informations, which ſhall be circumſtantial and ſigned by the informer, if he can write.* And it is added in the ſeventh article, *that both Accuſers and INFORMERS, where accuſations and informations ſhall appear to be ill-grounded, ſhall be obliged to make good the coſts, damages, and intereſts of the accuſed, and even incur greater pains and penalties, if the caſe ſhould require it: which is, likewiſe, to be obſerved in regard to thoſe who have made themſelves parties, even though they ſhould have afterwards deſiſted, in*

* The Cuſtom of requiring ſecurity from Informers was not revived by the Ordinance of 1670. Nevertheleſs, at the drawing up of the verbal Proceſs of this law, the Attorney General and Monſieur Puſſort took notice, that, though the precaution of requiring ſecurity from the Informer *made no part of the ordinance, it became the prudence and wiſdom of the Attorney General and his ſubſtitutes to enquire into the quality of the Informers and the nature of their informations, and to require ſecurity from them to make good, in caſe of calumny, their damages and intereſts to the parties accuſed.* Verbal Proceſs, on the 6th article of the 3d tit. of the ordinance of 1670. p. 67.

caſe the complaints exhibited by them ſhall be found to be ſlanderous.

Thus, the laws make no difference between the accuſer and the informer, in regard to the ſubjecting them to pains and penalties, in caſe the accuſation appears to be ſlanderous. They ſay, that the information ſhall be written and ſigned by the informer; and the neceſſary conſequence of this precaution is, to ſecure to perſecuted innocence the reparation it has a right to expect. All theſe injunctions owe their riſe to that great principle; that the honour of the ſubject is, as well as his fortune, under the ſafe-guard of the laws.

But, if the informer is equally liable with the accuſer to be condemned to pay coſts, damages, and intereſts, when convicted of calumny in the courſe of the proceedings; it muſt infallably follow, that the ſame motives, for which the depoſition of the accuſer is to be rejected, form an inſurmontable obſtacle to the informer's being admitted as a witneſs. The deciſion ought to be the ſame in all caſes, in which the motives for deciding are the ſame. Now, the intereſts of the Informer and the Accuſer being equal in regard to the conſequences of the accuſation,

ſation, what can we infer from thence, but that they equally loſe the right of depoſing.

All the authorities, which ſet aſide the teſtimony of the Accuſer, tend equally to ſet aſide the teſtimony of the Informer. Nothing more is requiſite, than that it ſhould be clear, on the one hand, that the Accuſer cannot be a witneſs againſt the accuſed; and on the other hand, that the Informer, in caſe of calumny, is liable to very great pains and penalties; * to conclude, that their teſtimony is equally inadmiſſible in the accuſations, to which they

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(1) Imbert, book iii. chap. 1. n. 7. explains himſelf thus: *When the Attorney General happens to be the only party, and has been inſtigated by other perſons to lay the accuſation, the accuſed, if acquitted, may have his recourſe for coſts, damages, and intereſts, againſt the inſtigator; and for this purpoſe the King's Council are bound, on the judge's acquitting the accuſed, to make known to him, if he requires it, the names of the inſtigators.*

Maſuer, tit. de queſtionibus in praxi, ſays, *And, if the informer has falſely informed and impeached, he ſhall be liable to be called to an account for it, and be condemned to pay coſts, damages, and intereſts, to the party, againſt whom he informed.*

The Ordinance of 1750 imports, Article 73. *Our Attorneys and High Juſtices ſhall be bound to name, if thereto required, the informer, after the perſon accuſed has been judicially acquitted, that he may have recourſe on him for his coſts, damages, and intereſts.*

have given riſe. To prove the perſonal intereſt of a witneſs in the iſſue of any cauſe, is to demonſtrate his incapacity to depoſe in the cauſe in which he is ſo intereſted.

The juſtneſs of this conſequence is ſo evident, as to be acknowledged by all the beſt writers on criminal affairs. Julius Clarus conſiders the Informer and the Accuſer in the ſame light; and lays it down as a maxim, that the depoſitions of both are to be equally rejected. He cites, in ſupport of his opinion, ſeveral Juriſconſults * La Combe † eſtabliſhes the ſame maxim. *An Informer cannot be a witneſs in the cauſe in which he is an Informer, as a civil party cannot be a witneſs in the criminal ſuit which he carries on.* This is clearly acknowledging the exact party between the Accuſer and the Informer, and the perfect conformity of their intereſts in the accuſation ſet on foot by them. A Juriſconſult already cited, who has thrown a great deal of light upon all theſe queſtions which relate to the authority of witneſſes, decides, that

(*) *Julius Clarus*, lib. 5. §. *finali*, quæſt. 7, *ad additiones*, n. 2. *Baldus in terminis, in capite omni*, col. 2. *de teſtibus regulam conſtituit quod omnino accuſator, querelans & denutiator à teſtificando repellantur.*

† Treatiſe of Criminal Matters, *part* 3. *chap.* 1. §. 5.

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that the teſtimony of an Informer, though of the higheſt rank, cannot be admitted as a proof; nay, he adds, that it does not form ſo much as a preſumption. *Nec facit indicium contra accuſatum, etiamſi fuerit princeps, vel nobiliſſima perſona. - - - - Etiamſi ſint plures et unus tantummodo, tanquam magis idoneus, fuerit electus.* *

If, therefore, this conſideration alone, namely the Accuſer's being anſwerable for coſts, damages, and intereſts, is ſufficient invincibly to ſet aſide his teſtimony, how is it poſſible that of an Informer ſhould be received? The only difference between an information and an accuſation, with regard to the reparations which the accuſed has a right to require, is, that, the information being ſecret, and the accuſed, of courſe, ſtabbed by the Informer, as by an inviſible hand, the law puniſhes the treachery of the Informer with ſo much the greater ſeverity. †

* *Farinacius in ſuis quæſtionibus criminalibus*, quæſt. 60. n. 64.

† This reſults from the third law of the Theodoſian Code, tit. *de Calumniatoribus. Innocentes ſub ſpecie falſæ criminationis non patimur callidorum impugnatione ſubverti: qui ſi tentaverint, intelligant ſibimet ſeveritatem legum pro commiſſis facinoribus incumbere.*

Theſe maxims are ſuſceptible of a very ſtriking application in this caſe, in which there are two well eſtabliſhed facts. The firſt, that all the Members of the Council of Pondichery have been admitted to give evidence againſt Count Lally. The ſecond, that they had previouſly acted againſt him in the capacity of informers, by preſenting to the Miniſter a Memorial of their own ſigning, in which they charged him with the moſt grievous crimes, and beſeeched the Miniſter to name a tribunal, in which they might proſecute him. Meſſieurs Moracin, de la Selle, Lenoir, Denys, Nicolas, Duplan, Courtin, and, in general, all the Members of the Council of Pondichery have been admitted as witneſſes. Now they have all owned, at their confrontation with him, that they had ſigned the above Memorial, which contained different informations againſt Count Lally. They, therefore, unite theſe two qualities, which we have demonſtrated incompatible, that of Informer and that of Witneſs.

What credit can be due to witneſſes, who have the moſt ſenſible intereſt in the ſucceſs of the accuſation? If all the laws conſpire not to acknowledge any witneſſes as worthy of credit, eſpecially in criminal matters, except ſuch as are entirely irreproachable, *omni exceptione majores*; if it is abſolutely requiſite

ſite, that they ſhould be above all ſuſpicion, to create that certainty, which alone ought to ſerve as a baſis to judicial determinations, how is it poſſible to conſider, as proofs of an accuſation, declarations made by the accuſers themſelves? Thoſe who declare themſelves informers muſt know, that, by the mere act of informing, they expoſe themſelves to all the pains and penalties enacted againſt defamers. They muſt, therefore, be ready to do all that in them lies to ſecure to themſelves impunity; and it is preciſely this conſideration which deſtroys their teſtimony.

But the objection founded upon the quality of an informer is greatly ſtrengthened, where particular motives of hatred and revenge have inſpired the information as well as the depoſition.

It is not to be doubted, but that enmity, when well proved, renders a teſtimony inadmiſſible. * Now the ſentiments of hatred and fury, which in this affair animate againſt

* *Cùm teſtes debeant eſſe omni exceptione majores idcircò quælibet inimicitia etiam levis, illos repellit à teſtificando.* Farinacius, *de teſtibus*, tit. 6. q. 53. n. 53. La Loi 3. ff. *de teſtibus*, contains an enumeration of the exceptions that may be taken againſt witneſſes: *Teſtium fides diligenter examinanda eſt, ideoque in perſona eorum exploranda erunt imprimis conditio cujuſque.....vel an inimicus ei ſit adversùs quem teſtimonium ferat.*

Godefroy

gainſt Count Lally the informers, who have been heard as witneſſes againſt him, are diſtinguiſhable by characters, which it is impoſſible to miſtake.

It appears by facts, which have been recited, to what lengths they went in the ſettlement againſt Count Lally; intrigues upon intrigues to make all his enterpriſes miscarry; a formal diſobedience to his orders, or rather a formal revolt againſt his authority: injurious and threatning letters directed to him; attempts on his perſon at his leaving Pondichery; atrocious defamations, all the venom of which is concentered in a libel compoſed by a Fryar, who was the life and ſoul of that execrable Cabal.

Such are the practices, with which Count Lally reproached them at his confrontation, and which they have themſelves confeſſed in writings without number. It has even been proved, that ſome of the Counſellors of Pondichery countenanced by their preſence the ſeditious gathering of the 18th of January, in which ſeveral terrible invectives were uttered againſt Count

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Godefroy, on this law, thus characteriſes the acts of enmity from which may be derived matter of exception. *Puta ſi quis tibi palam maledixerit, infauſtas voces adverſus te jactaverit,.....ſi inimicis tuis amicitiam copulavit.*

Count Lally, and the Intendant of the army loſt his life. Count Lally, in his confrontation with Monſieur Moracin, particularly objected to that Counſellor his being of the number of the ſeditious, who treated him with ſo much indignity.

He even added, that it was proved by a letter of this very witneſs, that the inſult offered him, as well as the murder of the Intendant, were premeditated acts. * He made the ſame objection, founded on their being preſent at the ſame riotous gatherings, to Meſſieurs Denys, la Grenée, and other Members of the Council of Pondichery. In a word, he made it evidently appear (what reſults from the facts and the pieces of which an account has been given) that many of theſe Counſellors were guilty of mal-practices in the diſtricts where they commanded; that they mutually reproached each other with theſe mal-practices; † that the Company had expreſſed their diſſatisfaction with the conduct

* This letter, which has been already mentioned, p. 145, *ſays, that Count Lally was too narrowly watched to hide his journey; and that the Intendant was born to leave his bones in the Indies.*

† Count Lally produced a letter, written to him, the 30th of June, 1760, by Monſieur Moracin, in which this Counſellor takes a very odd method to clear himſelf of a charge brought againſt him, of having called one of

conduct of these Counsellors in the Memorials they put into Count Lally's hands; and that the complaints of Count Lally, relating to the unfaithfulness of their stewardship, were the only motives, which induced them to blacken him in the Indies and in Europe, and to become witnesses against him in the criminal prosecution, which they themselves have set on foot against him.

Add

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of his Fellow Counsellors a *knave*. This letter contains such new ideas of moral honesty, that we think it our duty to exhibit them here in the very words of the writer. *You have said in the hearing of these gentlemen, that I told you that Monsieur de Larche was a knave, and that, when he came to hear what I told you, he answered the charge by all those speeches of which I complain. Permit me to observe to you, that you confounded the expression which you construed with that I used. I might have told you long since, that I had seen Monsieur de Larche do the action of a very malhonnête (dishoneſt or ill-bred) man, which I can easily prove, and that this action, added to his natural haughtiness, made me keep a distance with him. I never said that he was a knave; I might have heard it said by others; but I never troubled myself enough about what related to Monsieur de Larche to enquire into the truth of this report, which some people have contradicted.* NOW A MAN MAY BE A VERY MALHONNETE (DISHONEST OR ILL-BRED) MAN WITHOUT BEING A KNAVE. I CAN PROVE HIM POSSESSED OF THE FIRST OF THESE QUALITIES; I NEVER ATTRIBUTED TO HIM, AT ANY TIME, OR BEFORE ANY PERSON WHATEVER, THE SECOND. Without examining in this place all the shades between a *malhonnête* man and a knave, one may venture to affirm, that these two qualities are very compatible.

Add to these particular objections one general fact owned by all the Members of the Council of Pondichery; namely, their signing the Memorial presented to the Minister, in which they informed against Count Lally as guilty of horrid extortions; in which they were not afraid to say, that his military conduct argued *something more than mere want of military capacity*; in which, in a word, they desired that judges might be appointed to pronounce upon all these charges: Add that so strange and so striking a circumstance of some of these witnesses appearing with a written paper in their hands, so that their informations were ready drawn up, * and, even committed to print in libels, which are themselves extracts from that of a Jesuit convicted of calumny, of duplicity and rapine; and it must be allowed, that Count Lally has the advantage

* The law 3. §. first, ff. *de testibus*, orders the Judges to examine attentively, if the witness has made his declarations *extempore*, and with simplicity, or if he has brought a studied discourse. *Et qui simpliciter visi sint dicere, utrùm unum eumdemque meditatum sermonem attulerint, an ad ea quæ interrogaveras ex tempore verisimilia responderint.*

Godefroi, on these words, *simpliciter visi sint dicere*, observes, that this simple unstudied manner of expressing oneself removes all suspicion: *Sine suspicioni: ullâ notâ, non instructi à producente*; and, he adds on these words; "*meditatum sermonem*," *tunc enim corrupti dicuntur.*

vantage of oppoſing to the Council of Pondichery all the motives, which can determine his judges to reject their teſtimony.

As little regard is to be paid to the declarations made by the other witneſſes produced againſt Count Lally. They are officers of the company's troops, whom their rank and their fortune render immediately dependent on the Company, and who have evidently a common intereſt with the accuſers of Count Lally, and his other enemies. We do not propoſe to collect in this place all the particular and peremptory exceptions, which make againſt each of theſe witneſſes ſeparately conſidered. We reſerve this diſcuſſion for another opportunity. We ſhall at preſent confine ourſelves to a recapitulation of the general inductions, which ſpontaneouſly flow from known and well proved facts. Now, it has been demonſtrated by a great number of written proofs, that many of theſe officers openly ſeconded the intrigues and ſiniſter practices of the Council of Pondichery againſt Count Lally; yet theſe are the very men, who have been admitted to depoſe againſt him. Thoſe officers, too, have been heard, who headed the revolt of the 18th of January, 1761. One of them, Monſieur Mariol, had repaired at the head of the rebels to the General's quarters at ten in the morning;

ing; the other, Monſieur Law, aſſembled the conſpirators the ſame day at an entertainment, in which they mutually animated each other; and lent them his houſe as a place of rendezvous.

Officers, too, whom Count Lally had condemned to military pains for military offences, have been admitted to give teſtimony againſt him. Thoſe have been heard, whoſe mal-practices he had repreſſed; who had put their hands to hand-bills intended to excite the troops to revolt; and others, who had been broken by the Council of Pondichery. Such are the men, whoſe depoſitions concur with thoſe of the Council of Pondichery. But, if ſuch witneſſes are to be liſtened to; if informations dictated by fury, revenge, and hatred are to be conſidered as proofs, what ſubject can be ſafe? The moſt irreproachable probity, ſervices equally long and diſtinguiſhed, would avail nothing againſt calumny. The honour, the life, the reputation of the moſt worthy perſons would become the ſport of impudence and impoſture. It is to prevent ſuch fatal evils, that the law rejects, as unworthy of confidence, every teſtimony evidently dictated by paſſion, and the perſonal intereſt of the witneſs who gives it. Now, we flatter ourſelves with having made it appear, that the quality of the Informers

formers heard againſt Count Lally furniſhes him with the ſtrongeſt grounds for ſetting aſide their evidence.

In the ſecond place, we add, that the bare recital of the civil and military operations of this Commander demonſtrates an abſolute exiſtence of the *Corpus Delicti*. His enemies accuſe him of extortion, and inſinuate that there are grounds to ſuſpect him of High Treaſon: But it is in vain they endeavour to blaſt his character by ſuch wretched calumnies. The crimes, with which they venture to charge him, are irreconcileable with his behaviour during his reſidence in the Indies. Let us but follow him in his different expeditions; let us but examine attentively his correſpondence; let us but weigh the expreſſions he makes uſe of in all his letters; and we muſt be blind not to diſcover, both in his writings and in his actions, proofs equally numerous and concluſive of probity, of diſintereſtedneſs, of the moſt active and warm zeal for the good of the ſettlement. Count Lally is not reduced to produce, againſt vague informations, nothing but contrary allegations. He produces writings, which leave no room even for the ſlighteſt ſuſpicion of the pretended extortion, with which he is charged.

How

How is it poſſible to maintain, that Count Lally appropriated to himſelf the riches of the Indies, when it has been irrefragably proved by the regiſters and the uniform declarations of the treaſurers of the army, that the ſums produced by his conqueſts and other military operations were brought into the Company's treaſury; and that he is, himſelf, their creditor for the whole of his appointments; when it has been demonſtrated by authentic papers, that he even ſacrificed his own private fortune to pay the troops, and procure proviſions for Pondichery? A vague accuſation of extortion cannot hold out againſt ſo many and ſuch ſtriking proofs. If the cabal of informers has blinded thoſe, who know nothing of facts which have happened at ſix thouſand leagues diſtance from this Kingdom, this blindneſs muſt ſurely be quite cured by the united teſtimonies, which concur to eſtabliſh the innocence of the accuſed. The gravity of calumnies and the number of calumniators may be ſometimes ſo great as to darken our judgement; but, when truth appears again, we do not ſo readily forgive the impoſtors the pains they have taken to impoſe upon our good faith. The enemies of Count Lally have not been afraid to advance, in a Memorial preſented to the Miniſter, that he had remitted to Europe

immenſe ſums by the hands of the Danes, the Dutch, and the Engliſh. They bound themſelves in a writing dated four years ago, to produce the proofs of this imputation. They have been often and often called upon ſince to realize ſuch infamous ſuſpicions; but they have not as yet made good their promiſe. Nothing, therefore, now remains, but that they ſhould own themſelves guilty of calumny in the face of the whole world. The public has been preſented with the moſt exact picture of the civil and military conduct of Count Lally. The truth of our relations is ſupported by a multitude of papers, which have been laid before the Magiſtrates and the public. Now, if the certainty of all the facts, of which we have given an account, is inexpugnable, it cannot but follow, that the accuſation of extortion has been proved to be ſlanderous. It cannot be ſuppoſed, that a Commander, who has not touched even that which was lawfully his due; who has conſtantly preferred the general intereſt of the ſettlement to his own private intereſt; who advanced conſiderable ſums of his own as often as the good of the ſervice appeared to him to require it; and who proves the irreproachableneſs of his conduct by all the proofs of which truths of facts are ſuſceptible; it cannot be ſuppoſed, we

ſay

ſay, that this very Commander ſhould have permitted his integrity to be ſo far warped by a blind love of money, as to endeavour to enrich himſelf by unlawful means.

The reſult, then, of the facts and writings which have been exhibited is, that the different expeditions and operations of Count Lally, conſidered in their beginning, their progreſs, and their end, exclude all idèa of extortion. But, if there does not exhiſt the ſmalleſt trace of this delinquency, with which he is directly charged, what muſt become of theſe infamous ſuſpicions, with which his enemies have been endeavouring to ſully his fidelity? Did this Commander betray his country, when he haſtened the preparations for reducing to her obedience the Engliſh ſettlements; when he was making conqueſts for her on the coaſt of Coromandel? Will his enemies attempt to fiſh any pretext of accuſation out of the laſt misfortunes which he experienced? But, what General would take upon him the command of armies, if want of ſucceſs were, alone, to expoſe him to a criminal proſecution? Beſides, what efforts did not Count Lally make, how many councils did he not give, to prevent theſe misfortunes, the real cauſes of which are now well known. It has been proved, that it

was the total want of proviſions and the means of procuring them, which occaſioned the loſs of Pondichery, which had been reduced to the greateſt diſtreſs even within a few days after the arrival of Count Lally. Letters have been produced, in which the Governor of that place tells Count Lally, that he has no reſources to expect but ſuch as his military ſucceſſes can procure him.

Muſt Count Lally, then, be culpable, becauſe the want of aſſiſtance from our fleet prevented his ſucceeding in mixt expeditions; becauſe without veſſels, without money, without proviſions, he could not reſiſt an enemy abundantly provided with proviſions of every kind; an army, whoſe land forces were four times more numerous than ours, and were, beſides, ſupported by a fleet of fourteen ſhips of the line.

It has been proved, that Count Lally made uſe of all the expedients in his power to preſerve our ſettlements. That the inexecution of his orders often rendered uſeleſs his deſigns; that thoſe, who ſhould have ſhared his labours and his efforts, diſputed his authority, and trampled under foot all the laws of civil and military ſubordination.

It is therefore the height of injuſtice to fiſh for charges againſt Count Lally in the miſfortunes of a ſettlement, which he never ceaſed endeavouring to defend, till there was a phyſical impoſſibility of its ſubſiſting any longer. Odious ſuſpicions of treachery and treaſon are not to be admitted, when there are manifeſt proofs of zeal and loyalty. Theſe reflections evince the truth of the two points, on which the general defence of Count Lally turns; 1ſt. That the witneſſes, who have depoſed againſt Count Lally, are unworthy of credit in a court of juſtice. 2dly. That the bare recital of his civil and military operations in the ſettlement demonſtrates an abſolute inexiſtence of the *Corpus Delicti*. Thus, on the one hand, the informations of his enemies are incapable of forming any proof, and are ſet aſide by all the conſiderations which can affect their credit. On the other hand, the expoſition of his ſervices, and the authentic papers produced by him, operate ſo ſtrongly towards his juſtification, as to conſtitute an aſſemblage of the qualities and virtues the moſt oppoſite to the delinquencies with which he is charged.

COMMISSION APPOINTING COUNT LALLY LIEUTENANT GENERAL OVER THE TROOPS, WHICH MAY BE SENT TO THE INDIES.

LEWIS, by the grace of God, King of France and Navarre, to all thoſe, to whom theſe preſents ſhall come, GREETING. Having reſolved to ſend troops to the Indies, to ſupport the ſettlements of the India Company, and being deſirous to provide for the command of theſe troops, we thought we could not chuſe a fitter perſon for that purpoſe, than our dear and well beloved the Sieur de Lally, one of the Lieutenant Generals of our armies, conſidering the proofs he has given us of his valour, experience, capacity, fidelity, and affection for our ſervice, in the different military affairs in which we have employed him. FOR THESE REASONS, and other conſiderations us thereunto moving, we have made, conſtituted, appointed, and eſtabliſhed, and, by theſe preſents ſigned with our hand, make, conſtitute, appoint, and eſtabliſh, the ſaid Sieur de Lally our Lieutenant General, Commander of the troops which are to be ſent to the Indies; and have, there-

therefore, given, and do give, him full power and authority to order them what to do, and to employ them, wherever need may be, to the effect of our intentions; to cauſe the muſters and reviews to be made of our troops, by the ordinary Commiſſaries by us named for that purpoſe; to cauſe our ſaid troops to obſerve good diſcipline and order, civil as well as military, according to our regulations and rules of war; ſee thoſe, who ſhall dare to diſobey them, puniſhed and chaſtiſed; direct the payment of our ſaid troops, according to the ſtates thereof ſent us; as likewiſe all other ordinary and extraordinary diſburſements requiſite to be made for their uſe; to iſſue the neceſſary orders for that purpoſe on the military cheſt; and, generally, to do and direct every thing he may judge fit and neceſſary, having given and giving him power to do and direct every thing, as we ourſelves might or could do and direct, if we were perſonally preſent; even though the caſe ſhould require a more ſpecial mandate than is imported by theſe preſents. WE, THEREFORE, INJOIN the Sieur Chevalier de Soupire, Major General of our armies; the Brigadiers, Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, Captains, Lieutenants, and Enſigns of our ſaid troops, or others employed with them; the Commiſſaries of war; Officers of our Royal corps of artillery and fortification; and all others,

whom it may concern, to acknowledge the ſaid Sieur de Lally in quality of our Lieutenant-General, Commander in Chief, and readily to obey him and liſten to him in all things relative to the ſaid powers, as they would to ourſelves in perſon; for ſuch is our pleaſure: in witneſs whereof we have cauſed our ſeal to be put to theſe Preſents, given at Verſailles the Nineteenth day of the month of November, in the year of Salvation One thouſand Seven hundred and Fifty-ſix, and of our reign the Forty-ſecond. *Signed*, LOUIS. On the back is written: By orders of the King, *Signed*, M. DE VOYER D'ARGENSON, and ſealed with the great ſeal of yellow wax.

COMMISSION OF KING's COMMISSARY AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF ALL THE FRENCH SETTLEMENTS IN THE EAST INDIES, GRANTED TO COUNT LALLY.

LEWIS, by the grace of God, King of France and Navare, to all thoſe to whom theſe preſents ſhall come, GREETING. The preſent poſture of affairs in the Indies having engaged the India Company to preſent us le Sieur de Lally, Syndic of the ſaid Company, to be by us appointed

Com-

Commander in Chief of all its ſettlements, we thought, that the better to enable the ſaid Sieur de Lally to fulfil all the views of the ſaid deſtination, it was proper to inveſt him with the title and power of *our Commiſſary*, in that part of the world. FOR THESE CAUSES, we have commiſſioned, ordered, and eſtabliſhed, by theſe preſents ſigned with our hand, commiſſion, order, and eſtabliſh, the ſaid Sieur de Lally, one of the Syndics of the India Company, our *Commiſſary* in all the ſettlements of the ſaid Company in the Eaſt Indies, and the Iſlands of France, Bourbon, and Madagaſcar; have likewiſe, at the nomination of the ſaid Company, hereunto annexed under the counter-ſeal of the preſents, commiſſioned, ordered, and eſtabliſhed; commiſſion, order, and eſtabliſh him, *Commander in Chief* of all the ſaid ſettlements, in the ſaid qualities of our Commiſſary and Commander in Chief, there to *command* as well the inhabitants, Directors, Clerks of the ſaid Company, and other ſervants thereof who are now or may be hereafter employed there, as all other perſons whatſoever charged with the affairs of the ſaid Company, of whatever quality and condition they may be, and whatever may be their employments and functions; likewiſe the *Governors, Particular Commanders, Officers of the land and ſea forces* of the Company, who now

are

are or may hereafter be there; to make them take the oath of fidelity, which they owe us; to make the inhabitants *live in union and concord* one with another; to keep the *land and ſea forces* of the ſaid Company in good order, civil as well as military, according to our regulations and thoſe of the ſaid Company; to *maintain the commerce* and traffic of the Factories of the India Company; *preſide in all the Councils*, as well ſuperior as provincial, both thoſe that are already, and thoſe that may be hereafter, eſtabliſhed, without making any innovation, however, in the ſettled order for collecting the votes; and this during the preſent war with England. *We injoin all Governors, Counſellors, Particular Commanders, Officers, ſoldiers, land and ſea forces of the Company, Directors, Clerks, and other ſervants of the ſaid Company of whatever title and denomination they may be; and all inhabitants of whatever quality and condition they may be, to acknowledge and cauſe to be acknowledged the ſaid Sieur de Lally, in the ſaid qualities of our Commiſſary, and Commander in Chief of all the forts and ſettlements of the ſaid Company in the Eaſt Indies, and the Iſlands of France, Bourbon, and Madagaſcar; and to obey him in every thing he may command them in the ſaid qualities, without any contravention whatſoever, ON PAIN OF DISOBEDIENCE.*

DIENCE. WE, THEREFORE, ORDER our very dear and loyal Chevalier, keeper of the ſeals of France, the Sieur de Machault, to receive from the ſaid Sieur de Lally the oath uſual and required on ſuch occaſions, that the ſaid Sieur de Lally may enjoy the powers, honours, and privileges attributed to him by theſe preſents; for ſuch is our pleaſure: in witneſs whereof we have cauſed our ſeal to be put to theſe preſents. GIVEN at Verſailles, the Thirty-firſt day of December, in the year of Salvation One thouſand ſeven hundred and Fifty-ſix, and of our reign the forty-ſecond. Signed LOUIS, and on the fold, by order of the King, MACHAULT.

Extract from a Memorial, intitled, " A particular Account of the Counſellors and Under-Merchants of the Eaſt India Company's Settlements," *put by the Directors of the India Company into the Hands of Count Lally before his departure from France.*

" Monſieur de Leyrit was ſaid *to be fit for trade; weak, phlegmatic, and ſilent; ſuffered others to get the ſtart of him; did not know how to maintain the proper ſubordination; ſuffered the military officers to crow over him.*

Mon-

Monſieur Louet, Chief at Mahé, was characterized as *a favourer of innovations and a lover of independence.*

The note concerning Monſieur Moracin was by no means to his honour. He was ſaid to be *lazy; to love expence and ſhew. A TIGHT HAND MUST BE KEPT OVER HIM IN HIS CORRESPONDENCE.*

Monſieur Deſvaux, of the Council of Pondichery, was characterized as *lazy, taking advantage of the protection of Monſieur de Leyrit, and Monſieur de Leyrit's friendſhip for Madame Deſvaux.*

Againſt the name of Monſieur le Noir ſtood the following obſervation. *Commanded at Yanam; and, on the enemies appearing before it, abandoned it to them.*

Meſſieurs Duplan, Beauſſet, and de la Selle, were not cited as patterns of probity and diſintereſtedneſs. The articles of the memorial, which regarded them, are as follows.

Duplan, *Commiſſary of Monſieur de Buſſy's army, and paid to extol immoderately the new projects, HAS MADE A GREAT FORTUNE THERE. A VAGUE AND BOMBASTIC SPEAKER.*

Beauſſet, *charged with the care of the High Roads, and Coco Plantations, in which employments he*

he does not forget himſelf. As to the reſt, of a confined genius, and loves money as well as his wife, who governs him.

De la Seile, Senior ------ *Monſieur de Buſſy charged him with the recovery of four Cercars; does not want parts; but he ſpeaks as his intereſt directs; is worſe informed than he affects to appear; or leſs ſincere.*

Meſſieurs Miran and la Porterie were likewiſe deſcribed as men, *who in the management of the affairs, with which they were intruſted, had ſcarce any thing in view but their private intereſt.* On the ſame line with their names, and relatively to the details, with which they were entruſted, ſtood this ſhort but ſignificant note. *THEY DON'T FORGET THEMSELVES THERE.*

Extract from the Inſtructions given by the Company to Count Lally, in regard to the Company's military ſervants.

Le Sieur de Lally will take care not to truſt any expedition entirely to the troops of the Company. There is great reaſon to fear, that the ſpirit of inſubordination and undiſcipline, and the love of money, might make the Officers commit faults, which it is but prudent to prevent, in order to avoid the diſagreeable neceſſity of puniſhing them. Beſides, the ſucceſs of every enterpriſe will be the ſurer for the Company's troops

troops having nothing to do but follow the example, which will be given them by his Majeſty's troops.

Letter from the Company to the Gentlemen of the Superior Council of Pondichery, dated the 19th of March 1759, in anſwer to one written by it before Count Lally's arrival in the Indies.

SINCE the Company has had ſettlements of any conſiderable extent in the Indies, it has never received, gentlemen, either from the Governor, or from the ſuperior Council, ſuch details and eclairciſſements, as might enable it to form a true judgment of the quantity and quality of its incomes, and its expences. For a long time paſt, theſe incomes have been repreſented to it as ſources of wealth ſufficient not only to anſwer all its expences in the Indies, but even ſupply it with gratuitous cargoes. For this reaſon, the Company having, after the laſt war, made the greateſt efforts to remit you conſiderable funds, expected that theſe ſame funds, added to the annual revenues above mentioned, would have had ſuch a great and laſting influence on your circumſtances, as to make them perfectly eaſy in that reſpect. Nevertheleſs, it now ſees with concern, that not only you are very far from being

being as yet in this ſo much deſired ſituation, but that your affairs wear a much more diſagreeable aſpect, than ever they did.

If the preſent war, and the expences occaſioned by it, were the only cauſes of this failure, the Company, perhaps, would not have ſo good a right to complain; but what muſt always appear amazing to it is, that, ſince you enjoy theſe revenues, and even in years in which you enjoyed tranquility along with them, your circumſtances have not been a whit the better. All your letters have been conſtantly filled, as they are at preſent, with complaints of the ſcarcity of funds, and the neceſſity you are under of contracting onerous debts; without which, you ſay, the Council could never, perhaps, have been able to ſend us the few cargoes we have received for ſome years paſt. Nor is this all. It looks as if, in laying open your wants, you did not think yourſelves at the ſame time bound to ſupply the Company with any accounts of your ſtewardſhip; particularly the uſe you make of its revenues. In fact, we have never been able to gather from your letters any ſatisfactory detail; we ſee no reſolutions of the Council for letting the Company's lands; we know no farmers but ſuch as you condeſcend to let us know; we are ſtrangers to that authority by which you change them;

we

we cannot diſcover, either any examination of accounts at the expiration of the leaſes; or any verbal proceſſes to prove the deficiences; or any reſolutions of the Council to order works. It is only by the public voice we can learn any thing of your undertakings. In fine, we are left in the dark, even with regard to the expence requiſite for the keeping and preſerving of theſe very poſſeſſions.

At length, this affected ſilence of yours determined the Company to ſend Monſieur Clouet to the Indies, in order to procure by his means the informations we wanted; and, at the ſame time, charge him with the general receipt of theſe revenues, and direct him to pay with theſe very revenues the expences of the war. Judge, therefore, gentlemen, how great muſt have been the aſtoniſhment of the Company, on hearing that Monſieur Clouet ſaw himſelf obliged to ſpend ſome months at Pondichery, without being ſo much as able to ſet about the buſineſs upon which we ſent him.

Though the demand he made of two Counſellors to form an office had not the ſanction of the Company, you ſhould, notwithſtanding, in order to make the Company forget your criminal ſilence, have exerted your-

ſelves, one and all, to procure Monſieur Clouet all the aſſiſtance he might want. Far from this, you affected not to know the contents of his inſtructions; you began by putting a great deal of time between his memorials and your anſwers; you put him off till the expiration of the leaſes; you endeavoured to terrify him with the multitude of the objects which required his attention; you told him, that, for the future, it would be his buſineſs to find money, couliſes, proviſions, men, &c. In fine, there have been members of the Council ſo little circumſpect, as to adviſe things diametrically oppoſite to the intentions of the Company. You do not ſo much as vouchſafe to ſend the Company either the memorials of Monſieur Clouet, or the Council's anſwers to them.

If you wiſh, gentlemen, that the Company ſhould not conceive thoſe ſuſpicions, which ſuch a conduct might naturally create, you muſt be more circumſpect for the future, and more attentive to the execution of its orders. It directs Monſieur Clouet to return to Pondichery, and conform to the new orders it now ſends him. Theſe orders tend only to clear up ſome articles in his firſt inſtructions, which are ſtill the ſame. We ſend you a copy of our letter to Monſieur Clouet. We ſend another to Monſieur de Lally, requeſting him, at

the ſame time, to give, himſelf, ſuch orders, as may prevent the execution of thoſe given by the Company ſuffering any difficulty or delay. The Company has reaſon to believe and hope, that it will not be obliged to uſe any other methods to inforce obedience.

We are, very perfectly, Gentlemen, your moſt humble and obedient ſervants, the Syndics and Directors of the India Company. *Signed*, COLABAU, CASAUBON, GILLY, GODEHEU, SAINTARD, MICHEL, CLAESSEN, ROTHE, and COTTIN. P. C. *Signed*, SAINTE-CATHERINE.

Letter from the Company to Count Lally, dated the 20th of March, 1759.

SIR,

YOU may ſee, by the foregoing diſpatches of the Company, with what impatience we wiſhed for the news of your arrival on the coaſt of Coromandel. The public and the Proprietors had joined us in our wiſhes and prayers, when Monſieur le Comte de Montmorency, who arrived at Port L'Orient the 28th of laſt month, brought the Company all the packets, of which he had been ſo kind as to take charge; *and which have informed us of*

of the celerity and ſucceſs of your firſt operations; the ſiege of Cudaloor begun the very day of your arrival; that of Fort St. David undertaken immediately after; the taking of this fort, the moſt conſiderable and beſt fortified of all the forts built by the Europeans on the coaſt of Coromandel; and the taking of Devi-cottah immediately after; are events, WHICH WILL RENDER FOR EVER MEMORABLE YOUR ARRIVAL AT PONDICHERY. . . . . . .

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We cannot aſſiſt you, Sir, but with our wiſhes, and tell you what we ſhall be glad to hear you have done. The Miniſtry and the Company are ſenſible, that your projects and your enterpriſes depend upon circumſtances, and ſuch an actual knowledge of the places where you are, as your ſituation affords you an opportunity of acquiring.

However important your military operations may be, the State and the Company, Sir, expect from your zeal and activity, that, when theſe operations ſhall be ſuſpended or ſtopt, or happen to be ſuch, as you may cauſe to be executed without being yourſelf perſonally preſent, *you will be kind enough to beſtow ſome thoughts on the*

adminiſtration of the Company's affairs, and the origin of the ABUSES WITHOUT NUMBER, which we can perceive in them. AN ABSOLUTE DESPOTISM ſeems to be the firſt thing that requires correction; and we beſeech you, Sir, to employ all the authority, with which you are inveſted, to put an entire ſtop to this abuſe, and even cut the roots of it. We think, Sir, that it belongs to the Company to judge, what departments in the adminiſtration of its affairs ought to be excluſively reſerved to the Governor and Commander in Chief; and that all thoſe affairs, concerning which it thinks proper to write to the ſuperior Council, ought to be treated of in the Council, and there diſcuſſed by all the members which compoſe it. To this effect, the Company means, that all its letters to the Council ſhould be opened in full Council; read there in an audible manner; regiſtered there article by article; and that all the members ſhould be informed of the orders they contain, and of the duties they impoſe on them. This is a neceſſary preliminary, which we earneſtly beg of you, Sir, to ſee executed during your ſtay at Pondichery. Every thing conſpires to make the Company place its whole dependance upon you for the form to be therein obſerved. *But it moſt earneſtly begs of you to eſtabliſh one, from which it may not be in the power of the members to deviate; the purport*

port of which every member may know; the execution of which he may inſiſt upon; and which may render himſelf culpable, if he does not inſiſt upon the execution of it.

This firſt form, when once well eſtabliſhed and faithfully executed, will ſecure to the Company two things of equal importance to it; one, that its lands and revenues will be adminiſtered, or let out upon leaſe, with œconomy; that no motives of complaiſance or private favour will cauſe this or that ſteward or farmer to be preferred to another, who might have it in his power to make the lands or revenues produce more, and, beſides, offered to give better ſecurity for the perception and bringing in of ſuch produce. *You cannot but ſee, as we do, Sir, that this ſecurity is not to be obtained only by the Council's excluding itſelf from all intereſt, directly or indirectly, in the collecting of the revenues; and that the Company cannot, on any pretext whatſoever, ſuffer thoſe, who, in virtue of their office, are obliged to look to its intereſts, to be diverted therefrom by any perſonal intereſt, which can never be compatible with that of the public. What is here ſaid of the members of the Council, is to be underſtood of the Under-merchants, and other perſons in the Company's ſervice. Both the one and the other ought to ſtand excluded, by ſuch their office, from the charge of any kind*

of Farm whatſoever. They ought not to be ſo much as permitted to become ſecurity for the Farmers; and, in caſe it ſhould come to be diſcovered, that there was any thing in diſpute between any of them and a Farmer, and they had made in the leaſes any private ſtipulation, verbal or written, not only ſuch ſtipulation ſhall be null and void, *but the perſon employed by the Company, who has taken ſuch liberty, ſhall be excluded from the ſervice of the Company, and proſecuted at the ſuit of the Attorney General, as guilty of tranſgreſſing the Company's orders.*

The other ſecurity, which we expect from the publicity of the Company's orders, is, that the Company's money will be expended *with more order and œconomy than it has hitherto been.* In this place, Sir, we ſhall not enter into any detail with you relating to this matter. But the Company earneſtly requeſts you to peruſe all the letters it has already written, and ſhall hereafter write, to the Council, each of which treats of ſome particular article, which it has equally at heart to inſpect narrowly into and clear up.

You will ſee, Sir, by theſe letters, that the Company has been hitherto kept in the dark in regard to the reſult of the examination of the account of the Farmer Rangapapouley; that it has not as yet been made acquainted with

with the ſucceſs of the three Commiſſaries of the Council deputed to examine the Farmers accounts, who ſhould, every one of them, have brought back journals of all the ſteps they took, in order to procure for the Council the informations, which they had been deputed to obtain; that, before your arrival, conſiderable expences had been made to encloſe Karical; *to conſtruct, in the neighbourhood of the limits of Pondichery, certain kinds of fortification, which you yourſelf, Sir, and all the military gentlemen, have extremely diſapproved*; *that money had been likewiſe laid out in fortifications at Chilimbrum, which appeared to be entirely uſeleſs, when examined by good judges.*

All theſe and many other leſs conſiderable expences, which it would be too long to particularize, were made at a time, that the want of money was moſt ſeverely felt; *they were made without the propriety of them being properly diſcuſſed*; *without the neceſſity of them being demonſtrated*; *without the means to pay them being provided. If the Council had been made acquainted with the orders of the Company, and the Company's diſpatches had been read in the Council, it would, no doubt, have obſerved, THAT THE FILLING OF THE MAGAZINES WITH PROVISIONS AND MILITARY STORES WAS FAR MORE NECESSARY*; *and that the funds*

exhauſted by theſe expences, if employed in the purchaſe of military ſtores, would have enabled you, on your arrival, to execute, with greater celerity conveniency and ſecurity, the operations you had to perform, in order to deſtroy the ſettlements of the enemies of the ſtate and the Company.

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. . . . . But, Sir, be upon your guard againſt the rapaciouſneſs of the men under your orders; and beſtow your confidence only on ſuch, as are entitled to it by their good conduct and good name. Keep at a diſtance all thoſe, who have rendered themſelves liable to ſuſpicion; cauſe to be narrowly watched thoſe, who have not as yet been tried; *and prepare for us, we beſeech you, ſuch notes and inſtructive memorials, as may enable us to ſet a juſt value on all thoſe attached to the Company's ſervice. Our opinions of them vary greatly; AND THE COMPANY DESIRES TO BE THOROUGHLY AND PARTICULARLY INFORMED OF THE MERIT OF ALL THOSE EMPLOYED IN ITS SERVICE. Theſe are the informations, Sir, which the Company expects from you; and which conſtitute one of the chief advantages it hopes from your voyage to the Indies.*

Hitherto we have confined ourſelves to the advantage, that would accrue from your firſt ſucceſſes, of which Monſieur le Comte de Montmorency has given us the detail; but

we hope you will procure ſtill greater advantages to the Company. We ſay nothing to you of your expedition to Tanjore, the circumſtances of which we have received no direct account of; but we flatter ourſelves, by what Monſieur de Leyrit writes to the Company, in his letter of the 1ſt of Auguſt 1758, concerning your way of thinking, *that, without giving yourſelf any trouble to diſcuſs the intereſts of the Mooriſh Lords, or who is to have the Nabobſhips, you will not loſe ſight of the object of your military expedition.*

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It is, Sir, this uninterrupted ſucceſs, which alone can procure you the means of ſucceeding in your future enterpriſes; ſupply you with the neceſſary reſources; and enable you to ſupport indiſpenſable expences. You muſt be ſenſible, how much œconomy is wanting; *notwithſtanding which, we meet every where PROOFS OF THE MOST BOUNDLESS PRODIGALITY, AND THE GREATEST DISORDER. We ſee the rents of our lands devoured for the moſt part by deficiencies; we ſee immenſe expences to attain trifling ends, and an exceſſive conſumption of effects of ſuch a nature, as not to be replaced. INCONSIDERATE DEMANDS ARE MADE UPON US,* for want of reflecting on the impoſſibility the Company is under of providing for them. *For, in fact,*

Sir,

where could we find fleets to carry, from the ports of France to Pondichery, all the proviſions, military ſtores, naval ſtores, tools, and effects of every other kind, which they write to us for? Where could we find funds to purchaſe them? Yet, as though all theſe things were nothing, we are told, that they would be no better than thrown away, UNLESS WE SEND WITH THEM TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND MARKS OF SILVER, AMOUNTING TO ABOVE TEN MILLIONS OF LIVRES. You know what efforts the Company made at your departure; you know, that, without the effectual aſſiſtance of the government, it would have been impoſſible for the Company to make them; you know, that, at the moment of your ſetting out, the Company even found itſelf utterly unable to ſupply every thing, with which it had reſolved to provide you; and that the government was obliged, by the then circumſtances of its affairs, to ſend elſewhere two men of war, which were to ſail with you to the Indies; and two battalions of his Majeſty's troops, with which your detachment was to have been reinforced.

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We have the honour of being with a reſpectful attachment, &c.

Extract

Extract from a Letter written by Count Lally to Monſieur de Leyrit. dated Karical the 28th of June 1758.

As to the letters I receive from Meſſieurs de Buſſy and Law, I can hardly help miſtaking them for the productions of the madhouſes in Paris. If they promiſe to join us, well and good. Otherwiſe, were I in your place, I would not give myſelf the trouble to anſwer them. I ſhould be glad to know in what conſiſts the advantage our Company can expect from their war or their peace; their treaties or their alliances. In good earneſt, you muſt have a great ſtock of patience and good nature, to read their letters. For, how is it poſſible to liſten, without indignation, to a man at the head of 150 ſcare-crows, who tells you ſeriouſly, that he is in doubt, whether he ſhall fall upon the Capital of the Mogul Empire, or deſcend with all the forces God has put into his hands and make an irruption into Bengal. My opinion is, that, when theſe gentlemen arrive, you immediately order them to be let blood and put under a courſe of phyſic, if there are ſtill any hopes left of their coming to themſelves again.

RE-

Report made by Monſieur de Folenay, concerning the Mutiny of the Army at Vandiwaſh.

I THE underwritten, Captain Commandant of the ſecond and third battalions of the regiment of Lorrain, at the time the mutiny happened at Vandiwaſh, on the 17th of October 1759, certify, that being at Monſieur Alen's, Major of the regiment of Lally, and at that time Commander of the Army, about four in the afternoon, I was informed by an acquaintance of mine, that a revolt had already broke out in my quarters. I found all the common ſoldiers, grenadiers, corporals, and under-corporals of the whole regiment, in the ſtreets, and going to draw up on the ſpot, where we uſed to aſſemble; I ſaw them with their arms and baggage. I threw myſelf into the midſt of them, aſking what made them aſſemble without orders in this manner? But I could hear nothing but an univerſal bawling, the purport of which it is impoſſible for me to particularize. I called on the officers of the regiment to aſſiſt me to quell this tumult, and bring about peace. They readily ſeconded me; and, as the mutineers began to move, we put ourſelves in their way to ſtop them. I ſoon found all my endeavours

endeavours ſignified nothing; and I own, that the paſſion I was in, made me forgot all they ſaid and all they did. I can, indeed, very well remember, that, finding it impoſſible to ſtop them by the word of command, or even by the King's name, I put myſelf at their head, and told them, that, if they were going to the enemy, they ſhould not go without taking me along with them. Their officers did the ſame, and we marched together for above half a league. At length they ſtopt, and drew up in order of battle. I then aſked what they had to complain of. They alledged, that they could not obtain any juſtice; that they were quarrelled with about trifles; that they were not allowed to go to the Bazars in drawers, and were thereby obliged to be always in guetres; that they were not paid; that they were, notwithſtanding, ſeverely puniſhed, and even threatened with the picket, when they did not appear orderly on duty; whereas, far from being able to purchaſe guetres, they had not wherewith to procure themſelves drawers; that they had too long ſuffered themſelves to be impoſed upon; that their officers thought only how they could amuſe them; that the General had laid his hands upon every thing; that he had bought a ſhip, and put three millions on board it; that he was on the point of embarking, and taking every thing along with him; that they were covered with

wounds;

wounds; that they were intitled to ſome indulgence, eſpecially now that they ſaw the Field Officers recalled, particularly the Chevalier de Soupire, who had promiſed them at Port L'Orient, that he would not return to Europe without them.

That they were abandoned on the coaſt; that, ſeeing themſelves baniſhed in ſuch a diſtant place, they had no longer any meaſures to keep; that they no longer conſidered themſelves as Frenchmen.

That, in a word, they were not going to the enemy; and that in a ſhort time we ſhould ſee them halt, and know what they really intended.

However, in ſpite of all their bawling, I could perceive a change in them; they came to terms with me; they deſired I ſhould give them a promiſe under my hand to ſay nothing of what had happened, and inſiſted on all the other officers doing the ſame. I thought proper to comply in order to bring them back to their duty. This done, they faced about and followed me, aſſuring me that they loved me, as well as all their own Officers; that they would ſell their lives for us, but that the wretched condition they were left in after an action, in which they had

had ſaved the Indies by their bravery, had made them take that deſperate ſtep; that they had no reaſon to complain of any body but their general; that they had, however, deſerved a far different treatment.

When we had almoſt got back to our quarters, they heard the drums beat a march. Upon this, they ſtopt ſhort in ſpite of all we could ſay to them; they began to ſhout, and their ſhouts were anſwered. The troops of the Company and the regiment of Lally appeared in full march to them, calling them cowards if they retracted. Upon this, the tumult began again; and I could no longer make any impreſſion upon them. The whole army went to paſs the night half a league from its quarters. This is what I atteſt, in witneſs whereof I ſign. *Signed*, Folenay, Captain of the regiment of Lorrain.

We ſpent the night with them, exhorting them and begging of them to return to their duty. They were by this time all gathered together. The 18th at day break they beat the General, before they put themſelves in motion. Monſieur Alen, myſelf, and ſeveral other Officers who followed him, ſpoke to them again. They immediately returned to their bawling, ſtill repeating, without conſenting to liſten to what we ſaid to them, that

that they were not going to the enemy. They had, in the night, ſeized on all the artillery and ammunition. At eight in the morning, they began their march, when we thought proper to retire to Vandiwaſh, as we found our preſence ſerved only to exaſperate them. We ſent Meſſenger after Meſſenger to them. We ſtrove to engage the few ſoldiers who lagged behind to join them, hoping, that, as they appeared better diſpoſed than thoſe of the main body, the more of them joined the main body, the ſooner we ſhould be able to bring it to reaſon.

Things went on thus till the 19th. At night, Monſieur de Fumel, heretofore a Major General, arrived with money.

We accompanied him to the Aldeé of Colour, whither the mutineers had withdrawn. Monſieur de Fumel called for the chiefs of each body, who thereupon aſſembled before us; when we propoſed to them, that they ſhould take four months pay; repreſented, that we had been hard put to obtain even ſo much; that there was a neceſſity for their yeilding to circumſtances. The Chiefs appeared to conſent; they anſwered that they would go and inform their reſpective corps of the offers that had been made them. They were hereupon deſired to aſſemble the heads of the Companies, that theſe

theſe offers might be repeated to them. A ring being formed, they were, accordingly, repeated; and the heads of the reſpective companies, which compoſed it, ſeemed willing to comply; but thoſe, who ſtood near them, cried out immediately, that no compoſition would do; that nothing leſs than their whole pay would ſatisfy them. Upon this the ring broke up, and we went to our different corps, who aſſured us, as before, of their averſion to go over to the Engliſh; that they would fight like lions; that, were the Engliſh to appear, they would call upon us to head them again.

They returned, however, to their old complaints, on our repreſenting to them that every thing poſſible had been done. They told us that there was money in Pondichery; and that a great deal was ſtill wanting to make up their pay. They enumerated to us the ſums lately received by the General; that he had received 80,000 pagodas from the inhabitants of Pondichery; 100,000 rupees from the Daubachis; eight laks from the ſquadron; that he had, beſides, in his ſhip, wherewith to pay twenty one. That it was the faſhion of the country for Generals, when they left it, to carry off all they could along with them. That Monſieur Dupleix had carried off ſeveral months pay belonging to the

troops; that Monſieur Godeheu had done the ſame; as would Monſieur de Lally, if they had not ſtirred in time. It now appeared to no purpoſe to preach to them any longer. Monſieur de Fumel bid us withdraw.

Second and third day, I certify the truth of this report. *Signed* FOLENAY.

Declaration of Count Lally to the Gentlemen of the ſuperior Council of Pondichery.

31ſt of Auguſt, 1760.

WE are come at laſt, Gentlemen, to the eve of the catoſtrophe, which I have foretold to you. Your hatred againſt me has got the better of your deſire to ſave Pondichery. Since the impriſonment of Monſieur de Buſſy, Monſieur Moracin has put himſelf at the head of a cabal formed by three or four of your members, who have erected themſelves into cenſors of all my negotiations and military operations.

From the day of your firſt diſobedience to the King's orders; a memorable day, in

in which the enemy appeared both by ſea and land to attack us.

Twelve days ago, you applied to me for a national Council, merely with a view to break the meaſures I had taken for the immediate raiſing of the ſum of 300,000 rupees on merchants, who were your friends and partners, in order to load with it wretches, who, I well knew, would never be able to raiſe, in time, the tax that ſhould be impoſed upon them. This ſum was the only reſource left for officers, who, for want of mere ſubſiſtence, are no longer able to keep with their reſpective corps. Theſe merchants are the men, who, for two years paſt, have been abſorbing all the ready money of this ſettlement. You, at length, forced me to conſent to the holding of this Council, the reſult of whoſe deliberations was known the next day by the enemy.

You have been ever ſince conſtantly importuning me to ſend out detachments, to bring proviſions into Pondichery; you decided, that I had more troops than were requiſite for the defence of the place. In conſequence hereof, I, ten days ago, ſent out 200 men. I was for ſending out the like number the day before yeſterday; but you oppoſed it, on pretence that it would be ſtripping the

place of ſome of the troops neceſſary for its defence.

You have forgot yourſelves ſo far as to preſcribe to me operations, with which the King and the Company have charged me, and me only; and which they have even forbid me to communicate to you. You have already twice laid me under a neceſſity of laying before you the powers of the Court, which injoin you, on pain of diſobedience, to obey me.

It is high time I ſhould take a final reſolution. That of ſeverity is, I well know, what you would willingly drive me to. It would haſten, by a month, the loſs of the place, in conſequence of the refuſal I ſhould then experience of the few means ſtill left to keep it off. Behold, therefore, what I have at laſt reſolved upon. It is to lay down the authority, with which the King and the Company have entruſted me, and to charge you alone with the event. I ſhall for the future look upon myſelf as a private perſon in every reſpect; and, as ſuch, ſhall be equally ready with the meaneſt inhabitant to expoſe my perſon, in caſe the Engliſh ſhould attack our walls. And I order you, in the King's name, to enter this my declaration in your regiſters, and

to

to let me have a copy thereof compared with the original; which done, I leave you at liberty to do and act, as you yourſelves ſhall think proper. *Signed*, LALLY, *and underneath is written*, By the King's Commiſſary. *Signed*, ROCHETTE.

N. B. The reaſons aſſigned by Count Lally for taking this ſtep were, that the members of the Council, and the other ſervants of the Company, had openly ſhook off the yoke of his authority; that their paſt behaviour ſufficiently indicated a fixed reſolution to thwart, privately or publickly, all his future meaſures for the ſafety of the place; and that the orders given by him with that view, inſtead of being obeyed, ſerved only to increaſe the fury of his enemies. After all, he never actually quitted the command, the Officers of the army having declared, that in that caſe they would, likewiſe, throw up their commiſſions.

ACCOUNTS OF THE TAKING OF PONDICHERY GIVEN BY THE ENGLISH COMMANDERS.

Colonel Coote's Account; in a Letter to one of His Britannic Majeſty's Secretaries of State, Dated Head Quarters at Oulgaret, February 3, 1761.

SIR,

ON the 23d of October, Admiral Stevens ſailed from Trincamaley to refit the ſquadron, leaving five ſail of the line, under the command of Captain Haldane, to continue the blockade of Pondichery by ſea, which place began to be greatly diſtreſſed for want of proviſions. On the 9th of November, I ordered a ricochet battery for four pieces of cannon to be erected to the northward, at about 1400 yards from the town, more with a deſign to harraſs the enemy, than any damage we could think of doing to the works at ſo great a diſtance. On the 10th, we began to land our ſtores, and to prepare every thing for the carrying on the ſiege with vigour. The rains being over by the 26th, I imagined the diſtreſſes of the enemy might be much augmented, and garriſon duty rendered very fatiguing, if ſome batteries were erected on different quarters of the town: I therefore gave directions

directions to the engineers to pitch on proper places, at ſuch diſtances, and in ſuch ſituations, that the ſhot from them might enfilade the works of the garriſon, and our men and guns not expoſed to any certain fire of the enemy. Accordingly, the following batteries were traced out, one (called the Prince of Wales's) for four guns, near the beach on the north ſide, to enfilade the great ſtreet, which runs north and ſouth through the white town: one for four guns and two mortars, to the north weſt quarter, at 1000 yards diſtance, to enfilade the north face of a large counterguard, before the north weſt baſtion, called the Duke of Cumberland's; a third called Prince Edward's, for two guns, to the ſouthward, at 1200 yards diſtance, to enfilade the ſtreets from ſouth to north, ſo as to croſs the fire from the northern battery; and a fourth to the ſouth-weſt, called Prince William's, for two guns and one mortar, at 1100 yards diſtance, in order to deſtroy the guns in St. Thomas's redoubt, and to ruin the veſſels and boats near it. On the 8th, at midnight, they were all opened together, and continued firing till day-light. On the 9th, the enemy kept up a warm fire on our batteries, without doing much damage to them. This day one gunner and a ſubedar of ſeapoys were killed. On the 25th Admiral Stevens, with four ſhips of the line, arrived off Pondichery, having

parted company with Admiral Corniſh and his diviſion, on the 16th inſtant, in blowing weather. On the 29th, a battery, called the Hanover, was begun, for ten guns and three mortars, to the northward, at 450 yards diſtance from the town, againſt the north-weſt counterguard and curtain.

On the 1ſt of January, we had a very violent ſtorm of wind and rain: it began at eight o'clock in the evening, and laſted till between three and four the next morning. I gave directions for the repairing our batteries, which the ſtorm had almoſt ruined, and the putting every thing into the beſt order our preſent ſituation would admit. On the 4th we had the agreeable ſight of Admiral Stevens in the Norfolk, who had the good fortune to weather out the ſtorm, without ſuffering the leaſt damage. On the 5th I attacked a poſt of very great conſequence to the enemy, in which were four twenty-eight pounders, called St. Thomas's redoubt, and carried it without any loſs. At day-light on the 6th, 300 of the enemy's grenadiers retook it, owing to the Officer, commanding the redoubt, not being able to keep his Seapoys together. This day Admiral Corniſh in the Lenox, with the York and Weymouth, arrived; and, as moſt of the ſhips, which had been diſabled, were now refitted, the blockade

kade of Pondichery was as compleat as ever. On the 12th the Hanover battery, being repaired, kept up a very briſk fire, and greatly damaged the counterguard and baſtion, and made a breach in the curtain. On the 13th, in the evening, I ordered a working-party of 700 Europeans and 400 Laſcars, with the pioneers company, under the command of a Major, to the northward, where the engineers had traced out a battery for eleven guns and three mortars. At eight o'clock they began a trench for introducing gabions of four feet high, which were to form the interior facing of the battery. At the ſame time a parallel was begun, 90 yards in the rear, of 250 yards long, and an approach of 400 yards in length. Notwithſtanding the moon ſhone very bright, and the battery within 500 yards of the walls, every thing went on without the leaſt diſturbance from the enemy. By morning ſix embrazures were in a condition to receive guns, and the reſt far advanced. This was called the royal battery. On the 14th the Hanover battery kept up a conſtant fire the whole day, which entirely ruined the weſt face and flank of the north-weſt baſtion. On the 15th the royal battery was opened, which, by eight o'clock in the morning, ſilenced the fire of the enemy, and gave us an opportunity of beginning a trench, to contain our royal mortars and three guns, for the more ſpeedy

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demolition of the demi-baſtion and ravelin of Madras-gate. This evening Colonel Dure, of the royal artillery, the Chief of the Jeſuits, and two Civilians, were ſent out by Monſieur Lally, with propoſals for the delivering up the garriſon, a copy of which I have the honour to incloſe you, and my anſwer thereto. Alſo a copy of the ſeveral articles delivered me by the Chief of the Jeſuits, on behalf of the French Eaſt India company, to which I made no reply. On the 16th, at eight o'clock in the morning, the grenadiers of my regiment took poſſeſſion of the Villenour-gate; and, in the evening, thoſe of Draper's of the citadel. The Commiſſaries were immediately ordered to take an account of all the military ſtores found in the garriſon, and returns to be given in, of the number of Officers, non-commiſſioned and private, of the different corps, at the time the place ſurrendered, as well as the number of inhabitants; all of which I have now the honour to tranſmit to you, as well as a plan of the garriſon, with the works carried, and intended to be carried on, againſt it.

It is with the greateſt pleaſure I acquaint you, that during the whole time of the blockade, a perfect harmony ſubſiſted between the navy and army, and all poſſible aſſiſtance given me by Admiral Stevens. I ſhould likewiſe do great injuſtice to Captain Haldane, if I omitted

I omitted to mention his attention and aſſiduity for the public ſervice, during his having the command of the ſhips left on the coaſt by Mr. Stevens, and of his doing every thing that could be wiſhed or expected from a good and gallant Officer.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Signed, EYRE COOTE.

Tranſlation of Mr. Lally's Propoſals for the Delivery of the Garriſon. Directed to Colonel Coote, Commander in Chief of his Britannic Majeſty's Forces before Pondichery.

THE taking of Chandernagore, contrary to the faith of treaties, and of that neutrality which has always ſubſiſted between all European nations, and namely between the two nations in this part of India; and that immediately after a ſignal ſervice which the French nation had rendered the Engliſh, not only in taking no part againſt them with the Nabob of Bengal, but in receiving them in their ſettlements, to give them time to recover from their firſt loſſes (as appears by the letters of thanks from Mr. Pigot himſelf, and from the Council of Madras to that of Pondichery) added to the formal refuſal of fulfilling the conditions of a cartel,

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agreed upon between our reſpective maſters, though it was at firſt accepted by Mr. Pigot, and the commiſſaries were named on both ſides to go to Sadraſt to ſettle amicably the difficulties which might occur in its execution, put it out of my power with reſpect to my court to make or propoſe to Mr. Coote any capitulation for the town of Pondichery.

The King's troops, and thoſe of the Company, ſurrender themſelves, for want of proviſions, priſoners of war of his Britannic Majeſty, upon the terms of the cartel *, which I reclaim equally for all the inhabitants of Pondichery, as well as for the exerciſe of the Roman religion, the religious houſes, hoſpitals, chaplains, ſurgeons, ſervants, &c. referring myſelf to the deciſion of our two

* Count Lally inſiſts, that, though he confined himſelf, conformably to the advice of a council of war, to require for the troops no other conditions than thoſe of the cartel, he, in ſo doing, required the moſt advantageous conditions he could poſſibly expect; ſince, in caſe his demand had been complied with, and the Count d'Aché had arrived in time with money to pay the ranſom ſtipulated by the 11th article of that cartel, Count Lally and his army might have recovered their liberty, and found themſelves in a condition to retake Pondichery from the Engliſh.

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courts for reparation proportioned to the violation of ſo ſolemn a treaty.

Accordingly Mr. Coote may take poſſeſſion to-morrow morning at eight o' clock of the gate of Villenour; and after to-morrow at the ſame hour of that of Fort St. Louis; and as he has the power in his own hands, he will dictate ſuch ulterior diſpoſitions to be made as he ſhall judge proper.

I demand merely from a principle of juſtice and humanity, that the mother and ſiſters of Rezaſaïl be permitted to ſeek an aſylum where they pleaſe, or that they remain priſoners among the Engliſh, and be not delivered up into Mahomud Ally Cawn's hands, which are ſtill red with the blood of the huſband and father, that he has ſpilt, to the ſhame indeed of thoſe who gave them up to him; but not leſs to the ſhame of the Commander of the Engliſh army, who ſhould not have allowed ſuch a peice of barbarity to be committed in his camp.

As I am tied up by the cartel in the declaration which I make to Mr. Coote, I conſent that the gentlemen of the Council of Pondichery may make their own repreſentations to him, with regard to what may more immediately concern their own pri-

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vate intereſts, as well as the intereſt of the inhabitants of the colony.

Done at Fort Louis of Pondichery, the 15th day of January, 1761.

Signed, LALLY.

Colonel Coote's Anſwer to Monſieur Lally's Propoſals.

THE particulars of the capture of Chandernagore having been long ſince tranſmitted to his Britannic Majeſty, by the Officer to whom that place ſurrendered, Colonel Coote cannot take cognizance of what paſſed on that occaſion; nor can he admit the ſame as any way relative to the ſurrender of Pondichery.

The diſputes which have ariſen concerning the cartel concluded between their Britannic and moſt Chriſtian Majeſties, being as yet undecided, Colonel Coote has it not in his power to admit, that the troops of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, and thoſe of the French Eaſt India Company, ſhall be deemed priſoners of war to his Britannic Majeſty upon the terms of that cartel; but requires that they ſurrender themſelves priſoners of war, to be uſed

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as he ſhall think conſiſtent with the intereſts of the King his maſter. And Colonel Coote will ſhew all ſuch indulgences as are agreeable to humanity.

Colonel Coote will ſend the grenadiers of his regiment, between the hours of eight and nine o'clock to-morrow morning, to take poſſeſſion of the Villenour gate; and the next morning, between the ſame hours, he will alſo take poſſeſſion of the gate of Fort St. Louis.

The mother and ſiſters of Raza Saib ſhall be eſcorted to Madras, where proper care ſhall be taken for their ſafety; and they ſhall not, on any account, be delivered into the hands of Nabob Mahomud Ally Cawn.

Given at the head quarters at the camp before Pondichery, this 15th day of January, 1761.

Signed, EYRE COOTE.

Articles

Articles propoſed to Colonel Coote by the Chief of the Jeſuits; to which no anſwer was returned.

The ſuperior Council of Pondichery, authorized by the Count de Lally, Lieutenant General of the armies of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, and his Commiſſary in India, treat for the ſaid town and its inhabitants, preſent the following articles to Colonel Coote, Commander of his Britannic Majeſty's troops on the coaſt of Coromandel.

ARTICLE I.

Upon the reduction of the place, its inhabitants ſhall not in any wiſe be injured, their houſes ſhall be preſerved, and they ſhall retain all their effects and merchandize, with liberty of choice to convey them wherever they ſhall think proper, or to continue their dwelling in the ſaid town, as new ſubjects of his Britannic Majeſty; and they ſhall be treated as the old ſubjects have uſually been treated; accordingly, thoſe who have heretofore had poſſeſſions or advantages, ſhall not be deprived of them.

ARTICLE II.

They ſhall be maintained in the exerciſe of the Roman Catholic religion, in the ſame manner

manner as has been practiſed under the French Government. The churches and the houſes of the eccleſiaſtics and religious perſons ſhall be preſerved, together with every thing thereunto belonging, whether they be ſituated without or within the town. The miſſionaries ſhall have liberty of paſſing from place to place, and ſhall find, under the Engliſh flag, the ſame protection as under the French flag.

ARTICLE III.

Not only the buildings and houſes, belonging to private perſons, whether laymen, eccleſiaſtics, or religious perſons, ſhall be left in the condition they are, but alſo the buildings belonging to the Company, as well as the fort, the warehouſes, and the walls of the town, with all the fortifications, until the date of theſe laſt, that is to ſay, every thing of this kind, belonging to the Company, ſhall be decided by the two reſpective courts.

ARTICLE IV.

The papers of the regiſtry and notary Office, on which depend the fortunes of the inhabitants, ſhall be ſent to France without any obſtacle, by ſuch conveyances as they ſhall think fit, who are now charged with them, and in whoſe poſſeſſion they ſhall, in the mean time, remain.

ARTICLE V.

The treatment herein before ſtipulated by the firſt article, for the inhabitants of Pondichery, ſhall be extended to all the members of the Council, Company's Agents, Officers ſettled in the ſaid town, and all others, who have been, or now are, in the ſervice of the Company; and ſo, in like manner, to the merchants, whether Armenians, or of any other nation, ſettled heretofore in Pondichery for their trade.

ARTICLE VI.

The Creoles, or natives of Mauritius and of Bourbon, amounting in number to forty-one, including five Officers, as well thoſe who are in health, as thoſe who have been wounded, or are invalids, having ſerved as volunteers, and not being ſoldiers, ſhould have the liberty of returning to their home by the firſt good opportunity they may find.

ARTICLE VII.

Safeguards ſhall be granted to prevent diſorder.

ARTICLE VIII.

All the foregoing articles ſhall be executed according to good faith.

Re-

Return of Braſs and Iron Ordnance, Carriages, Powder, Shot, and ſmall Arms, found on the Works of Pondichery, Town, Citadel, and Artillery Park.

Braſs ordnance ſerviceable, —	81
Ditto unſerviceable, — —	2
Iron ordnance ſerviceable, —	436
Ditto unſerviceable, — —	48
Braſs howitzers ſerviceable, —	13
Iron ditto ſerviceable, —	2
Braſs mortars ſerviceable, —	82
Iron ditto ſerviceable, —	7
Carriages of different ſorts ſerviceable,	326
Ditto unſerviceable, —	58
Mortar beds, wood, ſerviceable, —	46
Ditto, iron, ſerviceable, —	7
Double headed ſhot, —	182
Lead ſhot of different nature, —	60264
Shells and hand-granadoes, —	22599
Grape ſhot, ——	1095
Barrels of ſerviceable powder of 200lb. each —— ——	207
Barrels of ſerviceable ditto of 100lb. each —— ———	1488½
Total of Powder, ——	lb. 230580
Barrels unſerviceable, ——	56
Powder in cartridges of different nature ——— ——	lb. 40330

Excluſive of ſmall arms ammunition.

Ammunition fixed for	Wall pieces	2907
	Muſkets,	368640
	Carbines,	98980
	Piſtols,	46830
	Gingalls,	20700
Muſkets new with bayonets,		1550
Ditto new without bayonets,		125
Ditto with locks, moſtly bad,		2351
Ditto unſerviceable, between 7 and		8000
Engliſh wall pieces, good,	—	18
Ditto, bad,	—	8
French wall pieces, good,	—	190
Gingall pieces, old,	—	73
Carbines, —	—	35
Fuzees long, new,	—	120
Ditto, old,	—	50
Fuzees ſhort	—	30
Piſtols, new pairs,	—	6000
Ditto, old pairs,	—	310
Hangers, new,	—	3200
Sabres, new,	—	1000
Broad ſwords and ſabres mixed,		195
Bayonets, new, —	—	3000
Ditto, old, —	—	2000
Pole axes,	—	1200
Cartouch boxes, new,	—	3000
Ditto, old,	—	2000
Hogſheads of Flints, about	—	20
Barrels of Muſket balls,	—	6
Kegs of ditto, —	—	80

Iron

Iron ramrods, about ——	12,000
Copper drums, ——	15
Wood ditto, —— ——	17
Eſpontoons, old, ——	28
Cartridge boxes of different ſizes,	20860

A ſmall quantity of fixed ammunition.

Ladles of different ſizes, ——	265
Spunges ditto, moſtly old, ——	430
Lead aprons of different ſizes,	360
Wad-hooks, ditto, ——	50
Grates for heating ſhot, ——	2

With a large quantity of muſket ſlings, buff belts, armourers, ſmiths, and carpenters tools, locks, and other lumber.

ACCOUNT GIVEN BY THE ADMIRALTY-OFFICE.

REAR Admiral Stevens, in his letters of the 6th and 7th of February laſt to Mr. Cleveland, informs the Lords Commiſſioners of the Admiralty, that Pondichery ſurrendered to his Majeſty's arms on the 15th of the preceding month, having been very diligently blockaded by his Majeſty's ſquadron under his command for upwards of eight months; and for a conſiderable time by Colonel Coote, Commander in Chief of his Majeſty's land forces. General Lally, in expectation of relief from the French ſquadron,

ſuffered himſelf, garriſon, and inhabitants, to be reduced to the utmoſt degree of diſtreſs and miſery for want of proviſions. Colonel Coote began the ſiege about a month before its ſurrender; and the laſt battery, conſiſting of eleven twenty-four pounders, which he raiſed, was within about five hundred yards of the walls. In two days after this, they gave up the place at diſcretion. The 16th in the morning at eight o'clock, a company of grenadiers took poſſeſſion of the Valedour-gate; and on the 17th, at the ſame time, Colonel Coote, accompanied by Rear Admiral Corniſh, and the Captains Haldane and Tinker, took poſſeſſion of the citadel on the part of both ſervices, as they were ſo connected together in the reduction of this important conqueſt to his Majeſty's arms, and to the Eaſt India Company in particular.

He flatters himſelf, that the zeal, which has ever animated him in the faithful diſcharge of his duty to his royal maſter and his country, will meet with their Lordſhips approbation; and he thinks it his duty to acquaint their Lordſhips, how well he is ſatisfied with the conduct and behaviour of Rear Admiral Corniſh, and the Captains of his Majeſty's ſhips under his command, in carrying on the public ſervice.

He alſo informs their Lordſhips, that on the 1ſt of January, a violent ſtorm of wind coming on, he found it abſolutely neceſſary, for the ſafety of his Majeſty's ſhips, to cut their cables and put to ſea; where he parted company with the other ſhips of the ſquadron; and on the 4th, returning into Pondichery road, he had the misfortune to find his Majeſty's ſhip Duke of Aquitain had foundered about two leagues to the ſouthward, and the Sunderland about two leagues to the northward of that place, and moſt of the crews periſhed. The ſhips Newcaſtle and Queenborough, with the Protector fireſhip, were drove on ſhore and loſt a little to the ſouthward of Arianeopang, but the people were ſaved; as alſo the ordnance, and moſt of the ſtores and proviſions. Several of the other ſhips ſuffered in the ſtorm; but with the help of the maſts, yards, and ſtores ſaved from the wrecked ſhips, and the aſſiſtance of the ſquadron, they were, in a very few days, completely fitted, and put in a proper ſtate for ſervice.

That having intercepted a letter from General Lally to M. Raymond, French Reſident at Pullicat, a copy of which is hereafter added, the Admiral immediately diſpatched circular letters to the Dutch and Daniſh ſettlements, to acquaint them, that

notwithſtanding the repreſentations of General Lally, he had eleven ſail of his Britannic Majeſty's ſhips of the line, and two frigates, under his command, in condition for ſervice, holding the blockade of Pondichery; and as that place was cloſely inveſted and blockaded by land and ſea; and as, in that caſe, it was contrary to the law of nations, for any neutral power to give them any ſuccour or relief, he had determined to ſeiſe any veſſel or boat that ſhould attempt to throw any proviſions into that place.

Tranſlation of an intercepted letter from General Lally to M. Raymond, French Reſident at Pullicat, dated Pondichery the 2d of January 1761.

MR. RAYMOND,

THE Engliſh ſquadron is no more, Sir: out of the twelve ſhips they had in our road, ſeven are loſt, crew and all; the four others diſmaſted; and it appears there is no more than one frigate that hath eſcaped; therefore don't loſe an inſtant to ſend us chelingoes upon chelingoes loaded with rice: the Dutch have nothing to fear now; beſides (according to the rights of nations) they are only to ſend us no proviſions THEMSELVES, and we are no more blocked up by ſea.

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The ſaving of Pondichery hath been in your power once already: if you miſs the preſent opportunity, it will be entirely your fault: do not forget alſo ſome ſmall chelingoes; offer great rewards: I expect ſeventeen thouſand Morattoes within theſe four days. In ſhort, riſque all, attempt all, force all, and ſend us ſome rice, ſhould it be but half a garſe at a time.

Signed, LALLY.

Letter from Monſieur Pollier, Officer of Artillery in the Battalion of the Indies to Count Lally; dated St. Thomas, the 21ſt of January 1761.

SIR,

THE intelligence I am going to give you is of conſequence. A conſpiracy has been formed againſt your life. As I am confined by ſickneſs to my bed, and would a thouſand times rather loſe my own life than that you ſhould ſuffer by any treachery, I give you leave to make what uſe you pleaſe of this intelligence. There is a villain, who has ſaid openly in the preſence of ſeveral Officers, that he was certain one of his acquaintances would riſk his own life rather than miſs yours. I can produce witneſſes of what I advance; but, Sir,

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if you proſecute the affair, take me out of the ſight of your enemies, who, being ſo numerous, would not fail to ruin me. Be aſſured of the fidelity and reſpect, with which,

I have the honour of being,

Sir,

your moſt humble and moſt obedient ſervant,

DE POLLIER.

Extract from the Manifeſto of the Council of Madras

At the ſame time, that Monſieur Lally ſent the foregoing declaration by Colonel Durre of the Artillery, Monſieur Lavaur, ſuperior of the Jeſuits, and two members of the Council came, in the name of the ſettlement, with ſeven articles of capitulation, in which they required every thing, that a town in the beſt ſtate of defence could expect. In a word, they propoſed, that the Engliſh garriſon ſhould do no more than juſt relieve the French troops; and that the town and its inhabitants, their effects, privileges, and religion, ſhould continue on the ſame footing . . . . .

Extract

Extract from the Repreſentations made to Mr. Pigot and the Council of Madras, by Monſieur de Leyrit.

Is it, then, by the law of retaliation you hope to be able to juſtify your proceedings?

I allow, gentlemen, that Monſieur de Lally demoliſhed Fort St David, which ſenſibly affected you, and not without reaſon. But, on the other hand you muſt allow the truth of the facts, which I am now going to lay before you.

Was not the Fort of Chandernagore the firſt fort demoliſhed in the Indies ſince the commencement of the war? The Engliſh ſeiſed upon this factory contrary to the laws of neutrality, upon which the French had always depended; and which, on their ſide, they had ever ſtrictly obſerved; ſo ſtrictly, as to refuſe to liſten to the ſollicitations of the Nabob of Bengal, who preſſed them to join him againſt the Engliſh. . . . . .

When Monſieur de Lally, General of our troops, Commiſſary of our King, and Syndic of our Company, wrote to Colonel Coote, who commanded the Engliſh troops, *to invite him to come, the day following, and take poſſeſſion of*

of our place, he authoriſed us to ſend our Deputies with Monſieur le Chevalier Durre, the bearer of his letter. As to the contents of this letter, we ſcarce know any thing of them, *and we beſeech you, Gentlemen, to get us a copy of it. The articles of capitulation, with which our Deputies were charged, had been examined by Monſieur de Lally, and were preſented to Colonel Coote, who did not refuſe any of them; and told us, that he would ſettle every thing the day following, in the propereſt manner he could with Monſieur de Lally. We, beſides, know, that Monſieur Coote, at his firſt interview with Count de Lally, told him, that he was ready to grant him all his demands, except thoſe it was unreaſonable to expect.* What is it then that has been ſettled between them? We know nothing of it, *as our General ſet out without telling any thing of the matter. But, ſince yours has put into your hands the place, which was put into his by Monſieur de Lally*, he muſt have told you upon what conditions he received it; and we beſeech you to let us know what you know yourſelves of this affair. It is not probable, that our General ſhould have delivered, without any conditions or reſervations, a place, which we had more Europeans to defend than you to attack, according to the liſts taken by your own Majors. If it ſhould happen, that there is no capitulation in writing, it muſt, of courſe, be owned, in order to remove all

ſuſpicion of colluſion, that Monſieur de Lally, when he ſurrendered us at diſcretion to Colonel Coote, reckoned on his being able to engage him to procure us a ſo much more favourable treatment at your hands. But it appears by the manner, in which you have hitherto behaved towards us, that you intend to forget your equity ſo far, as to take advantage of that circumſtance. . . . . .

This ſtep cannot leſſen our gratitude for what Mr. Pigot does, with all that goodneſs and politeneſs which are ſo natural to him, to alleviate the diſtreſs of every individual amongſt us. We ſhall, at all times, and in all places, be ready to give the moſt authentic teſtimony of it; but our private intereſt ſhould not blind us to our duty, and the intereſt of the public, with which we have been entruſted. . . . . .

It ſeems to me to be mutually the intereſt of both nations, that ſome ranſom, and the means of paying it, ſhould be agreed on. *I hope you will not be the only perſon to reliſh this propoſal*, a compliance with which the Engliſh Commanders by ſea and land will prefer to any other ſtep that tended only to do evil for evil. . . . . .

. . . . . .

Extract

Extract from the Memorial addreſſed to the Council of Madras by Father Lavaur, againſt the demolition of the Fortifications and Houſes of Pondichery.

You, yourſelves, Gentlemen, are intereſted in it. One day or another you may be charged with what you are thus going to do of your own authority. Your own conſtituents may hold you anſwerable for the ill conſequences of it.

After ſubmitting, Gentlemen, what I have been ſaying to your conſideration, I have nothing left but to require, that you enter it in your books, and give me a certificate thereof. It is the leaſt we can expect from your juſtice.

Done at Pondichery, the 4th of April 1761.

Signed, LAVAUR.

Extract from a Letter written by Father Lavaur to Monſieur Dupré, Governor of Pondichery.

Are you equally in a hurry, Sir, to deſtroy the houſe, in which we have a domeſtic altar, for the private exerciſe of our religion? May

we

we continue in it long enough to remove the effects belonging to it, which I ſhall take care to do with all the diſpatch I poſſibly can? Moſt of our Monks are already ſet out for other places, to which I am ſending part of our effects. Three prieſts, and three aſſiſtants are the only members of our community, which now remain with me. We have ſtill on our hands ſeven boarders, all young children, who have no friends or relations here to take care of them. Are we, then, to be turned without more ado into the ſtreets; and ſet out without further delay? Have I not ſome reaſon to expect, that you will grant us the reſpite, which juſtice requires, to ſave what we can from the ruins of our apartments, as well as the furniture ſtill remaining in them?

I have the honour, &c.

Pondichery the 4th of April 1761.

Signed, LAVAUR.

Extract from Monſieur Dupré's Anſwer to Father Lavaur.

Reverend Father,

Were I to enter into a juſtification of the meaſures taken with reſpect to this ſettlement, I could begin by citing the orders, which you know

know Monſieur de Lally received from the Court of France, to demoliſh all the maritime places he might take from the Engliſh, and to tranſport all the Europeans he ſhould find in them to the Iſland of Bourbon. I could tell you of the hard uſage, which it appears they were to receive there. I could lay before you, as ſo many proofs of the rigour with which your General meant to execute theſe orders, numberleſs inſtances of ſeverity, I might call it cruelty, exerciſed by him on thoſe of my country, who have had the misfortune to fall into his hands; and, if, after ſix weeks granted you to remove, you ſtill think the time too ſhort, I could put you in mind of the inhabitants of Fort St. David being obliged to remove in three days, almoſt without any other effects, than what they could themſelves take along with them. But I do not now mean to enter into this diſcuſſion; all I mean is, to anſwer that part of your letter, which is levelled at me in particular. As to the reſt, I muſt beg leave to refer you to my ſuperiors at Madras.

I am, &c.

Signed, DUPRE'.

Extract

EXTRACT FROM THE RETURN MADE OF THE FRENCH TROOPS AND OTHER EUROPEANS FOUND IN PONDICHERY.

Commiſſioned Officers, Staff-Officers, Non-Commiſſioned Officers, Rank and File.

King's Troops.

Artillery	83
Lorrain Regiment	327
Lally's Regiment	230
Marines	295
	935

Company's Troops.

Artillery	94
Cavalry	15
Volunteers of Bourbon	40
Battalion of India	192
Invalids	124
	465
Supernumerary, commiſſioned, and extraordinary Staff	37
Total of the troops	1437

Civil Liſt including the Governor, Council, and inhabitants	381
Total of troops, civil Officers, and inhabitants	1818

People afterwards found out, not included in the above liſts.

Surgeons, &c. of hoſpitals	39
Attendants to ditto	9
Invalids of the German brigade	29
Men diſcharged, and remain in town	173
Provoſt people	4
Total	254

Note, it appears by a Letter from Admiral Stevens, that no money was found in the place.

Extract from a Letter relating to the taking of Pondichery, dated Fort St. George, the 1ſt of February 1761.

Monſieur Lally is arrived amongſt us. Notwithſtanding his fallen condition, he is now as proud and haughty as ever. A great ſhare of wit, ſenſe, and martial abilities, obſcured by a ſavage ferocity, and an undiſtinguiſhed contempt for every perſon that moves in a ſphere below that of a General, characterizes this odd compound of a man. When

he

he marched out of the citadel of Pondichery, his officers and men ſaluted him with a loud and general hiſs, loading him, at the ſame time, with the moſt abuſive and opprobrious names. His Commiſſary would have juſtified his character, but he paid dear for the attempt; they killed him on the ſpot, and would have done as much by his patron, if he had not made good his retreat to the Engliſh camp. He was ſo generally hated, (if I may be allowed the expreſſion) that the very dogs howled at him. It is a convincing proof of his abilities, the managing ſo long and vigorous a defence, in a place where he was held in univerſal deteſtation.

Our batteries were opened only a few weeks before it was given up, and were indeed ſo well ſerved, as to perform wonders; but the want of every neceſſary within, was what wrought chiefly in our favour. The inhabitants had ſubliſted for a conſiderable time upon their elephants, camels, horſes, &c. I can aſſure you for a truth, that a dog ſold for 24 rupees or as many half-crowns; of this miſerable proviſion there did not remain enough for one day longer, when the Engliſh took poſſeſſion of it.

Extract from the Speech made by the Governor to the Council of Madras, concerning the Deſtruction of the Fortifications and Houſes of Pondichery.

Gentlemen,

I ſhall add another repreſentation, and a letter received from Monſieur de Leyrit, the laſt Governor of Pondichery. Theſe papers contain every thing that can be alledged, in point of humanity or the cuſtom of war, againſt the demolition of the fortifications and the buildings. Let us but ſee the letters Patent of his Majeſty, the orders of the Company, and the intercepted inſtructions of the Court of France to the Count d'Aché and General Lally, and we ſhall be then provided with the principal papers, which can influence our deliberations on theſe important queſtions.

Neither the Admiral of his Majeſty's ſquadron, nor the Commander in Chief of his troops, had any orders concerning the manner of treating the conquered places; and they had neither ſufficient funds or authority to keep Pondichery as a royal conqueſt, though they were ever ſo well diſpoſed to do it.

We

We ſhall ſhew, that we could not ſpare Pondichery, without expoſing ourſelves to the greateſt danger of loſing the fruits of our ſucceſs, without ſubjecting ourſelves to heavy expences, and even without riſking our own ſettlements.

We have done no more than what ſound reaſon dictated to us to do; viz. to deſtroy Pondichery and abandon the other conqueſt, that our future operations might not be embaraſſed by ſuch a charge; nor the forces, which we are in a condition to keep on foot to preſerve our own ſettlements, be divided into a great number of ſmall garriſons, each of which would then become an eaſy conqueſt. When we had drawn off for the expedition 2500 effective troops, from thoſe which we had then on the coaſts (the greateſt number that could be ſpared for that purpoſe) there would ſcarce have remained 700 men to garriſon our own ſettlements and our conqueſts, as well as to keep watch on 2000 priſoners; and double that number would have ſcarce ſufficed to garriſon Pondichery alone. We ſhould, therefore, have expoſed ourſelves to the almoſt certain riſk of loſing that place, if the French ſquadron ſhould appear on the coaſt, whilſt our ſquadron and our army were abſent. Moreover, we ſhould expoſe ourſelves not only to loſe our conqueſts, but likewiſe Madras,

and all our own ſettlements on the coaſt of Coromandel. Our own intereſt, therefore, abſolutely required, that we ſhould deſtroy Pondichery, and all the other Forts that were weak or uſeleſs.

The inſtructions of Monſieur d'Aché and General Lally contain poſitive orders to raze the public buildings of all the maritime places they might take; and we can alledge inſtances of the rigour with which Monſieur de Lally intended to execute theſe orders.

The French were permitted to remain cloſe upon three months at Pondichery, and allowed time to carry off all their effects except thoſe in trade. The Engliſh of Fort St. David were allowed but three days, and could carry away but very little or rather nothing. This we can eaſily prove; as, likewiſe, that our treatment of private perſons has been as humane, as that, which Monſieur de Lally had orders to ſhow us, was the reverſe. There needs no other proof of the punctuality with which he intended to execute theſe orders, then his behaviour at Fort St. David and Madras. His manner of thinking is evident by the letter we intercepted of his to Monſieur de Leyrit, when he was about to raiſe the ſiege of our Capital. It is dated the 14th of February

1759.

1759. He therein ſays, that he had given the moſt poſitive orders for the deſtruction of the Black Town of Madras. All theſe things, which he has done, fully juſtify our doing the ſame in our turn; and are ſufficient to acquit us from that inhumanity, with which Monſieur de Leyrit charges us, and which is the ſole object of this recapitulation.

Done in the Council of Fort St. George the 13th of April, 1761.

Letter written from Paris by the Council of Pondichery to the Comptroller General.

MY LORD,

Monſieur de Leyrit's bad ſtate of health prevents his waiting on you with the memorial, which you required of us; the abundance of the matter, the order of the facts, the multiplicity of the proofs, have not left us at liberty to abridge them as much as we could wiſh. Nevertheleſs, it is but a miniature of the picture, which we have ſtill to draw; but we hope that this miniature will be ſufficient to leave you no room to doubt, on which ſide truth and juſtice are to be found.

You will therein ſee, My Lord, to what a degree the Council and wretched ſettlement

of the Indies have been oppreſſed, from firſt to laſt, under the authority of a deſpotick maſter, ever a ſtranger to all the laws of prudence, honour, and even humanity.

You will therein obſerve the prudent behaviour, and perfect ſubmiſſion, of a Council, who, in the midſt of the inſults, the gibets, and the wheels, with which they were inceſſantly threatened, ſupported, to the laſt, the character of true patriots, and voluntarily ſacrificed the laſt farthing of their fortunes for the common ſafety, though convinced by ſad experience of the bad uſe that would be made of them.

You will therein ſee, that, from the moment of Count Lally's arrival, the Council was entirely ſtript of its authority; that Monſieur de Lally, alone, ordered and diſpoſed of every thing; and that nothing was left to the Council but to obey, even in thoſe things which it diſapproved moſt. That Monſieur de Lally is alone accountable for the entire ſtewardſhip and adminiſtration of both the interior and exterior concerns of the Company, ſince nothing was ſettled, employed, or expended, without his orders.

That

That he is accountable for the rents of all the Company's lands, and the revenues of all its territories; that, in the month of October 1758 (five months after his arrival) he broke and annulled the ſtewardſhip of the Council, in order to let the Company's lands to two private perſons, whom he had forbid in writing to pay a farthing to either the Council or the Governor, though at this time he affected to charge us with the victualing of Pondichery; that he is equally accountable for the effects in the magazines, ſince he likewiſe forbid the perſon entruſted with the care of them to deliver any for the future to the Governor's orders, though it had been heretofore cuſtomary with the Governor to iſſue ſuch orders.

That he is accountable for the contributions and revenues of the kingdom of Thiagar, the kingdom of Arcot, and the provinces which depend on it, ſince he acted as ſteward in them in the name of a Black Lord, and received the money ariſing from theſe contributions and revenues.

That he is accountable for the exceſſive taxes which he impoſed on both the Blacks and the Europeans, the produce of which was paid into his hands.

That

That he is accountable to his own Farmers for what they paid for their leaſes, ſince, after draining them of every penny, he, by his own authority, turned them out of their farms, the very moment they were going to ſend to Pondichery the grain diſtined by them to victual that place; putting into their place a Black, whom he had a little before by bribery ſaved from the Gallows, and by whom he cauſed to be ſold the proviſions on which our ſafety depended.

That he is accountable for the loſs of Pondichery, ſince it ſurrendered merely for want of proviſions, and he alone had in his power the means of ſupplying it with them; namely, money to purchaſe them; the fruits of the Company's lands; the produce of the Company's harveſts, and troops to protect that produce.

That he is, likewiſe, accountable for not having employed the means he had of victualling the place, even after the Engliſh had begun to blockade it; and thereby repairing the faults he had before committed in not ſupplying it at a properer ſeaſon.

That he is, moreover, inadmiſſible in the accuſations, which, it is ſaid, he has dared to form; and ought to be conſidered as a man dead

dead in law, ſo far as not to be permitted to act in juſtice any other part than that of a criminal, ſince he has gone ſo far as to ſuborn falſe witneſſes againſt thoſe, by whoſe complaints and depoſitions againſt himſelf he had been alarmed.

You will not find in our Memorial, my Lord, an account of all the ſums which he remitted to Europe, through the hands of the Danes, the Dutch, and even the Engliſh themſelves. This matter ſhall be cleared up hereafter. We have reſolved not to mention any facts in this place, but ſuch as are well proved.

Neither have we made any mention of what relates to his military conduct. It would draw us into too long a detail; and we are, beſides, of opinion, that the ſuperior Officers, who have been, as well as the ſoldiers, the witneſſes and victims of Monſieur de Lally's conduct and incapacity, have not failed to give an account of it. However, we reſerve to ourſelves to furniſh a ſimple journal of his military operations, leaving it to men of his own profeſſion to judge of them.

We have only the honour of aſſuring you, Sir, that there are nine capital articles, which prove

prove ſomething more than mere want of capacity. They are as follows.

ARTICLE I.

The campaign of Tanjore, coloured with the motive of all others the leaſt ſuitable to the intereſt and dignity of the nation, but which favoured the views of Monſieur de Lally, as he might ſink with impunity the greateſt part of the money he expected to derive from it; and, in fine, the ſhameful flight from before Tanjore, equally fatal to the honour and intereſt of the nation.

ARTICLE II.

His obſtinate refuſal to take the neceſſary ſteps and precautions to inſure ſucceſs to the ſiege of Madras, in ſpite of all the advice and all the repreſentations of thoſe, who had a right to interfere on the occaſion; and his conduct during the ſiege.

ARTICLE III.

The ſeparation of his forces, by which he revived the hopes of the Engliſh, enabled them to keep the field in ſpite of us, and even come and attack us during the ſiege of Vandiwaſh, with a kind of equality, which, joined to the miſconduct of Monſieur de Lally, was ſufficient to ſecure them the victory.

ARTICLE IV.

His abandoning almoſt the whole country after this battle, by diſperſing his troops; as if he had nothing to do but put them into quarters.

ARTICLE V.

His affecting to leave all the frontier places, without a ſufficient number of troops or quantity of proviſions and ammunition; as if he wanted to make as ſpeedy an end as poſſible of the tragedy.

ARTICLE VI.

His affected negligence in cauſing proviſions to be brought into Pondichery, when preſſed to it in the moſt earneſt manner, though he had the means of doing it in his hands; and made a ſhew of uſing them.

ARTICLE VII.

His refuſing to make a proper uſe of the army of the Myſoreans; his imprudence in keeping them inactive on the glacis, to help to conſume the reſt of our proviſions; his endeavours to diſguſt them; and his propoſal to fall upon their camp with his troops.

ARLICLE VIII.

His refuſal to uſe any of the many methods and expedients propoſed to him for ſuccouring the place.

ARTICLE

ARTICLE IX.

The project formed by him to ſurrender the place at diſcretion to the enemy, publiſhed under his hand a long time before any thoughts were entertained of capitulating; and put in execution by him alone, without the participation of the Council.

It is not, my Lord, the deſire of revenging the injuries offered to ourſelves in particular, and our perſonal ruin, which animates us in the drawing up of the picture, we take the liberty to lay before you; it is the force of truth; it is the pure dictates of our conſciences; it is the general cry; it is the complaints of ſo many unhappy families, which call upon you, by our voice, for juſtice on Monſieur de Lally; who gluts himſelf with impunity on their tears and their blood, and triumphs in their ruin, in the face of the whole kingdom, which cries out for vengeance againſt him.

We are, with profound reſpect,

My Lord,

Your very humble, &c.

Petition

Petition preſented to his Majeſty by the Governor and ſuperior Council of Pondichery, the 3d of Auguſt 1762.

TO THE KING.

SIRE,

THE Governor and ſuperior Council of Pondichery throw themſelves at your Majeſty's feet, to give you an account of the misfortunes with which that flouriſhing ſettlement has been overwhelmed, and from which all their zeal for your glory and the intereſt of the ſtate could not reſcue it.

Injured to the laſt degree, in their honour and in their reputation, by the imputation of the blackeſt crimes, with which Monſieur de Lally, ſince his arrival, has never ceaſed to load them, they preſume to apply to your Majeſty for juſtice; and beſeech your Majeſty to let them know the tribunal you intend to appoint to render it to them.

Signed, DUVAL DE LEYRIT, MORACIN, COURTIN, LE NOIR, DENIS, NICOLAS, DUPLAN, DE LA SELLE, AND LAGRENE'E.

AC-

AUTHENTIC ACCOUNT OF THE CONDEMNATION AND EXECUTION OF COUNT LALLY.

EVER ſince the proper Officer began to report the affairs of Pondichery to the tribunal appointed to examine into and determine them, it every week beſtowed three, and often four, evenings on that buſineſs, from Three till between Nine and Ten. At length, on Saturday the 3d of May 1766, the report ended, and the Attorney General having delivered his thundering concluſions againſt Count Lally, he was, in conſequence thereof, removed, in the night between Sunday the 4th and Monday the 5th, from the Baſtile to the priſon called the Conciergerie, which communicates by different flights of ſtairs with different halls of the Great Court of Parliament. Though it was but One in the morning when he reached the Conciergerie, yet, as he was not prepared for the removal, he refuſed to go to bed. About Seven the ſame morning, he was ſent for to the Great Chamber, which was inveſted on all ſides by the Parliament Guards; and, on his appearing before his Judges, was ordered to give up his red ribband and his croſs, which he thereupon cauſed, with an air of great unconcern, to be taken from off his coat. He was then placed upon the ſtool in order to be interrogated. He no ſooner found himſelf

in

in this ſituation, than joining his hands, and lifting his eyes up to heaven, he cried out; Is this then the reward of forty years ſervice! This interrogatory laſted ſix hours, during which, being greatly fatigued, he was ordered a glaſs of wine and water. It began again at Three in the evening. The Marquis de Buſſy and the Count d'Aché were ſucceſſively confronted with him. They remained but a ſhort time in the Great Chamber; and, on leaving it, were conducted back by the Tipſtaffs. The Court did not break up till Nine the ſame evening, when Count Lally was re-conducted to the Baſtile, by the Parliament Guards and ſeveral companies of the Watch. The next day, the Judges proceeded, by Six o'clock in the morning, to give their opinions, the doors ſtill continuing ſhut; yet had not done till Four in the evening, when they pronounced an arret, which, though very long, contained nothing but a bare recital of the proceedings againſt him, and ſeveral perſons accuſed, likewiſe, of abuſes and crimes in the Eaſt Indies, with their acquittal or condemnation, without ſpecifying the facts, on which ſuch acquittal or condemnation was grounded. The perſons mentioned with him, were as follows: Armand Anthony Francis Fretard de Gadeville, heretofore Quarter Maſter of the King's army in the Indies; James Hugo de Chaponnay, heretofore Captain in the regiment of Lally;

James Pouly, heretofore Provoſt of the King's army in the Indies; Luke Allen, heretofore Major of the King's army in the Indies; William Meagher, Phyſician, heretofore Surgeon of the army of the ſaid Lally in the Indies; John Ferdinand Rochette, heretofore Secretary of the ſaid Lally; Charles Foſſier, heretofore barber and valet de chambre of the ſaid Lally; John Deſchaux, cook; Joſeph Francis de Ferre, Lieutenant in the regiment of the Indies; all, priſoners in the Conciergerie of the Palace; as, alſo, againſt Anne Anthony d'Aché, Lieutenant General of the King's naval armies, Commander of the royal and military Order of St Lewis; James George, Vicomte de Fumel; Auguſtin Anthony Detard de Chamboy; and Charles Francis de Bazin; all priſoners at large; and, moreover, againſt the Abbé Noronha; Friar Freinch; James Philip Hurpy; Joſeph Lewis Dennis Jacquelet; a certain Black called Ramalinga; and two other perſons, Lieutenants in the regiment of Lorrain; accuſed, likewiſe: but abſent and contumacious. The concluſion of this arret, the only part of it which related to the acquittal or condemnation of the accuſed, is as follows:

"The Court, the Great Chamber aſſembled, rders that the ſaid Joſeph Francis de Ferre ſhall pply to the King for Letters of Grace and Re-

Remiſſion; and, without paying any regard to the petitions and applications of the ſaid Thomas Anthony de Lally, which petitions and applications are hereby rejected, or to the exceptions made by him againſt the witneſſes, which exceptions are hereby declared impertinent and inadmiſſible, declares the ſaid Lally, attainted and convicted of having betrayed the intereſts of the King, his dominions, and the Company of the Indies; of abuſes of authority; of vexations and exactions of and againſt the ſubjects of his Majeſty, and others, foreigners, inhabitants of Pondichery; for reparation of which and other crimes reſulting from the Trial, it deprives him of all his titles, honours, and dignities; condemns him to have his head ſevered from his body, on a ſcaffold to be erected, for that purpoſe, in the place de Greve; declares his goods acquired and confiſcated to the King's uſe, after deducting from them the ſum of 10,000 livres, to be laid out in buying bread for the poor of the Conciergerie, and the ſum of 300,000 livres to be diſtributed to the poor inhabitants of Pondichery, in ſuch portions as the King ſhall think proper; adjourns, till after the execution of the ſaid Lally, the deciſion of the accuſations brought againſt Armand Anthony Francis Fretard de Gadeville, James Hugo de Chaponay, and James Pouly; in regard to the accuſation brought againſt the ſaid Luke Allen, orders the parties out of court; acquits the ſaid Anne Anthony

d'Aché of the accuſation brought againſt him; orders that all the expreſſions injurious to the ſaid d'Aché, that occur in the memorials of the ſaid Lally, ſhall be erazed and blotted out as injurious and ſlanderous; a verbal proceſs made thereof; and a copy of ſuch verbal proceſs delivered to the ſaid d'Aché; the whole at the expence of the ſaid Lally, who is likewiſe hereby condemned to pay the coſts of the ſaid d'Aché; likewiſe, diſcharges John George Vicomte de Fumel, Auguſtin Anthony Detard de Chamboy, Charles Francis de Bazin, John Ferdinand Rochette, William Meagher, James Deſchaux, and Charles Foſſier, of the accuſations brought againſt them; orders the ſaid Rochette, Meagher, Deſchaux, and Foſſier to be ſet at liberty; and injoins, on pain of corporal puniſhment, all clerks and goalers to ſtrike their names and accuſations out of their regiſters; poſtpones the determination of the accuſations brought againſt the Abbé Noronha, Friar Freinch, Ramalinga, and two perſons formerly Lieutenants in the regiment of Lorrain, whoſe contumacy has been ſufficiently proved; and orders further informations to be taken againſt them during the ſpace of twelve months, to be then communicated to, and finally pronounced upon by, the Court; orders that all the memorials, &c. of the ſaid Lally, as containing falſhoods and calumnies, ſhall be and remain ſuppreſſed; orders, beſides,

ſides, the preſent ſentence to be printed, publiſhed, and ſtuck up wherever need ſhall be, and copies of it to be ſent to the Colonies.

As ſoon as this ſentence was pronounced, it was ſent to the Vice Chancellor to be by him communicated to his Majeſty.

The Thurſday evening following, at Eleven o'clock, Count Lally was removed from the Baſtile to the Conciergerie of the Palace; and the next day at noon, his ſentence was read to him, and ſoon after delivered by the Parliament's Printer to the public criers. At half an hour paſt Four of the evening of the ſame day, the Count, accompanied by the pariſh prieſt of the pariſh of St. Lewis, who inceſſantly exhorted him, and eſcorted by two hangmen, aſcended a cart, which was followed by the ordinary waggon of the Executioner of High Juſtice. The public were very much ſurpriſed to ſee the Count gagged; and, at firſt, imagined it was done with a view of hindering him to ſpeak; but they were afterwards given to underſtand, that, after his ſentence had been read to him, he had endeavoured to ſwallow his tongue, and had even given himſelf a wound in the breaſt with a pair of compaſſes he had concealed in his night-gown; and that his execution, which was to have been performed by torch-light, had been haſtened on account of this

this wound, and the fury he was in. He was conducted from the Court to the Greve in leſs than half an hour; and, preciſely at Five, aſcended the ſcaffold, where, after taking the gag out of his mouth, he was blindfolded. The hangmen then cut off his head at two blows, threw it with the body into a common hackney coach, and buried both in the church-yard neareſt to the place of execution. He was aged 67.

In about ten days after, the Attorney General of the Treaſury Court of the Parliament repreſented to that Court, that the effects found in Count Lally's apartments were ſo inconſiderable, that, as he had no ſettled reſidence in the kingdom, it might be juſtly ſuſpected great part of his moveable eſtate had been depoſited in other hands; and, without the interpoſition of the Court, might continue ſecreted, to the great loſs, not only of the King to whom Count Lally's effects were confiſcated, but likewiſe of his creditors, and of the poor to whom part of them had been adjudged. Upon this, the ſaid Court immediately iſſued a decree, injoining all perſons having any knowledge of the Count's moveable eſtate, or even papers, to declare to the Court what they knew of them, by the 20th of June, on pain of being conſidered as receivers and detainers of ſtolen goods.

This

This decree made ſuch an impreſſion, that, before the expiration of the term therein limited, no leſs than 1.400,000 livres worth of his effects were returned into Court, great part of which had been left with a gentleman in ſuch a manner, as to furniſh no more than a mere ſurmiſe that they belonged to Count Lally. But, on breaking open an exterior cover, this ſurmiſe appeared to be but too juſtly grounded, to the no ſmall joy, it may be preſumed, of his enemies, as he had defied them to produce the ſhadow of any fortune he had except what he had given the Miniſter a minute of; offering, withal, in caſe they did, to acknowledge himſelf guilty of all the charges brought againſt him.

FINIS.